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E-commerce has offered many opportunities to business firms to minimise their 
operational costs, enhance the customer base and develop better customer relationships.  
These opportunities have also created some challenges, especially those related to identity 
frauds. Therefore, this study aims at understanding identity fraud management and 
analyses existing managerial practices at large e-tailers to suggest improvements. 
To attain the objectives of this study, the qualitative approach of data collection was 
adopted. The interview method of data collection helped to get in-depth information about 
the context under study. The case study research approach was chosen to investigate the 
what, how and why of the issues and practices of identity fraud management. The data 
were collected at three large e-tailers based in the UK, in the course of 33 semi-structured 
interviews. For the analysis, thematic approach was adopted and the results were 
processed using single and cross-case analysis. 
The findings revealed that identity fraud was one of the biggest challenges for e-tailers, 
as they are losing a significant amount of their revenues. Various types and methods of 
identity frauds have been explored. The results show that the case firms have the process 
of managing identity frauds, and the stages of fraud management suggested by Wilhelm 
(2004) were present. It was also found that e-tailers prioritised the technological aspects 
of fraud management, while the developing the skills and awareness of their staff was not 
given required focus, which may be one of the possible reasons for the existing 
deficiencies in fraud management. In fact, this study has found that human factor is a 
critical aspect of fraud management. It has also been established that customer education 
is not carried out effectively, despite the fact that identity theft mostly occurs at the 
customer side. A more active and explicit stance against identity fraud is recommended. 
However, because the e-tailers operate in a highly competitive environment, there is a 
trade-off between putting up extra security layers and the ease for customers for making 
a purchase, making identity fraud management ever more challenging for them.  
Present study contributes to the body of literature by understanding identity fraud 
management and analysing current managerial practices at large e-tailers. Reflecting on 
the theoretical and empirical data, e-tailers are forwarded some novel practices for better 
management of identity frauds. Additionally, e-tailers are also suggested improvements 
in existing managerial practices. This study may help e-tailers to effectively manage 
iii 
 
identity frauds, which will result in reduced fraud losses, better firm image and favourable 
customer relations and offering the society a secure environment for online shopping. 
Finally, a conceptual framework has been suggested for effective management of identity 
frauds in e-tail context. Managerial practices are suggested and guidelines are given at 
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1.1 Background of the Study 
The advancements in technologies have changed the way of life; especially shopping 
habits have been changing quickly. Online shopping is taking the place of high street 
shopping. It saves time and offers a better comparison of products and prices. As a result, 
an increasing number of business organisations is getting involved in e-tailing. The nature 
and methods of frauds are also changing with the changes in selling practices. Identity 
fraud has become a challenging type of fraud for e-tailers, especially in developed 
countries like the USA, the UK and others. 
In the USA, 15.1 million customers suffered identity fraud in 2016 (Javelin Strategy, 
2018). Every two seconds, an American becomes a victim of identity fraud. The number 
of victims increases each year (see Table 2.3). Identity fraud accounts for billions of 
dollars in losses: in 2016 alone they amounted to US$ 16 billion (Javelin Strategy, 2018). 
Such losses, on the one hand, increase the cost of doing online business, on the other 
hand, discourage customers from online shopping; hence identity fraud is a significant 
challenge to e-tailers.  
In the UK, the situation is similar to the USA. Table 2.4 presents the picture of online 
fraud from 2013 to the mid of 2017. In 2013, 177,476 cases of identity-related fraud were 
reported by CIFAS member organisations, which grew to 227,003 in 2015 (CIFAS, 
2018b). The actual number of instances of identity fraud would be higher, as not all online 
business firms are members of CIFAS1. 
The increasing number of IDFs is ever expanding the challenges for e-tailers not only in 
the UK but for throughout the globe. Usually, when calculating the identity fraud losses, 
only direct losses are accounted for. The indirect losses such as reduction in sales, a 
decrease in market share, share price drop, and other legal costs have a significant adverse 
impact on business firms.  
                                                          
1 Credit Industry Fraud Avoidance System (CIFAS) is a non-profit membership organisation, based in the 
UK. Established in 1988, CIFAS is a leading fraud prevention service. It offer fraud database and 
networking opportunities for its member organisations and supports the fraud victims. Currently it has more 
than 350 member organisations. 
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Identity fraud in e-tailing has attracted the attention of academics. The extent literature 
covers different aspects of the problem. Bai and Chen (2013), Guitton (2012), Leasure 
and Zhang (2017) and Shamsi et al. (2016) deal with the behavioural aspect of fraud 
management. The focus of these studies is limited to the deterrence of fraud. In turn, 
studies by Alrashed (2016), Baz, et al. (2017), Prakash et al. (2015), Teh et al. (2016) and 
others investigate the technical aspects of fraud prevention. Research by Al-Jumeily et al. 
(2015), Carneiro et al. (2017) and Dorfleitner and Jahnes (2014) has its emphasis on the 
detection mechanism of IDFs.   
In addition, there have been some studies on comprehensive management of identity 
frauds, such as Jamieson et al. (2007) and Kumar et al. (2007) but they have focused on 
internal fraud from an audit perspective and on developing collaboration in fraud 
management respectively. So far, no significant study has sought to suggest better 
managerial practices in IDFM in e-tail sector. This study aims to bridge this gap. 
1.2 Aim and Objectives of the Study 
This study provides an understanding of identity fraud management and analyses the 
managerial practices in e-tailing, through a qualitative approach and suggest 
improvements. Therefore the objectives of the study are: 
 To explore types of identity fraud facing the e-tail sector in the UK. 
 To investigate the existing managerial practices of IDFM in e-tail sector. 
 To extend the fraud management lifecycle framework (Wilhelm, 2004) for 
improving managerial practices in IDFM in e-tail sector. 
A case study research design was selected for its merits and advantages to achieve the 
above objectives. This approach allowed the researcher to study the real life events and 
managerial practices and to examine phenomena under examination in greater depth (Yin, 
2014). The case study design was also helpful to  know the elements behind management 
actions, revealed organisational culture and human resources management activities 
(Metwally, 2013) and provided information about activities, culture and norms of the 
organisation (Stake, 2013). The case study approach with interviews as the data collection 
method, also helped to interact with the practitioners who dealt with the real world IDFM 
issues to get first-hand information in the problem under investigation (Gibbert et al., 
2008). 
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As a research method, case study incorporates a variety of means of data collection. As 
this study was aimed at analysing managerial practices, an in-depth investigation of 
existing practices was employed to establish “how” and “why” of IDFM issues, for which 
qualitative data collection method was a better choice (Yin, 2014). Data was collected 
through a series of semi-structured interviews held at three large e-tailers in the UK. 
Organisations for this study were selected on the basis of replication logic, reflecting the 
fact that in multiple case study research cases are not selected to be the representatives of 
the whole but for similar (literal) or contrary (theoretical) results (Yin, 2014). For this 
study, the cases were selected for similarities; with only three cases, these are to be 
selected for predicted similar results (Yin, 2014). Although, the selection of the case firms 
was not tactical as the most of these large e-tailers have shared characteristics in relation 
to identity fraud issues and management. However, the selection criteria was set as; a) the 
firm must be among the top 25 businesses engaged in online retailing, b) must be based 
in the UK and c) must be an independent organisation and not a market place.  
Questions for the interviews were designed to reflect the findings obtained during the 
analysis of the extant literature on the fraud management lifecycle framework proposed 
by Wilhelm (2004). A pilot case study was conducted to test the interview questions, data 
collection techniques, time management and data analysis methods. All in all, 33 
interviews were conducted at three firms.  
This study used the thematic analysis approach, which offers flexibility in developing 
themes by thoroughly reading and re-reading the data set. The managerial practices could 
also be extracted through in-depth study of the data; such approach helped in exploring 
and analysing the managerial practices. 
1.3 Significance of this Study 
This study helps to identify and understand the weaknesses and limitations of managerial 
practices that exist at each stage of IDFM. Based on the analysis process and reflections 
from the literature, guidelines are suggested to improve IDFM in large e-tailers in the UK. 
The analysis of the fraud management framework undertaken in this thesis will help large 
e-tailers to improve the existing managerial practices and adopt better ones to enhance 
the effectiveness of IDFM. In accordance with the stages of fraud management, e-tailers 
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are offered a number of recommendations to help business managers adopt a holistic 
appraoch for better control on losses associated with identity frauds.  
Better managerial practices will also help the e-tailers to establish favourable customer 
relations and provide safe online shopping environment, providing these e-tailers with a 
competitive advantage. Unlike some other studies, this research anchors its 
recommendation in the analysis of a comprehensive set of activities at each stage of the 
framework, covering human, technological and procedural aspects of IDFM. This study 
also provides insights in the development, communication and awareness of and 
compliance with IDFM policies, which may help managers to ensure strategic actions 
towards the achievement of business objectives. 
This study offers suggestions for a balanced and appropriate management focus on 
managerial practices at each stage of IDFM. The findings reveal that generally, the e-
tailers are not giving proper attention to some of the stages of fraud management, which 
undermines its effectiveness. Importantly, this research provides evidence that calls for 
putting more emphasis on human aspects of IDFM. In particular, maintaining staff 
awareness and professional training are identified as the means of increasing the 
efficiency of fraud management.  
The role of customer education is also highlighted. Finally, tactical practices are advised 
to show the firms’ attitude to safeguard their customers and taking legal actions against 
fraudsters. E-tailers are also advised to publicise their measures against the fraudsters and 
send messages to the society that can reinforce customers’ confidence in the safety of 
online shopping and the potency of threat for fraudsters, which simultaneously may 
enhance fraud deterrence and develop customer trust. 
With the help of the recommended framework, e-tailers should be able to design and 
modify the managerial practices to improve the methods, procedures and policies, 
strategies and tools of IDFM. It will also help the e-tailers to enhance the human abilities 
to manage identity frauds, through feedback, training, knowledge and skill development. 
Like other studies, this research has some limitations. Firstly, the present study relies on 
data collected from a limited number of large e-tail firms, so the results of this study may 
not be generalizable to the whole population of e-tailers. Therefore, research based on 
survey would help in generalising the outcomes of this research. Secondly, the present 
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research used qualitative method of data collection, with limited number of respondents, 
although, the qualitative data give more detail and in-depth insight into the problem under 
study but it does not offer testing hypothesis or propositions, so in future qualitative 
studies are suggested to cover this limitation of present study.  
Another limitation, which may have significant impact on outcomes of future research, is 
the size of case firms and the economies these operate in. Present study focused on large 
firms operating in a developed economy, whereas small and medium e-tailers and those 
operating in developing economies may have variant practices for managing identity 
frauds, because of financial, cultural different managerial and economic conditions. 
Therefore, more studies are suggested encompassing different economic conditions and 
various sizes. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis consists of six chapters and is structured as follows.  
Chapter 2:  This chapter provides an in-depth insight into the identity fraud types and 
existing body of knowledge on its management. Various frameworks are 
explored and analysed, and the managerial practices at each stage of IDFM 
are presented. A critical analysis of the extant research is given, and a research 
gap is identified.  
Chapter 3: In this chapter, the research philosophies and methods are presented. The 
research design is explained and justified. 
Chapter 4: The data collected from the case firms are presented and analysed in the 
context of the extant literature. For each company guidelines are developed 
to improve their practices of IDFM.  
Chapter 5: The chapter presents a cross-case analysis of the collected results. It also 
discusses the managerial practices at each firm. The extended framework is 
explained and improvements are suggested at each stage of the framework. 
The novelty of this research is explicated in this chapter. 
Chapter 6: This chapter summarises the research outcomes and offers a brief on the 
accomplishment of this study. The key finds are highlighted and the extended 
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framework is described. Finally, the research limitations are specified and 
avenues for future research are suggested. 
The rest of this thesis explains these chapters in detail. 
  





Literature review is a critical part of an academic research. It syndicates outcomes of 
many studies producing a holistic conceptual frame for a study. It helps to categorise, and 
investigate the structure and dynamics of change within a body of literature (Nairn et al., 
2007). The literature review process starts with articles focusing on the significant facts 
on fraud and managerial practices in broader contexts.  
In the next phase, articles focusing on the analytical approaches to managerial practices 
specific to fraud are included. For theoretical reflections, articles on theories of fraud 
management are also reviewed. These highlight mostly the behavioural aspects of fraud 
management and help to understand its broader aspects. At the final stage, articles related 
to managerial practices and frameworks in fraud management are reviewed. This allows 
to get a comprehensive picture of identity fraud management covering all aspects of 
identity fraud management.  
This chapter discusses various concepts regarding fraud management. The types and the 
impact of identity fraud are examined as well as the role of managerial practices in fraud 
management. The concept of the fraud management is established, and stages of fraud 
management are explained. This chapter also scrutinises various frameworks suggested 
for effective fraud management. Finally, the framework selection process is described, 
and a research gap is identified.  
2.2 Understanding Identity Fraud in E-tail Sector 
The shopping preferences are changed with the introduction of internet as 82% of internet 
users in the UK prefer online shopping (Xiao, 2017). Due to this shift in shopping, 
traditional businesses have entered into online business and many new online businesses 
are also set up. The online business offers many advantages to the entrepreneurs 
especially related to investment and low cast of business operations. On the other hand 
online shopping provide many opportunities to the buyers, which a traditional market 
cannot offer.  Due to these reasons, online business is fast growing especially in the UK. 
These opportunities of e-tail business do come with a cost of online frauds. Identity frauds 
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make more than half of these crimes (CIFAS, 2018b). Identity fraud (referred as IDF in 
the remaining document) is the fraud committed by using the stolen or fabricated identity 
information to make an online purchase or to skip financial charges. It is the most 
common type of fraud in online retail organisations (CIFAS, 2015) and sometimes termed 
as identity theft.  
2.2.1 Identity Fraud  
The term identity in this study refers to any information specific to an individual or an 
organisation such as the name and date of birth, as well as information contained in 
personal documents such as the driving licence, passport, identity card and others. It also 
includes bank details, credit and debit card numbers, passcodes, passwords, any account 
information with organisations, tax returns, health card numbers, or any specific data that 
make it possible to identify an individual or organisation. IDF is a type of fraud attempted 
by using stolen or fictitious identity information. IDFs are committed to gain money, 
purchase goods and services and avoid payment obligation through stolen or fabricated 
identity.  
2.2.2 Methods of Stealing Identity Information 
The methods of identity theft can be divided into two broad sections, online and 
traditional methods. Online or cyber-identity theft occurs with the help of information 
and communication technologies; these methods are highly organised and need 
technological expertise (Roberts et al., 2013). Some common methods of cyber-identity 
theft are phishing, key logging, malware and social engineering2. These are the 
technology-based methods, so countermeasures need technological solutions; 
management here can support IT professionals to counter such fraud attempts.  
The traditional methods of identity theft are mostly non-technical. These include theft of 
mail (which may contain personal or credit card information), lost purse, shoulder 
surfacing (when someone tries to peak over the victim's shoulders to get identity 
                                                          
2 Phishing is a cybercrime involving contacting the targeted individuals through emails, phone calls or text 
messages for the purpose of extracting sensitive personal data. A key logger is a software which records 
every key stroke of a computer, mobile phone or such other devices. The key logger is installed into the 
target device through different methods and the hacker than knows every key stroke; thus identity 
information is stolen to commit frauds. Malware (in short for malicious software) is a software, designed 
to damage or gain authorised access to a computer system, to get identity information with a view to 
committing IDFs.  In turn, social engineering refers to identity theft through social media. 
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information) and friendly frauds. The latter occurs when a fraudster gets personal 
information from a friend or a family member by abusing the existing relations of trust. 
Mostly traditional attempts of identity theft occur with customers, but effective customer 
education can help to prevent such information theft. IDFs are also committed using 
fabricated information, in which the fraudsters make fictitious identity and try to use it 
for personal gain. 
2.3 Impact of Identity Frauds on E-Tailers 
Identity fraud losses are a growing concern, especially for online business organisations. 
In the USA, 15.4 million customers suffered identity fraud in 2016 (Javelin Strategy, 
2018). Every two seconds, an American becomes a victim of identity fraud. The number 
of victims increases each year (see Table 2.1). Identity fraud accounts for billions of 
dollars in loss.  
Table 2.1 shows that USA business firms are suffering significant losses on account of 
IDFs. The table also presents the amount of losses in IDFs from 2014-2016.  Such amount 
of losses, on the one hand, discourages customers from online shopping while, on the 
other hand, increases the cost of doing online business. 
Table 2. 1 The impact of identity fraud on US business 
Number of Identity fraud victims 
Amount lost to identity fraud (Billion 
USD) 
2014 2015  2016 2014 2015 2016 
12.7 13.1 15.4 16.2 15.3 16.0 
Source: Javelin Strategy (2018) 
In the UK, the situation is similar to the USA. Table 2.2 presents the picture of online 
fraud in 2013-2016. The table shows that identity related frauds are the leading type of 
frauds, and increasing year by year. The data on IDFs from CIFAS member organisations 
is shown in the following table. 
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Table 2. 2 The nature and scale of frauds reported by CIFAS member 
organisations 
Fraud Type Number of frauds 
2013 2014 2015 2016 
Asset Conversion Fraud 301 323 258 381 
Application Fraud 38,573 37,960 41,186 31,559 
False Insurance Claims 342 324 366 496 
Facility/Account Takeover Fraud 30,349 18,771 15,497 22,525 
Identity Fraud 108,554 113,838 169,592 172,919 
Misuse of Facility Fraud 42,956 105,779 94,001 96,803 
Total 221,075 276,993 320,900 324,683 
Source: (CIFAS, 2018a; CIFAS, 2018b; CIFAS, 2018c) 
Identity-related fraud makes a major contribution to overall business frauds in the UK. 
Table 2.2 contains data on the share of identity-related fraud over the last five years. The 
Table shows that the number of IDF is continuously increasing. Such a large number of 
identity frauds is a severe concern to online business firms in the UK, as business firms 
bear most of these losses (Brody et al., 2007). Furthermore, the data on identity related 
frauds trends and it share in total frauds is presented in the following table. 
Table 2. 3 Identity-related frauds 2013-2017 
Fraud type 2013 
% of total 
frauds 
2014 
% of total 
frauds 
2015 
% of total 
frauds 
2016 
% of total 
frauds 
2017 
% of total 
frauds 
(Jan-Jul) 









































Source: (CIFAS, 2018a; CIFAS, 2018b; CIFAS, 2018c) 
Table 2.3 represents the identity related frauds and their trends. The firms calculate 
application and account takeover frauds separately from other identity frauds so for the 
purpose of this study these are added to give a comprehensive picture of IDFs. The table 
shows that IDFs are continuously at inclining trend. It also reveals that the number of 
IDFs has significantly increased in last four years except 2014. The CIFAS reports show 
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that fraud in e-tail sector is growing at higher rate as compared to other sectors;  it 
increased by 28% from 2013 to 2016 (CIFAS, 2018a; CIFAS, 2018b).  
According to CIFAS (2018c), IDFs (excluding the account takeover and application 
fraud) for first six months of 2017 increased by 5%, from the corresponding period the 
year before, accounting for 56% of the total number of frauds reported by its member 
organisations. CIFAS also reports a sharp rise in IDF in e-tail sector. These figures 
confirm that IDF is a growing challenge for e-tailers. The figures presented in the above 
tables are limited to the CIFAS member organisations, so the actual number of IDFs may 
be higher than these. Additionally, the CIFAS report only covers large organisations, 
whilst medium and small organisations are not included. IDFs suffered by these e-tailers 
are mostly not reported at all. 
E-tail business is one of the sectors most affected by online frauds. According to the 
public / private sector partnership Get Safe Online (getsafeonline, 2017), the UK 
businesses have lost over one billion pound for the period 03/2015 to 03/2016 to online 
frauds. It has also been confirmed that IDFs constitute more than half of the total online 
frauds. Mostly, when calculating the identity fraud losses, only direct losses are accounted 
for. The indirect losses such as: reduction in sales, a decrease in market share, share price 
drop, and other legal costs have significant adverse impact on business firms.  
Online identity fraud trend is changing and the e-tail sector is getting more attention of 
fraudsters as the number of IDFs in the UK e-tail sector has grown by 49% from 2016 to 
2017 (CIFAS, 2018b).  Such trend shows that IDF in e-tailing is getting more significance 
as it has negative implications for them. These frauds result in a significant business losses 
thus lead to reduction of the market value and net profits. In the given scenario, 
management of IDFs is also getting more attention from the stakeholders of e-tailers. 
Identity fraud is also attracting the focus of academics, as no significant work has been 
undertaken (Amasiatu and Shah, 2018). The literature on IDFM especially on e-tail sector 
is at the infancy, thus, leaving a significant gap in the literature on how to effectively 
manage these frauds in e-tail sector (Amasiatu and Shah, 2018). There have been some 
studies (Alrashed, 2016; Baz et al., 2017; Boss et al., 2015; Teh et al., 2016) on 
technological aspects of preventing and detecting identity frauds but the author could not 
find a significant literature on holistic management of identity frauds in e-tail sector, 
encompassing every aspect of fraud management. Thus, this study would help to bridge 
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this gap by understanding IDFM, analysing managerial practices and suggest e-tailers 
improvements to enhance their understanding on IDFs, controlling fraud losses, 
maintaining better customer relationships and maintain the growth of online shopping. 
The data shows that online organisations are suffering from significant financial and non-
financial losses because of identity frauds. The identity frauds are also a serious obstacle 
to the development of online business markets, as lack of customers’ trust in online 
purchasing hinders growth in online business activities. The extant literature has multiple 
studies on fraud management, but these are not focused on managerial practices in e-tail 
sector. Therefore, there is a need to focus on managerial practices to effectively manage 
the IDFs. 
2.4 Significance of Management in Dealing with Identity Frauds 
Identity fraud is one of the biggest challenges to e-tail organisations, so the sole 
responsibility of managing the fraud lies with the management of business organisations. 
Hannagan and Bennet (2008 p.05), define management as “the process of achieving 
organisational goals and objectives effectively and efficiently through planning, 
organising, leading and controlling the human, material and financial resources 
available to it”. Management deals with the day-to-day and strategic business issues by 
utilising the organisational resources.  
The role of management is critical to the success of any organisation, which is reflected 
in the market position of the organisation. An efficient management system is pivotal to 
the success of organisations. In the age of close competition, only organisations with 
excellent and sustainable management system can perform better. Therefore, each 
organisation should seek to develop a specialised management system for sustainability 
and excellence (Latham, 2012). A good management system entails better managerial 
practices, which have significance for superior firm performance (Bloom and Van 
Reenen, 2007). Despite the recognised importance of management systems, the author 
could not find any study analysing the managerial practices in IDF management in the 
UK e-tail sector, which is the aim of this study. 
2.5 Managerial Practices in Fraud Management 
Effective identity fraud management would be a competitive advantage because if an 
organisation is better at managing IDFs, the fraud tends to move to the competitors 
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(Becker et al., 2010). Identity fraud management consists of peoples, processes and 
technology. Managerial practices have a significant impact on these three elements of 
fraud management. In an organisational context, peoples are a critical resource for online 
organisations. HRM practices such as recruitment and selection, training and performance 
review have a significant impact on the management of identity frauds in online 
organisations.  
Organisational processes and internal control systems are developed by the management 
of organisations to ensure a required outcome of the employees’ activities. Thus, the 
processes involved in the management of identity frauds are also designed by managers, 
but literature is mute on how managers establish such processes and internal control 
system to manage IDFs effectively. Managerial practices related to the management of 
identity fraud are critical for its effectiveness, which can determine the organisational 
standing on such a challenging issue, but no study is focused on analysing these practices 
to suggest improvements. 
Online business is based on technology and the decisions related to the acquisition, 
deployment, functioning and evaluation of the technology are at the disposal of the 
management of organisations. These decisions are extremely important. Therefore, 
managerial practices on decisions regarding investments, technology acquisition, 
deployment, policies on their use and training to the end users, need to be analysed. 
Before moving to the analysis of managerial practices in identity fraud management, it is 
necessary to know what constitutes fraud management, as without knowing its boundary 
it is not possible to set managerial practices in the current domain.          
2.6 Understanding Fraud Management 
As already mentioned, there has been no research on the management of identity frauds 
in online business organisations, especially in the management context. However, fraud 
is an old activity, so the literature is rich in fraud management activities, but the contexts 
are deviating from the current study. Therefore, to attain the aim of this study, it is 
necessary to study the existing practices for fraud management in related contexts.  
Regarding the behavioural aspects of fraud management, it is a well-established argument 
that the potential fraudsters can be deterred from fraud by the fear of being caught and 
punished (Alanezi and Brooks, 2014), as the first stage of fraud management. The concept 
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of changing the behaviour of potential fraudsters comes from the deterrence theory. It has 
been widely studied in various contexts and is proved to be significant to control the 
deviant behaviour.  
The root of deterrence theory lies in the fear appeal theories. The fear appeals influence 
attitude, intention and behaviour of fraudsters and may prevent a fraud (Tannenbaum et 
al., 2015). So far, the significance of this deterrence has been confirmed in various 
contexts mainly in relation to accounting and audit (Dorminey et al., 2012) and employee 
theft (Hollinger and Clark, 1983). In the identity theft domain Kumar et al. (2007) suggest 
that fear appeal do deter identity fraudsters, as it hinders the IDF to move from a threat to 
an attempt. So far, the literature shows that the significance of deterrence has been 
investigated and found to be an active element of fraud management. Although, 
deterrence has an impact on the fraudsters’ behaviour, still frauds are attempted. The 
literature is missing on how e-tail organisations deter the identity frauds and what 
practices they have adopted in this sphere, how these practices work and what are their 
limitations. So far, research is needed to analyse managerial practices for IDF deterrence 
in e-tail organisations to suggest improvements 
Although, deterrence has a significant impact on fraud attempts, in spite of this the frauds 
are still attempted. One of the major reasons, as suggested by Cressey (1950) in Fraud 
Triangle Theory, is the existing of an opportunity of committing a fraud, which refers to 
the system’s weaknesses to prevent and detect frauds. Because of this, fraudsters can 
escape from being caught and punished. What follows is that in addition to deterrence, 
organisations should also have systems to prevent and detect attempted frauds.  
To safeguard from fraud attempts an effective prevention is a significant tool, which is 
based on information security systems and the organisational arrangements (Devos and 
Pipan, 2009). For effective prevention, there should be IT-based solutions (Devos and 
Pipan, 2009), preventive technologies to fail any attempt of information theft and IDF 
(Boyer, 2007). A sound prevention system is an effective anti-fraud action (Prabowo, 
2011). So far, it may be deducted that prevention is a critical element of fraud 
management.  
For online transactions, customers use credentials to access their accounts, to prevent 
unauthorised access, e-tail organisation needs an effective authentication system to 
validate such information (Usman and Shah, 2013). Such credential information are 
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stored on the business database.  These databases are the hot target for fraudsters to steal 
the customers’ information, so information security is critical to prevent identity 
information theft (Sanchez, 2012).  
On the other hand, these systems are also the interacting point for the customers/ fraudster 
and the organisations, so there is a need to have an effective system to prevent 
unauthorised access to the customer account. Additionally, for the security of 
organisational databases and communication systems from any identity theft or data 
breach, an effective prevention system is inevitable (Alonso-Paulí and Pérez-Castrillo, 
2012; Bishop, 2004; Koskosas, 2013). Thus, prevention is a critical stage in fraud 
management. 
Although, measures are there to prevent identity fraud attacks, however, the literature 
findings reveal that fraudsters may use genuine customers’ information. As a result, some 
fraudulent transactions still pass through the security net. These transactions are usually 
based on genuine but stolen information, so organisations need to implement systems to 
detect these suspicious transactions as the next stage after prevention, in fraud 
management (Chang and Chang, 2011). Detection is a critical stage to fight online fraud 
(Devos and Pipan, 2009) as without an effective detection system it is impossible to 
control the online frauds (Kundu et al., 2009). 
The literature suggests that a fraud attempt is merely a result of an assumption of the lack 
of detection, Therefore, organisations should have an effective detection system, which 
helps to create the fear of being caught and punished (Cressey, 1950). Dorminey et al. 
(2012) in a meta-analysis of white-collar frauds conclude that detection is an anti-fraud 
response to fraudsters. Thus, the extant literature suggests organisations to have an 
effective detection system to manage identity frauds if deterrence and prevention fail.  
Once the fraud is detected, the next stage is to stop it before completion or to minimise 
the fraud effects and prevent it from reoccurring, in the fraud management domain, it is 
called mitigation stage (Jamieson et al., 2007; Kumar et al., 2007). Sometimes, 
prevention and mitigation terms are used interchangeably, but in fraud management, 
mitigation is a distinct concept and applies to the practices in minimising the effects of 
fraud (Wilhelm, 2004). The purpose is to adopt the managerial practices, which can help 
to minimise the extent of fraud losses or to discontinue it. Mitigation is a significant stage 
of fraud management that allows to keep the effects of detected fraud to the minimum by 
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verifying and validating the customer identifies. It also includes the recovery of customer 
credit history and information sharing (Jamieson et al., 2007; Kumar et al., 2007; 
Wilhelm, 2004).  
Once fraud has been detected and mitigated, it is necessary to identify its type, methods 
and means, and the reasons why it passed through the prevention system. In fraud 
management, this set of practices is called fraud analysis. It helps the organisations to 
assess fraud risks and to estimate the effectiveness of prevention and detection systems 
to counter the frauds attempts (Brody et al., 2007). Such analysis help enhancing 
efficiency at each stage of fraud management and develops guidelines for its 
effectiveness. These guidelines are forwarded as fraud management policies and 
technological evaluations. Thus, the analysis stage works, once a fraud has been 
attempted, whether successful or not and suggest measures to improve fraud management 
process.  
At each stage of fraud management, anti-fraud policies create layers of protection for the 
organisation and its employees and to have no policy on fraud is a bad strategy (Verdon, 
2006). Development of an anti-fraud policy would help to protect the personal 
information that may be used in identity frauds (Calvasina et al., 2007) and such policies 
are meant to improve the effectiveness of identity theft management (Kumar et al., 2007). 
In addition to the development of anti-fraud policies, there should be an efficient 
communication of policies and guidelines on how to comply with (Prabowo, 2012). 
Therefore, it may be deduced that anti-fraud policies and their communication and 
compliance are a significant stage of fraud management.  
The above-mentioned fraud management stages focus on actions before and during the 
fraud attempt, but successful frauds require further investigations and prosecution to 
recover the fraud losses and to get the fraudsters punished. Although, fraud investigations 
is a function of law enforcing agencies, businesses have a part to play. For example, they 
may help by collecting and preserving evidence in close partnership with the law 
enforcement agencies (Gogolin and Jones, 2010). Business organisations should 
investigate fraud occurrences and collect as much evidence as possible for a successful 
prosecution of the fraudsters.  
Investigation and prosecution are critical in fraud management. Successful prosecutions 
help organisations to recover fraud losses. Secondly, an effective prosecution will 
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disperse the warning message to potential fraudsters (deterrence) of being caught and 
punished. Thirdly, it helps organisations to uphold their image against fraudsters, and 
finally, a better customer relationship is maintained. The success of prosecutions depends 
on investigations, so organisations should be involved in investigations to develop and 
effective coordination with law enforcing agencies.  
So far, the discussion has highlighted the stages of fraud management - deterrence, 
detection, prevention, mitigation, analysis, policy, prevention and prosecution of frauds. 
These stages have also been confirmed to be significant for managing fraud in banking, 
insurance, and credit card issuing companies (Wilhelm, 2004), in internal fraud and audit 
(Jamieson et al., 2007), in collaborating for combating identity theft (Kumar et al., 2007) 
and in first-party fraud (Amasiatu, 2016). By contrast, Ijeoma and Aronu (2013) argue 
that a holistic fraud management, consisting of these stages is not effective in internal 
fraud management in small and medium conventional business organisations in Nigeria. 
Based on the literature, this study assumes that these eight stages are significant in IDFM 
in e-tail sector. Therefore, this study analyses managerial practices at each stage of IDFM 
and suggests improvements at each stage, which will confirm the significance of these 
stages in IDFM in e-tail sector.  
These eight stages are not single actions but sets of various practices. A stage is “one of 
a series of positions or stations one above the other” or “a period or step in a process” 
(Merriam Webster, 2018). Both definitions are applicable in the context of this study, as 
the stages of fraud management follow one-an-other. Such as deterrence comes before 
any fraud attempt, and prevention works when a fraud is attempted. If prevention fails, 
the next stage is to detect the fraud, and next is mitigation to verify the customer identities 
and reduce the fraud impact. Analysis stage diagnoses frauds to know its methods and 
trends and to evaluate the other stages, which failed to stop the fraud and report to senior 
managers to develop and update fraud policies. Finally, investigations take place to 
collect evidence and fix responsibilities of frauds, which is followed by prosecution. 
For superior anti-fraud performance, a coherent strategy should be adopted rather than 
focusing on one or more activities (Amasiatu, 2016). So far, the literature suggests 
adopting a more holistic approach to fraud management (Button, 2011; Wilhelm, 2004).  
Thus, it may be deduced from the above discussion that a comprehensive fraud 
management consists of eight stages. Therefore, the next step is to review the extant 
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literature for any fraud management framework comprising these stages. This is 
necessary to understand the relation and role of each stage in fraud management and 
establish a balance of focus among these stages. An appropriate framework would also 
suggest the best composition of these stages, and a balance between these stages. The 
literature review on fraud management frameworks also helps the selection of an 
appropriate one to extend in this study.  
A systematic review approach was adopted to explore frameworks of fraud management 
consisting of these stages. At the exploration stage, the database Business Sources 
Complete and the search engine Google Scholar were used to identify such frameworks. 
Furthermore, to make the search more specific, name of each stage was also used in 
parallel to the key words framework, fraud and management. The search engine returned 
153 items and the database 1862 items. Next each item was carefully checked for the 
presence of any of these stages, and any study with these stages was selected for further 
investigation.  
Most studies were focused on one, two or three stages. Even some frameworks included 
three or four stages, but these were not appropriate enough to meet the objectives of a 
comprehensive fraud management. In the end, the sorting process produced only four 
studies suggesting the frameworks based on already mentioned fraud management stages. 
It is also an objective of this study to extend a  framework, so selection criteria are 
mentioned, and the appropriateness of the selected framework is also explained. These 
frameworks are detailed in next section. 
2.7 Fraud Management Frameworks and the Selection Process 
A framework is an arrangement of parts that gives something its basic form (Merriam 
Webster, 2018).  Because fraud management is a proces, its parts are madeup of stages, 
which are deterrence, prevention, detection, mitigation, analysis, policy, investigation and 
prosecution. The term framework has been used to describe any combination of these 
eight stages. The literature search has identified four such frameworks which differ in 
how stages are organised and managed.  
These are Role Based Framework (Shah and Okeke, 2011), Action-Event Identity Theft 
Management Framework (Kumar et al., 2007), Identity Fraud Enterprise Management 
Framework (Jamieson et al., 2007), and Fraud Management Lifecycle Framework 
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(Wilhelm, 2004). Although, all these frameworks have been developed for fraud 
management, none was designed specifically for e-tail activities. The next task, therefore, 
is to establish which one would best fulfil the objective of this study to extend it to IDFM 
in the e-tail sector. The selection criteria are discussed in the next section.  
2.7.1 Framework Selection Criteria 
Selection of an appropriate IDFM framework is critical. Surprisingly, the literature has 
nothing to offer in this regard except for a study on first party frauds by Amasiatu (2016). 
The selection criteria proposed by Amasiatu (2016) are adopted in this study. The selected 
framework should be functional, adoptable and comprehensive to cover all the necessary 
stages of fraud management, provide support for ongoing improvement, be empirically 
derived, each stage/step should have a clear focus and the stages should be interconnected. 
Finally, the selected framework should be based on fraud management or related context. 
The purpose of such exercise is to select an appropriate framework for extension in IDFM. 
The extended framework will provide the e-tail organisations, a coherent strategy with a 
comprehensive approach for IDFM. 
a) Functionality: It is the capability of or suitability for being functional (Merriam 
Webster, 2018). Being functional is to be capable of fulfilling its objectives.  
b) Adoptability: It refers to taking up and using something (Merriam Webster, 2018).  
It relates to the flexibility of a framework, which allows it to modify for the given 
purpose without losing its effectiveness. 
c) Comprehensiveness: This relates to covering something entirely or broadly 
(Merriam Webster, 2018). The holistic nature of the framework is necessary to 
address each aspect of fraud management. Therefore, the comprehensive 
framework should contain all the stages of fraud management as mentioned 
above, as a holistic framework should involve all necessary activities to address 
the problem (Furlan and Bajec, 2008)  
d) Support for Ongoing Improvements: Performance monitoring and evaluation are 
critical to the success of any framework that helps to improve its performance 
(Pergola and Sprung, 2005). Such continuous monitoring ensures that the aim of 
fraud management is achieved (Furlan and Bajec, 2008). 
e) Empirically Derived: Such frameworks are based on primary data, so their 
validity is less doubtful (Amasiatu, 2016).  
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f) Focused Stages:  It relates to the quality of actions and practices at each stage of 
the framework. They should be distinguishable, as the ambiguity in actions would 
lead to the confusion between various actors in fraud management (Wilhelm, 
2004).  
g) Interconnectedness: The stages of the selected framework should be 
interconnected, as some practices need close connection and frequent 
communication for the effective performance of the framework.  
h) Context Relatedness:  The context of the framework is important, as a framework 
in the related context would better fulfil the aim of its extension.  
Potential frameworks for this study are discussed below in relation to the selection 
criteria. 
2.7.2 Role Based Framework (RBF) (Shah and Okeke, 2011) 
The Role Based Framework (Shah and Okeke, 2011) focuses on the prevention of the 
internal identity theft. The framework synthesises the existing preventive measures 
against identity theft within organisations. It is suggests the responsibility of management 
at each level of authority and that of the law enforcing agencies. The fraud management 
practices are divided into three categories according to the management levels, and each 
is suggested a set of practices to perform.  
The strategic practices such as; identity theft risk management and policy related issues 
are linked to the top management of organisations. The framework suggests that the top 
management should develop the prevention and deterrence policies that would drive the 
behaviour of the employees towards the achievement of organisational goals and take 
disciplinary actions to correct the deviant behaviour.   
The middle management is engaged in developing training programmes to minimise the 
chances of human errors and help them to comply with the policies. Managers at this level 
should directly involve in the identity theft incident management and analyse the 
loopholes in the systems, causes of incidents and fix the responsibilities. Such practices 
would help to enhance the performance of technological systems and redress the 
shortcomings of the control systems.  
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The contribution of operation managers is critical for effective identity theft prevention. 
They are directly involved in day-to-day business activities. The framework suggests that 
the front-line managers have a direct influence on and frequent interaction with the 
employees so that they can play a vital role in identity theft detection and investigation. 
The operation level management also has a significant role in the free flow of 
communication between the management and the employees, which helps to flow the 
objectives, directions and policies right at the target. 
 
Figure 2. 1 Role-Based Framework (Shah and Okeke, 2011) 
The Role-Based Framework is meant to prevent the internal identity theft in online 
organisations. The role-based framework has not been tested in any empirical study. So 
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its functionality is not proven.  Its adoptability is also not validated by any study, as it has 
not be used in any empirical research. Managerial practices at each stage of fraud 
management are fixed with any level of the management, such as policy is set top-level 
management practice, while literature suggests the involvement of the operational staff. 
Thus, the Role Based Framework is rigid with managerial practices fixed at each level.  
Furthermore, it is not a comprehensive one as two important stages, i.e. mitigation and 
prosecution are missing, and without these stages, effective fraud management may not 
be ensured.  
The framework suggests for ongoing improvements, which make it matching with one of 
the criteria. The framework does not focus on the fraud management stages, but the role 
of each management level is highlighted, which makes the stages secondary. The stages 
of the fraud management also lack the interconnection that would negatively affect the 
performance of fraud management. Finally, the framework is focused on internal identity 
theft prevention only, which limits its context, while identity fraud management needs 
broader context for its effectiveness. Therefore, the Role Based Framework is not 
considered to be used as underpinning framework for an extension.   
2.7.3 Action-Event Identity Theft Management Framework (Kumar et al., 2007).  
Although, Kumar et al., (2007) use the term identity theft, they actually analyse the 
activities and stages of identity fraud management. Their research is focused on the 
collaboration of organisations to combat the identity theft and touches the activities in 
identity fraud management. The framework is designed to respond to four events 
(challenges) of identity frauds, which are threat, attempt, occurrence and loss.   
The threat represents the possibilities of fraud attempts from various internal and external 
sources. For that, deterrent activities are suggested to control the behaviour of potential 
fraudsters through fear appeal. The attempt refers to an attack on information systems or 
personal devices to get personal information and account credentials with a motive to use 
that for identity frauds. The prevention activities are recommended, and some preventive 
measures are suggested to fail any information theft attempt.  
Identity theft occurs when an attack breaks the security measures, and the fraudulent 
transaction is successful. The detection and mitigation activities are suggested to coup 
with a successful identity theft attempt. In the case of failure in protecting the identity 
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information, anything that happens because of the use of stolen information, either 
financial or non-financial is termed as a loss. To cope with these challenges, the 
framework proposes the analysis, policy and prosecution stages.  
The action-event identity theft management framework offers practices to manage the 
identity theft irrespective of any specific context. Although, the framework offers some 
actions at each stage of the identity theft management yet, it lacks a detail of practices at 
each step of the framework. The identity theft management stages are also borrowed from 
the Wilhelm (2004).  
 
Figure 2. 2 Action-Event Identity Theft Management Framework (Kumar et al., 
2007). 
Nevertheless, it may be a workable framework, but it has some limitations to be the 
appropriate one based on the selection criteria. The framework may be functional and 
adoptable, as it is already developed for identity fraud management. On the 
comprehensiveness, it lacks the investigation stage. The absence of an investigation stage 
would negatively affect the other stages such as prosecution and deterrence. First, without 
investigations, there will be no evidence to prove the fraudsters guilty of identity frauds, 
the arrest of fraudsters would not be possible, which is necessary for prosecution and 
creating the fear of being caught and punished. Finally, the framework does not support 
the communication of analysis results, which results in lack of ongoing improvements in 
identity fraud management.  
The framework is developed for collaboration among the stakeholders of identity 
information security. It is a set of suggestions not based on any empirical data or 
empirically tested. Although, the stages of the framework are focused, for developing 
colloboration among the organisaitons however, these stages are also working in a 
sequence without any interaction, which hinders the way for back and forth information 
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flow to improve the efficiency of these stages, so it fails on the interconnectedness. 
Finally, although it is context related, however, missing of a significant stage, lack of 
empirical validity and absence of the support for ongoing improvements, make it 
inappropriate to extend it in the current context.     
2.7.4 Identity Fraud Enterprise Management Framework (Jamieson et al., 2007) 
The framework incorporates three phases: anticipatory, reactionary and remediation. The 
anticipatory phase is a precaution to identity frauds, which includes stages of the policy, 
risk assessment, deterrence and prevention. The second phase comes into action once the 
fraud occurs. This phase consists of fraud detection, mitigation, analysis, incident 
management and review of the incident. The detection activities help the organisation to 
uncover any fraud attempt and take actions to minimise the effects of the frauds under 
mitigation stage. The fraud incidents are then analysed to know the fraud methods and 
techniques used to learn about how to prevent these in future. The next steps are incident 
management and the review of the incident that led the organisation to manage the effects 
of the incidents and to prepare to prevent such frauds in future.  
The remedial phase includes the investigation, prosecution, recovery and restoration 
stages. In this phase, the organisations have to investigate the nature of fraud, its methods 
and patterns, and collect the evidence and devices necessary to make the fraud 
prosecutable. Once the organisation collects enough evidence and is in a position to fix 
the responsibility the litigation process is initiated to prosecute the fraudsters. The 
recovery becomes possible after successful prosecution and restoration are achieved once 
the matter is fully resolved.  
The framework also suggests learning steps at three levels of the framework. The purpose 
of these steps is to gain an insight into the performance of the three phases. The first 
learning step includes the test and train as sub-activities. At this step, the authors suggest 
the testing of employees’ abilities to manage the frauds and necessary training to equip 
them with capabilities to deal with the frauds. A continued learning through a supervised 
and unsupervised training on the fraud system operations and effectiveness is suggested 
in the framework. Based on the learning steps, the framework suggests procedure 
adjustment steps for all three phases to improve the performance of these steps. 
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The framework is functional as it has a potential to be used in this study. It is also 
adoptable as it is developed for the identity fraud management. Although, it is 
comprehensive and covers all the stages necessary for fraud management, some of the 
stages are fragmented, or actions of one stage are divided into more stages, which makes 
it more complex. For example, the stages mentioned as incident management and review 
are the part of fraud mitigation and analysis.  
 
 
Figure 2. 3 Identity Fraud Enterprise Management Framework (Jamieson et al., 
2007). 
Under incident management, they refer to is the implementation of activities related to 
fraud occurrence, i.e. identity verification, and data matching, which are already 
discussed as part of mitigation. The review they refer to is a feedback to other stages, 
which already exists at the analysis stage. Thus, recovery and restoration are also set as a 
part of prosecution stage in other frameworks.  
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Additionally, internal audit is also suggested to review the process at each stage of fraud 
management which is already a part of analysis stage. So, such unnecessary fragmentation 
increases the number of stages and duplication of practices at various stages makes it 
complex. The analysis stage and internal audit support for the continuous improvement 
in fraud management. The framework is based on data from banking and public-sector 
organisations, which shows it is empirically derived. Nevertheless, the stages of fraud 
management are focused but lack direct interconnections of these stages, which may 
negatively affect the performance of fraud management.  
Although, the context of the framework is related to this study, the separation of learning 
practices and adjustment process adds to its complexity. Furthermore, all the stages of the 
framework rigidly flow in a series, which hinders the free flow of communication 
between each stage. The separation of these stages also limits the implementation of the 
framework in micro level organisations (Jamieson et al., 2007). Based on the limitations 
mentioned above this framework may not be suitable to be extended to achieve one of the 
objectives of this study.  
2.7.5 Fraud Management Lifecycle Framework (Wilhelm, 2004) 
The framework is based on an empirical study of a variety of industries, i.e., retail 
financial institution, mortgage providers, telecommunication and insurance. A broader 
concept of fraud is adopted to include online and offline identity frauds. The framework 
proposes eight stages of fraud management life-cycle: deterrence, prevention, detection, 
mitigation, analysis, policy, investigation and prosecution. The framework is virtual 
because; its stages are not rigidly sequential, where without completing activities of one 
stage one cannot move to another stage. On the other hand, the stages in the framework 
are networked to work either sequentially (see figure 2.6) or simultaneously if needed. 
The first stage, deterrence, is characterised as actions and activities to deter fraud attempts 
through fear appeal. The second stage, prevention, involves actions to prevent the 
occurrence of attempted frauds through technological measures. At this stage, 
sophisticated technology and effective information security measures are advised. 
Activities at the third stage, detection, are aimed at identifying and locating fraud before, 
during and after the completion of the fraudulent activity.  
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For detection of any suspicious transaction in the system, automated detection systems 
based on data mining and fraud rules are suggested. Activities to minimise fraud losses, 
stopping frauds continuity and blocking the sources of frauds are part of the fourth stage, 
called mitigation. Stage five consists of activities to analyse frauds that deterrence, 
prevention, detection and mitigations stages failed to control. It is a critical stage that 
analyses fraud methods, its channels and patterns, and reasons for the failure to stop it. 
Such analysis is useful to update the systems and developing policies and strategies to 
manage fraud. The stage of analysis also includes risk assessment and evaluation of the 
technologies, processes and organisation of fraud management.   
 
Figure 2.4 The linear representation of the Fraud Management Lifecycle 
Framework (Wilhelm, 2004). 
The development and compliance of policy to reduce incidences of fraud are the activities 
performed at the sixth stage, named as policy. This stage is helpful to control human 
activities and resource constraints to reduce chances of fraudulent occurrences.  The next 
stage investigation; consists of undertakings to obtain enough evidence and information 
on fraud occurrence and to support the prosecution process, which is the final stage of the 
framework. At prosecution, stage organisations work with law enforcing agencies to 
recover losses, get compensation and conviction of the fraudsters.  
The framework is functional, it has been used in various contexts. For example, Amasitu 
(2016) applied it to first-party fraud and Ijeoma and Aronu (2013) to internal frauds. For 
this study, as the stages are clear and managerial practices at each stage can easily be 
analysed for improvements. Its stages are not rigidly sequential, so it is flexible that can 
adjust changes without scarifying its purpose, which confirms its adoptability. As already 
mentioned that it consists of the eight stages, which are necessary for fraud management. 
Therefore, it is a comprehensive one. Furthermore, the framework itself suggests some 
managerial practices, which is an added benefit. Its analysis stage is focused on the facts 
about the fraud incidents and performance measurement of the other stage. Thus, it 
supports ongoing improvements in the fraud management.  
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As already mentioned, it is based on the primary data from the retail financial institution, 
mortgage, telecommunication and insurance industries, which confirm it as being an 
empirically derived. Each stage is given a boundary, so practices at each stage are 
distinguishable and every stage is given focus and are set equally important, which shows 
that the stages of the framework are individually focused. One of the best characteristics 
that no other framework offers is the interconnectedness of the stages. The networked 
representation of the framework (see figure 2.5) expresses fifty-six connections of the 
framework, which proves the interconnectedness of the stages. Finally, the framework 
has already been used for fraud management in various industries, which confirms the 
context relation of the framework with this study.     
 
Figure 2. 5 The network representation of the Fraud Management Lifecycle 
Framework (Wilhelm, 2004).++++++nn 
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The framework has been developed to investigate the fraud management and activities 
are divided distributed in its stages, which makes it a holistic framework. The framework 
has merits but does not explore in detail managerial practices at each stage of fraud 
management. Therefore, the literature on these eight stages have been reviewed 
individually. These practices were linked to the related stages of the framework. Finally, 
these practices are analysed in IDFM in e-tail sector. Based on empirical data and 
literature, the framework is extended for its effective use in IDFM in e-tail sector. 
Managerial practices reported at each stage of the framework are discussed in the 
following section. 
2.7.6  Summary of the Evaluation of the Frameworks 
In previous sections the potential frameworks have been explained and evaluated. The 
summary of the evaluation in given in the following table. 
Table 2. 4 Showing the summary of evaluation of the frameworks based on the 
selection criteria 










































































































(Shah and Okeke, 2011) Y Y N N N Y Y N 
(Kumar et al., 2007) Y Y Y Y N Y N N 
(Jamieson et al., 2007) Y N Y Y Y Y N N 
(Wilhelm, 2004) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
 
Table 2.4 shows the appropriateness of the discussed frameworks and presents the 
potential of each framework. The evaluation criteria as already mentioned was adopted 
from Amasiatu (2016). It offers eight steps for the evaluation of frameworks, which are 
already mentioned. This research applied these criteria on the potential frameworks and 
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analysed their merits to meet each of the eight criteria. The summary of the evaluation of 
each framework is also given below.  
The Role Based Framework proposed by Shah and Okeke, (2011)  presents a good insight 
to prevent the identity theft, but has some limitations. At first, it is not adoptable, as it 
focuses on the managerial roles, not on the identity fraud management stages. Secondly, 
it is limited to few stages of the fraud management and has no provision for ongoing 
improvements. Further, it is based on the literature, so lacks the empirical touch; hence 
its validity is not proven. Finally, it does not suggest for the interconnections of the fraud 
management activities, which is significant for its effectiveness. Therefore, this 
framework may not be suitable for this study. 
The Action-Event Identity Theft Management Framework suggested by Kumar, et al., 
(2007) although has some potential but it lacks the important stage of the investigation. 
Without investigation, it is not possible to collect the evidence and fix the responsibility, 
which also diminishes the role of prosecution. The framework also lacks the empirical 
grounds for its validity. The stages of the framework are also linear and sequentially 
interconnected, which make it unsuitable to be used in this study. 
 The Identity Fraud Enterprise Eanagement Framework, proposed by Jamieson, et al., 
(2007) has much potential to be used here, but there are two significant limitations. At 
first, the stages of the framework are linear, sequential and rigid, which makes it non-
adoptable.  Secondly, the stages of fraud management lack the interconnectivity that may 
lead to a lack of coordination and communication. Such lacking may negatively affect the 
performance of the framework in given context. Additionally, the framework has a 
complex structure with duplication of some steps. For example, the activities of review 
and risk assessment steps are already mentioned in the analysis stage, and restoration and 
recovery are the part of the prosecution stage. Furthermore, the rigidity of the stages 
makes it complex, as policy cannot be developed before risk assessment and the fraud 
analysis. Therefore, this framework may not be an appropriate for this study.  
Unlike all other frameworks, fraud management lifecycle theory, developed by Wilhelm 
(2004) meets the required criteria. It is functional and adoptable on account of its 
flexibility. It contains all the stages, necessary for effective fraud management. The 
analysis stage helps to evaluate its performance. Thus, operational improvement is 
possible in this framework. Further, the framework is empirically tested in industries like 
banking, credit/debit card issuers, insurance, telecommunications and mortgage 
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providers. Moreover, the stages of the framework are not rigidly linear like other 
frameworks, but also networked, which allows coordination and closer communication 
between each stage of the framework. The networked nature of the framework will allow 
grouping of various stages, thus, small and medium size organisations can have the 
advantage of the framework. Additionally, the practices at each stage are focused and 
specific to related stage, so a better fraud management organisation is possible.  Finally, 
the framework is specially designed for fraud management in online and offline 
organisations. Therefore, it may be helpful to attain the objectives of this study.  
The eight stages - deterrence, prevention, detection, mitigation, analysis, policy, 
investigation and prosecution - of IDFM and the managerial activities at each stage given 
in extant literature are presented in the next section. According to Wilhelm, (2004) each 
stage is the set of activities or practices performed to attain the objective of the stage. 
Therefore the managerial practices at each stage of fraud management are given below. 
2.8 Existing Managerial Practices at Each Stage of Fraud Management  
The extant literature has various studies investigating managerial practices in fraud 
management. Most of the studies focus on one or two stages of fraud management. Only 
a few studies researched fraud management comprehensively, yet no significant work has 
been identified during this research that investigates the managerial practices in the e-tail 
context. This section examines the state of the art in the fraud management literature 
covering various operations contexts such as internal fraud management, insurance 
frauds, information security, banking, service sector, financial sector and 
telecommunications and how it discusses managerial practices at each stage of fraud 
management are discussed in the following sections.   
2.8.1 Deterrence 
Deterrence should discourage fraudsters from committing a fraud. In fraud domain, the 
fear of being caught and punished and customer education and awareness are considered 
as fundamental deterrence practices (Jamieson et al., 2007; Wilhelm, 2004). Deterrence 
is a set of precautionary measures to implement before any fraud attempt takes place 
(Jamieson et al., 2007). Precautionary measures include customer education and sending 
a clear message to potential fraudsters to create fear of being caught and punished by the 
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law (Jamieson et al., 2007; Wilhelm, 2004). Thus, the deterrence of identity fraud is based 
on the customer education and fear of being caught and punished. 
Customer education, awareness and knowledge also have a significant impact on fraud 
deterrence (Sperdea et al., 2011). Customer education enhances the knowledge and 
awareness of customers that help them to avoid the risk of identity theft (Arachchilage 
and Love, 2014; Seda, 2014). Thus, customers may be educated to regularly monitor their 
bank account transactions, online business accounts and their credit files, and not to share 
any personal information on social media (Alrashed, 2016; Amori, 2008; He et al., 2014; 
McGee and Byington, 2015). Customer education also increases their efficacy when 
using technological systems, which has a positive impact on identity fraud deterrence 
(Arachchilage and Love, 2014; Holt and Turner, 2012). 
Additionally, organisations should also educate their customers concerning the growing 
risk of identity theft methods and practices to minimise that risk (Bourgeon et al., 2008; 
Wang et al., 2006). Frequent communication and interaction between customer and 
business regarding the education are required to enhance customer knowledge, awareness 
and efficacy, which directly affect their behaviour and encourage them to deter the online 
fraud (Wang et al., 2006). 
In addition to general awareness and education, online organisations could send 
specifically designed messages to a particular group of customers and victims to educate 
them on specific issues (Copes et al., 2010). Furthermore, the organisations should check 
the contents and context of messages that they communicate to the customer for their 
education and awareness on identity theft (Hille et al., 2015). Although, the discussion 
shows that customer education and awareness has a significant impact as an identity fraud 
deterrence, excessive warnings can undermine customers’ confidence. Therefore, e-tail 
organisations should adopt those managerial practice to educate customers that have the 
least impact on their reputation.  
As already mentioned, the fear of being caught and punished has a significant impact on 
fraudster’s behaviour, towards not attempting a fraud (Workman and Gathegi, 2007). 
Importantly, the certainty of punishment is more effective to discourage the fraudsters to 
commit fraud than its severity (Leasure and Zhang, 2017). The fraudulent behaviour can 
be averted by creating the fear of being caught and punished according to law (Dorminey 
et al., 2012; Sperdea et al., 2011).  Furthermore, the literature shows that the law 
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enforcing agencies are less interested in catching fraudsters involved in small business 
frauds (Lewis et al., 2014). However, managerial practices for creating fear of being 
caught and punished in e-tail organisations have not been analysed.  
Sending a clear message to potential fraudsters about the certainty of being caught and 
punished has a positive impact on fraud deterrence (Akers, 2013; Leasure and Zhang, 
2017). Regarding sending such messages, mass media plays an effective role and 
increases the effectiveness of deterrence by creating the fear of being punished (Zadig 
and Tejay, 2010). However, managerial practices have not been analysed for 
disseminating the information that creates fear among the potential fraudsters. Therefore, 
this study analyses managerial practices to investigate how the e-tail organisations are 
creating fear of being caught and punished to change the behaviour of identity fraudsters. 
Managerial practices discussed above are presented in the following table. 
Table 2. 5 List of the practices suggested for fraud deterrence 
Source Practices Interpretations 
(Akers, 2013)  - Identity fraud deterrence should be 
increased by creating the fear of 
being caught and punished in 
according to law. 
- The certainty of punishment has a 
real impact on deterrence of frauds, 
so it should be promoted. 
- The fear of being caught 
and punished averts the 
behaviour of fraudsters. 
 
- Certainity of punishment 
changes the intention of 
fraudsters towards not 







(Shamsi et al., 
2016) 
- Publicise the attribution of attack 
by mentioning the cyber weapon, the 
origin of the attack and the 
identification of the attacker.  
- Such practice creates the 
fear of being caught and 




- Customers should be advised to 
check their bank transactions, online 
accounts and credit files frequently.  
- They should also be suggested for 
not sharing personal information on 
social media. 
- It creates vigilance and 
help earlier detection of 
IDFs. 
- Such practice minimise 





(He et al., 
2014) 
(Hille et al., 
2015) 
- The organisations should check the 
contents and context of messages 
that they communicate to the 
customer for their education and 
awareness on identity theft. 
- Messages should not have 
any negative impact on 
customers, but help them 





- Customers should be educated 
about identity theft risk, its methods 
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(Seda, 2014) and guidance to avoid any identity 
theft occurrence. 
- Such education motivates 
customers in securing their 
credentials. 
(Bai and Chen, 
2013) 
- Try the full employment of mass 
media for deterrence 
communication. 
- Mass media has wider 
access to the community, so 




- Publicise the information on 
detection, arrest or punishment of 
cyber security attackers. 
- Such information creates 




- Organisations need to take two 
significant actions for effective fraud 
deterrence:  
- Educate their customers  
- Send fear messages to the society 
for fraudsters being caught and 
punished. 
 
- Customer education helps in 
minimising the number of 
IDT occurrences. 
- Fear appeals lead to avert 
negative behaviour of 
fraudsters. 
(Sperdea et al., 
2011) 
(Copes et al., 
2010) 
- Specific messages should be 
directed to the targeted customers 
and victims of identity theft. 
- Customised messages help 
in different situations to deal 
accordingly. 
(Zadig and 
Tejay , (2010) 
- Establish a sense of security. 
 
- Establish the visibility of active 
policing. 
- Prosecute the fraudsters. 
 
- Make aware the potential 
fraudsters of the organisational 
efforts and actions on information 
system attacks. 
- Sense of security develops 
customer trust. 
- Policing helps in reducing 
the number of IDF attempts 
- It enhances the IDF 
deterrence. 
- Such arrangements 
increase fraud deterrence. 
 
(D'Arcy et al., 
2009) 
 
- Develop the user awareness of 
security policies.  
- Develop security education and 
training programs.  
- Monitor computers for any 
violation. 
- Establish the threat of punishment 
for potential fraudsters. 
- It is to ensure effective 
compliance. 
- It motivates staff for the 
secure use of IT. 
- Earlier detection may 
reduce the impact of attack. 
- The threat of punishment 
results in fraud deterrence. 
(Workman and 
Gathegi, 2007) 
(Baer, 2008) - Deterrence depends on the 
fraudsters’ evaluation of risk, so 
societies should increase the 
expected penalties for effective 
deterrence  
- Severity of punished has 
direct impact on behaviour 
of fraudsters. 
Table 2.5 shows various managerial practices for effective deterrence of frauds. These 
practices are suggested for other contexts, such as; online banking, health services and m-
commerce, for information security, bio-matric authentication system, internet frauds and 
identity theft. However, these practices have not been analysed in identity fraud 
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deterrence in e-tail organisations. Thus, the extant literature has no significant studies on 
managerial practices about how e-tail organisations are deterring identity fraudsters? 
Therefore, this study analyses the managerial practices for identity fraud management in 
e-tail organisations to answer the question and will help the e-tail organisations to 
improve these practices for effective identity fraud deterrence.   
2.8.2 Prevention  
In fraud management domain, prevention practices are designed to prevent the frauds or 
to secure the information through technical systems and creating hindrances to commit 
identity theft. Prevention is important in failing any fraud attempt, while deterrence is 
limited to discouraging the fraudsters through fear using conventional methods, which 
are already discussed in the previous section.  Prevention is a process of developing 
arrangements against predicted risks which is based on IT solutions and managerial 
practices (Devos and Pipan, 2009). In literature and academia, prevention, deterrence and 
detection of frauds are sometimes interchangeably used (Wilhelm, 2004). However, the 
use of a framework helps to clarify the differences among these concepts with a set of 
practices at each stage. 
In online business, prevention refers to the deployment of protective systems, procedures, 
processes and practices, which help to protect online identity information and data 
breaches from fraudsters. Such stolen identity information is then used for identity frauds 
(Lee and Yu, 2012; Whitman and Mattord, 2011). Prevention also helps to validate the 
credentials of customers to access their account for online shopping. 
Online business organisations are responsible for protecting customers’ information and 
to prevent any identity theft attack (Cordell, 2013). For this purpose, mostly technological 
arrangements are made along with some organisational arrangements (Devos and Pipan, 
2009). These include a strong encryption technology, anti-virus, anti-malware, anti-
phishing technologies, firewalls, intrusion detection and digital signatures and certificate 
systems (Devos and Pipan, 2009; Geeta, 2011; Goyal et al., 2012).  
Online organisations are also suggested to implement strong encryption on the personal 
information on organisational and personal devices; as in case of any theft, emergency or 
error, it will prevent the identity theft, even after the devices are accessed (Alrashed, 
2016). Although, these measures have been suggested for the security of information 
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systems, but no research has been carried out on e-tail organisations that what practices 
these organisations have adopted to secure their customer information.  
An authentication system is critical to validate and verify the identity of the customers 
before allowing them access to their accounts (Usman and Shah, 2013). Weaknesses or 
limitations of an authentication system can lead to identity frauds, so online organisations 
should have a strong system to validate and verify the identity of customers before 
allowing them access to their accounts (Prakash et al., 2015; Sharma et al., 2015). For 
effective authentication, apart from traditional ID and password, online organisations are 
recommended to use bio-matric authentication, such as; finger printing, retina and face 
recognition and voice recognition (Mansfield-Devine, 2013; Usman and Shah, 2013; Teh 
et al., 2016).  
Although, bio-matric authentication systems have significant merits to verify the 
identities of customers, a significant limitation is suggested by Wang, et al., (2006): once 
bio-matric information is compromised, it is not possible to change it. To address the 
challenges of authentication, one-time password is suggested by Bang et al. (2012). These 
one-time passwords can be sent as text messages on the customers’ registered mobile 
numbers (Ates et al., 2013; Creswell and Poth, 2017), additionally customers can also be 
informed about account login, through such messages to timely prevent any identity fraud 
(Wang et al., 2015). The literature suggests various authentication systems and their 
effectiveness, but managerial practices on how e-tail organisations select and evaluate the 
effectiveness of their authentication system to prevent unauthorised access to customers’ 
accounts are not analysed. 
The practice of ensuring the validity of customer identities before accessing any account 
will prevent identity frauds. Furthermore, organisations may adopt the practice of sending 
a one-time password for account access to prevent any unauthorised access (Bang et al., 
2012). Such password will be sent to the registered contact of the customer, which will 
ensure the identity of the customer. Also, the practice of sending account login alerts also 
helps to detect any unauthorised access to a customer account, which can prevent any 
activity on the account (Kumar and Goyal, 2016; Wang et al., 2015). However, the 
practices for sending login alerts are effective in preventing unauthorised access in real 
time, but these have not been analysed in e-tail context. Furthermore, practices on how e-
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tail organisations detect unauthorised access and what channels they use to inform the 
customers for identity fraud prevention are not analysed.  
For effective prevention of information theft, organisations are encouraged to make 
arrangements to secure customer data at each step. Prosch (2009) emphasises that 
organisations should have a secure encryption system, protect data from internal and 
external theft through controlled access and dual authentication system and data 
processing should be carefully monitored for any human or system error.  
Furthermore, replicated data should be made secure through strong access policies, 
comprehensive training and periodical scanning of personal computing devices and 
strictly follow the privacy laws (Prosch, 2009). Although, Prosch (2009) has made good 
suggestions to prevent identity theft, however, managerial practices on how e-tail 
organisations are monitoring information security measures to ensure that customers’ 
information are secured and protected are not analysed. 
E-tail organisations outsource some of their services, e.g., data storage. Sometimes goods 
sold through these organisations are despatched by their suppliers. In these cases, e-tail 
organisations have to share their customers’ data with these organisations. These data at 
third party organisations may be at risk of theft and breach. To ensure the security of their 
customers’ identity information, online organisations are recommended to ensure same 
protocols of security, (for identity theft prevention) by third parties if any personal 
information is shared with them (Vahdati and Yasini, 2015; Phan and Vogel, 2010).  
The practice of ensuring the effective arrangements for identity theft prevention would 
help the e-tail organisations to maintain the security of customers’ information at every 
end.  Furthermore, online organisations should also ensure strong encryption at suppliers, 
vendors, and contractors to prevent any identity theft attack (Ahamad et al., 2014; 
Taitsman et al., 2013). These suggestions are significant to prevent identity information 
from theft and breach, but research is missing on how e-tail organisations ensure the 
prevention of their customer information at third party organisations. The functionality 
of prevention systems depends on the investment in preventive technologies, as a higher 
investment is linked to the efficiency and effectiveness of the technology (Boyer, 2007). 
Therefore, it may be deduced that managerial practices related to the investments in 
sophisticated technologies have a significant impact on the identity theft prevention. 
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Furthermore, the regular monitoring of prevention systems for their performance, and 
frequently updating these systems in response to emerging threats are critical to ensuring 
effective prevention of identity theft (Amori, 2008; Delanty, 2005). These studies 
emphasise the importance of investing in sophisticated technologies and their 
performance monitoring and updating. Although, sufficient investments in prevention 
system would normally ensure its efficiency and effectiveness, however, the nature of e-
tail organisations is different. These organisations face intense competition and operate 
with limited resources, which make their investment decisions challenging.  
However, literature is missing on what factors are considered by managers in e-tail 
organisations before making any investment in preventive technology. Furthermore, the 
literature is also missing on how managers analyse the effectiveness of existing systems, 
which subsequently leads towards the decisions on update the existing systems or to 
require more sophisticated technologies to prevent identity frauds.  
At the internal side of the information theft prevention, the extant literature  suggests to 
manage access to information. This helps to limit the data access to the staff members 
and to monitor who accessed what information (Alrashed, 2016). Keeping the least 
privilege access policy limits staff access to customers’ personal information and 
authorisation of access to customer data are significant to prevent identity theft from 
internal staff members (Wang et al., 2006).  
Furthermore, for effective internal identity theft prevention, organisations should keep a 
record of who accessed what type of personal information and the reasons, as such records 
will help the organisation to fix the responsibility of any mishap, and prevent the staff for 
any unnecessary access to customer data. (Alrashed, 2016). Nonetheless, data access 
management and keeping the record of data access may be effective to prevent internal 
identity theft, but literature is missing on how e-tail organisations are managing the data 
access and how they keep the record of who access what information.  
Having a comprehensive programme for internal and external training and education of 
employees on information security risk is also necessary to prevent information theft 
(Meinert, 2016). Also, the creation of the awareness on the severity regarding the risk of 
identity theft also has a significant impact on prevention of information theft (Boss et al., 
2015). Such awareness also changes the staff behaviour towards the safe and secure use 
of information resources  (Boss et al., 2015). Although, awareness of information security 
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risk and training can help the staff to change their behaviour towards a secure use of 
information resources, while, how awareness is created, what information is helpful to 
increase the awareness, and how it affects the behaviour of staff members, has not been 
analysed in e-tail organisations. 
Table 2. 6 List of the practices suggested for fraud prevention 
Source Managerial Practices Interpretations 
(Baz et al., 
2017). 
- Effective internal control system 
helps in the fraud prevention. 
- Information sharing is significant 
practice in the fraud prevention. 
- Such practice prevents  
misuse of IT resourse. 





- Organisations should: 
- Have a control system for access 
to personal information.  
- Recognise the identity of data 
handlers.  
 
- Have a record of staff having 
access to personal information and 
their criminal record check. 
 
- Organisations should implement 
strong encryption and firewalls on 
personal information.  
- Try to get the minimum required 
personal information from 
customers. 
- It controlls unauthorised 
access to personal 
information. 
- Such identity may help in 
fixing responsibility in case of 
any misuse. 
- It would help to ensure 
control the access on personal 
information and track record 
of employees. 
- Encryption helps in 
preventing any unauthorised 
access on personal records. 
- Un-necessary customer 
information increases the 
extent of risk.  
(Meinert, 2016) - Having a comprehensive 
programme for internal and 
external training of employees on 
information security is also 
necessary to prevent information 
theft. 
- Such training help 
employees in adopting better 
practices for secure use of IT 





- Regularly evaluate the 
performance of prevention systems. 
- It would ensure the 
continued effectiveness of the 
system. 
(Kumar and 
Goyal, 2016)  
- Online organisations should send 
account login alerts to respected 
customers to prevent any 
unauthorised access. 
- It may help detecting any 
IDF at an earlier stage. 
(Wang et al., 
2015) 
(Boss et al., 
2015)  
- Increasing the severity of the 
information theft risk for staff and 
customers and its awareness have a 
significant impact on identity theft 
prevention.  
- Sense of insecurity results in 
arrangements for preventing 
IDT. (Holt and 
Turner, 2012) 
(Albrecht et al., 
2011) 
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(Copes et al., 
2010) 
(Prakash et al., 
2015) 
- Online organisations should have 
effective authorisation and 
authentication system to validate 
the identities before access to 
customer accounts   
- It is necessary to prevent any 
un-authorised access on 
customer accounts. (Sharma et al., 
2015) 
(Ahamad et al., 
2014) 
- Organisations should ensure the 
strong encryption at suppliers, 
vendors, and contractors to prevent 
any identity theft attack.  
- Securing in-house resources 
is not enough, so take steps to 
secure customer information 
at every step. 
(Taitsman et al., 
2013) 
(Seda, 2014) - Regularly educate IT users on 
identity theft risk. 
- Educate IT users on measures to 
avoid identity theft. 
- IT users should know the 
potential risks to avoid them. 





(Teh et al., 
2016) 
- Online organisations should have 
a strong authentication system 
using the biometric identification. 
-  Biometric authentication is 







- Organisations should ensure the 
similar arrangements for identity 
theft prevention at third parties.  
- Similar arrangements at 
information sharing firms 




(Bang et al., 
2012) 
- Sending one-time password for 
account access is a critical practice 
to prevent any unauthorised access.  
- One time password helps to 
verify the identity of the 
customers. 
(Prosch, 2009), - Organisations should make 
arrangements at each step of 
customer data cycle. 
 
- At the transmission, they should 
have the practice of having strong 
encryption system. 
- The stored data should be secured 
from internal and external theft.  
- Organisations should have the 
practice of ensuring same protocols 
of information security by third 
parties if any personal information 
is shared with them.  
- Information is processed at 
different stages, so security 
measures should be taken at 
each step. 
- Strong encryption ensures 
information theft prevention 
during transmission. 
- Database security is critical 
to prevent any IDT. 
- Sometime information is 
stolen from third parties, so 
firms should ensure similar 
information security measures 
with partners.    
(Goyal et al., 
2012) 
- Implement technological 
solutions such as strong encryption, 
SSL, anti-virus, firewalls, intrusion 
detection system, anti-phishing and 
digital certificates to prevent any 
information theft. 
- Invest in technologies such as 
anti-malware, anti-fishing 
- Technological solutions are 





- Sufficient investments in 
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software, security of transaction 
getaway, monitoring of information 
communication. 
- Implement fraud reduction 
technologies (anti-virus, anti-
malware, anti-fishing and other 
security systems) on customer 
devices on organisational expenses. 
and other resources is 
necessary for effective 
measures. 
- IDT also occurs at customer 
side, which has impact on 
firms, so businesses should 
ensure IDT prevention at 
customer end. 
(Amori, 2008) - Internal and external prevention 
systems should be monitored for 
their performance and updated 
regularly 
- Monitoring of the 
effectiveness of prevention 
system ensures its 
effectiveness. 
(Delanty, 2005) 
(Boyer, 2007) - Make sufficient investment in 
preventive technologies. 
- For acquisition of 
sophisticated technologies, 
firms need to allocate 
sufficient budget. 
(Wang et al., 
2006) 
- Prevent unauthorised data access. 
 
 
- Train staff for secure use of 
information systems. 
-  Ensure screening of staff 
members. 
- Preventing unauthorised 
access safeguards sensitive 
data. 
- Training help staff to avoid 
possibilities of data breach. 
- Staff screening helps to 
minimise risk of IDT. 
Table 2.6 presents the practices for information theft and fraud prevention in various 
industries as described in the literature. Most of these studies are focused on technological 
arrangements. Furthermore, these practices are based on examination of financial 
institutions and public sector organisations and limited to identity theft. Hence, no study 
has been found to focus on e-tail organisations. Thus, managerial practices regarding how 
organisations ensure the security of its information sources, how do they ensure the 
effectiveness of authentication system, how these organisations manage the access on 
customer information are still missing in the extant literature. Therefore, this study 
analyses managerial practices for identity fraud and information theft prevention and 
suggests improvements. 
2.8.3 Detection 
A fraud detection system consists of practices intended to uncover or locate a fraud 
before, during and after its occurrence (Wilhelm, 2004). Detection is a critical stage of 
fraud management; it provides the base for the rest of the stages, as without detection of 
frauds there will be no mitigation, analysis, policy, investigation and prosecution of the 
frauds (Jamieson et al., 2007; Wilhelm, 2004). Fraud detection should be given 
significant consideration in fraud management as no matter how much organisations 
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invest in prevention systems the fraudsters will still find their way to get into the systems 
(Porter, 2004). In online business, there should be a real-time detection system; as, many 
transactions take place in a short period, and if detection system fails to process these in 
real time, it will hang up the whole business process (Jamieson et al., 2007). 
For the detection of identity fraud in credit card and loan applications the practice of 
having an automated screening system built on an organisational database to detect any 
duplicate or suspicious application is a necessity (Dorfleitner and Jahnes, 2014; Hardouin, 
2009; Swathi and Kalpana, 2013). Online transactions are enormous in number, therefore 
for an effective detection of identity frauds organisations should have a fraud screening 
system that flag out suspicious frauds for further verifications (Porter, 2004).  
Having a fraud screening system based on pre-set cues is significant to spot suspicious 
frauds (Allan and Zhan, 2010). The fraud screening system is based on fraud cues based 
on rules and conditions,  related to emerging fraud trends to detect identity frauds  (Phua 
et al., 2010). As the fraud trends are ever-changing, so to keep the effectiveness of fraud 
screening system intact, organisations  should regularly update these cues, in accordance 
with emerging fraud trends (Allan and Zhan, 2010).  
After detecting suspicious frauds, these are manually verified at the next stage to confirm 
whether these are frauds or genuine orders (Carneiro et al., 2017). Having a fraud 
screening system and updating its cues regularly is helpful in detection of suspicious 
frauds. The effectiveness of the screening system is based on the proper implementation 
of fraud parameters, rules and conditions on the dataset (Allan and Zhan, 2010; Bierstaker 
et al., 2006). However, the effective implementation of fraud parameters, rules and 
conditions depend on the skills, knowledge and awareness of employees regarding 
identity fraud in e-tail organisation. In addition, implementation of fraud cues on single 
organisation dataset is challenging (Allan and Zhan, 2010).  
Although, the effectiveness of screening system depends upon its proper implementation, 
which requires skills, knowledge and awareness of employees but literature is missing on 
what skills and knowledge are required to analyse the parameters, trends and methods of 
identity frauds for effective detection in e-tail organisations. Furthermore, how e-tail 
organisations are enhancing the skills, knowledge and awareness of employees to 
effectively managing the fraud screening system have not been analysed. 
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Online customers are connected to the internet with an IP address, which is specific to 
each customer. This allows organisations to monitor IP address to detect any fraud at an 
early stage (Cheng et al., 2015; Tan et al., 2016). The practice of monitoring the 
customers’ IP addresses helps organisations to know the location of account users. Thus, 
an attempt to access the account from an unusual location should trigger the screening 
system, which would help in detecting any fraud attempt (Tan et al., 2016). Linking 
customers’ devices with their accounts is also significant as a tool to detect identity frauds. 
Organisations should link customers’ device(s) to their accounts so that with the help of 
device recognition system, identity frauds using suspicious devices can easily be detected 
(Al-Jumeily et al., 2015; Ghosh, 2010; Peotta et al., 2011).  
Although, IP monitoring and linking customers’ devices with their accounts and having 
a device recognition system would help in identity fraud detection, the literature on how 
e-tail organisations are using device recognition system, and how the practice of linking 
customers’ devices with their accounts helps these organisations to detect identity frauds 
is missing. Furthermore, the literature on how the identification of customer location, 
helps e-tail organisations to detect identity frauds is also missing. So, this study tries to 
analyse these practices to suggest improvements in the effective use of these systems to 
detect identity frauds. 
For early detection of identity frauds, customer education and awareness are also 
significant. Educating customers to regularly monitoring their bank statement and 
running transactions would lead to an earlier detection of frauds, which can reduce the 
chances of further frauds so that additional losses can be avoided (Tajpour et al., 2013). 
However, how e-tail organisations educate their customers is still not known, and 
managerial practices, what to communicate the customers, what channels to use for such 
communication are also missing. Furthermore, setting up of a whistle-blower hotline is 
useful for detection of frauds (Porter, 2004). However, the anonymity of informers is 
necessary. Therefore, organisations should provide the customers and staff with a free 
hotline for fraud reporting with guaranteed anonymity (Njenga and Osiemo, 2013).  
Moreover, Porter, (2004) also suggests for manual authorisation of each transaction, but 
in online business thousands of these take place in a few minutes, so it is not feasible to 
verify and authorise each transaction manually (Carneiro et al., 2017). Setting up a 
whistle-blower hotline and manual verification of transactions are significant in detecting 
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frauds, but the literature is missing on how e-tail organisations create such awareness 
among the whistle-blowers and ensure their anonymity. Above discussed managerial 
practices for fraud detection are given in Table 2.7. 
Table 2. 7 List of the practices suggested for fraud detection 
Source Practices Interpretations 
(Allan and Zhan, 
2010) 
- Organisations should have an 
automated screening system, 
with predetermined cues that 
flag out the suspicious 
transactions. 
- Verify the suspicious 
transactions manually through 
fraud analysts.  
- Organisations should 
regularly update cues and 
ensure their accuracy according 
to identity fraud trends 
- Automated screening 
system works just-in-time to 
detect any suspicious 
transaction. 
 
- Manual verification helps 
to identify any fraudulent 
transaction. 
- For effective IDFM, it is 
necessary to cope with 
emerging fraud trends 
(Carneiro et al., 
2017) 
(Phua et al., 2010) 
(Al-Jumeily et al., 
2015) 
- Organisations should link 
customers’ devices with their 
account and use device 
recognition system to detect 
IDF. 
- Device recognition system 
helps the organisations to detect 
suspicious transactions for 
using multiple accounts on one 
device.  
- It helps to verify the 




- Such system helps to detect 
a new device accessing any 
customer account, which 





(Peotta et al., 2011) 
(Dorfleitner and 
Jahnes, 2014) 
- Organisations should have an 
automated screening system 
based on the characteristics of 
the applicants.  
- Organisations should 
manually review the suspicious 
applications. 




- Manual reviews help to 
differentiate between 





- Top management should 
ensure the effective internal 
control systems for fraud 
detection. 
- Internal control system is 
an effective tools to detect 
any fraud at an earlier stage. 
Swathi and Kalpana, 
(2013) 
- Organisations should have 
automated detection system 
built on the organisational 
database to detect any duplicate 
or suspicious application. 
- Detection system based on 
database is helpful to 
identify any fraudulent 
application. 
(Tajpour et al., 
2013) 
- Educate the customers’ for 
regular monitoring of their bank 
statements and running 
- Earlier fraud detection may 
help to mitigate the fraud 
impact. 
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transactions for an earlier 
detection of the frauds. 
(Njenga and 
Osiemo, 2013) 
- Management should provide 
anonymous telephone line to 
the staff and public for fraud 
reporting.  
- It would help in detecting 
fraud at earlier stage, thus 
would result in less damages. 
(Phua et al., 2010) - Organisations should use data 
mining techniques for fraud 
detection. 
- Data mining techniques are 
significant to detect IDFs at 
earlier stage. 
(Jamieson et al., 
2007) 
- Should have a real-time fraud 
detection system. 
- Fraud detected in real-time 
may result in no or least loss. 
(Porter, 2004) 
 
- Manually authorise each 
transaction. 
- Establish whistle-blower 
hotlines. 
- It would help in identifying 
any fraudelent transaction. 
- Whistle-blower hotline 
may result in detection of 
any fraud well in time. 
In Table 2.7 managerial practices suggested for effective detection of identity frauds are 
mentioned. Mostly these frauds are focused on the banking sector, credit card frauds and 
information security contexts. This shows that the financial sector is getting more 
importance in fraud management than e-tail sector. Although, some studies are focused 
on identity fraud detection, yet managerial practices related to e-tail context are still 
missing. Thus, not significant study has been found on the managerial practices for 
identity fraud detection in online retail organisations. Therefore, this study analyses the 
managerial practices for effective detection of identity frauds in e-tail organisations. It 
will also try to validate the significance of existing practices in current context and finally, 
suggestions are forwarded to improve the existing practices of e-tail organisations.  
2.8.4 Mitigation 
Mitigation starts with the certainty of the existence of a fraud or detecting a reasonable 
suspicious activity on any account. The purpose of mitigation is to lessen the severity of 
the fraud or minimising the fraud losses by stopping or discontinuing it. The mitigation 
practices are focused on controlling the extent of fraud, reducing the amount of the fraud 
losses and arrangements to recover or correct the implications of fraudulent attempt 
(Wilhelm, 2004). 
Once a fraud or a suspicious transaction is detected, mitigation practices are performed 
to confirm the geniuses of the identity information, order re-confirmation, trying to 
contact the genuine customer or victim and recovery of customer account in case of any 
fraudulent attempt (Jamieson et al., 2007; Wilhelm, 2004). As already mentioned the 
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purpose of mitigation is to try to keep the losses at a minimum and discontinue the fraud, 
for that a real-time fraud mitigation system is suggested by Jamieson, et al. (2007) and 
Wilhelm (2004). 
The notion ‘know your customer’ is also getting importance in effective detection of 
identity frauds. Albrecht, et al. (2011) maintain that organisations should ask their 
customers for any documentary evidence at the time of account opening to validate their 
identities, which will help to detect any identity fraud. Online organisations are also 
recommended to adopt the practices of updating the record of existing customers and 
devices and other identitical information to detect any fraud (Hardouin, 2009). Updated 
identity information also helps the organisations when a suspicious fraud is detected 
(Hardouin, 2009). To detect suspicious fraud, organisations are advised to make phone 
calls to the customers on their already given contact numbers to verify, whether it is a 
fraud or not (Cheng et al., 2015; Tan et al., 2016). Thus, through phone calls, 
organisations can challenge the fraudsters to verify the identity information in company 
records, which will help to detect a confirm fraud.  
At the mitigation stage a third-party involvement in identity verifications such as phone 
number, address, tax number, and such other information on customer credit history is 
critically helpful (Jamieson et al., 2007). After having such identity information, a 
telephonic call can further verify the genuineness of the customer (Cheng et al., 2015; 
Tan et al., 2016). A telephonic conversation would help to verify and validate the identity, 
based on the previous collected information.  
In addition to the validation of the customer’s identity, the verification of geographic 
location is also critical as matching it with IP location of the purchase order will determine 
the genuineness of the transaction (Cross and Blackshaw, 2014). The practice is also 
significant for vetoing new applications for accounts. Such arrangements before starting 
a business with a customer would help online organisations to mitigate any fraud well 
before it occurs.  
However, the literature does not reveal whether e-tail organisations implement such 
practices or not. If e-tail organisations have implemented above-mentioned practices for 
identity validation, but it has never been evaluated that what other identity information 
validation practices are implemented and how those are effective in e-tail organisation.    
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Information sharing on frauds is essential, as it helps to detect any fraud before it occurs 
(Feledi and Fenz, 2012; Power and Power, 2015). It helps to set the parameters and fraud 
cues based on such information. Through information sharing, any data used for fraud in 
one organisation can easily be detected at other organisations before the fraud occurrence. 
On the contrary, Chohan, et al. (2014) argue that organisations are reluctant to share such 
information due to lack of trust. Information sharing on identity frauds is critical to detect 
such frauds, but the literature on trust level to share such information among e-tail 
organisations is missing. Furthermore, managerial practices on what information is 
shared, and how is it used to detect identity frauds are also missing in the literature. 
Real-time mitigation practices are necessary to control the fraud extent. However, the 
meaning of real-time mitigation differs from industry to industry, yet faster mitigation 
practices would ensure quick termination of fraud events, with reduced losses and impacts 
and updating victim’s record (Wilhelm, 2004). The mitigation process should also be 
focused on recovery of customers’ credit history in minimal time. Although, a real-time 
mitigation is suggested for rapid termination of frauds, it is still not known how e-tail 
organisations ensure the real-time mitigation of identity frauds as no significant work has 
been done. 
Furthermore, what practices do the e-tail organisations have adopted to minimise the 
fraud losses, and how the customer credit history is recovered is not known. So far, the 
literature shows that there have been no significant studies on managerial practices for 
mitigation of identity fraud in e-tail context. Therefore this study analyses managerial 
practice in mitigation of identity frauds and suggests improvements.  
Employees have a critical role in the effective detection of identity frauds. Systems can 
only point out a suspicious fraud, but experts need to go through the verifications, analysis 
and make decisions, so the detection systems should not replace the human but 
complement the experts (Becker et al., 2010). The feedback on these decisions is also 
significant to evaluate the analysts’ performance, so the fraud managers should promptly 
inform the decision makers about their decisions, and there should be a training 
programme to enhance their performance (Becker et al., 2010).  
The staff related practices in identity fraud detection cannot be undermined, but practices 
on how e-tail organisations train their staff for effective verifications of identity fraud 
detection are not analysed. Also, the practices on how e-tail organisations give feedback 
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to fraud analysts to improve their performance in identity fraud detection are still missing 
in the literature.  
For the effective mitigation of frauds, the organisations should develop criteria to 
prioritise the transactions, such as; the judgemental criteria should be based on the 
experiences and specialities of the fraud investigators, and high-value transactions should 
be investigated by the seniors (Wilhelm, 2004). The managerial practices for effective 
fraud mitigation are listed in the following table.  
 Table 2. 8 List of the practices suggested for fraud mitigation 
Source Practices Interpretations 
(Cheng et al., 
2015) 
 
- For effective mitigation, phone calls 
help to verify whether it is a real 
customer or fraudsters, through 
asking identity related questions to 
match with records and credit history.  
- Online organisations should use IP 
address to check customer’s location 
for effective identity fraud detection.   
- Phone calls are more reliable 




- IP address location may help 
to detect any fraudulent 
transaction. 




- Organisations should monitor the 
customers’ identities and ask for 
documentary proof for earlier 
detection of identity frauds.  
- Documentary proof of 
identity is significant to verify 









- Once a suspicious transaction is 
detected, organisations should verify 
the orders, geographic location and 
identity information to mitigate any 
chances of fraud. 
- These verifications help to 
detect any identity fraud. 
(Power and 
Power, 2015) 
- Organisations should share the data 
related to frauds, with other 
organisations and law enforcing 
agencies, to help and get help to 
mitigate fraudulent attempts. 
- Such information sharing 
helps in verifying the identity 
information of customers and 




- Organisations are reluctant to share 
information on identity fraud 
management, due to the lack of trust 
among themselves. 
- Due to the competition, 
firms are not ready to share 
information about measures 




- For better mitigation, information 
sharing on fraud management is a 
critical practice. 
- Information sharing helps to 
detect any fraud and 
verification of ID 
information. 
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(Becker et al., 
2010) 
- Detection systems should not 
replace the human but complement 
the experts. 
- Managers should give feedback to 
fraud analysts on their decisions.  
 
- There should be a training 
programme for fraud analysts to 
enhance their performance. 
- Detection system should 
include technology and 
manual process. 
- Such feedback helps staff to 
minimise the number of 
wrong decisions. 
- Training helps staff to 
improve their performance 
for management of IDFs. 
(Hardouin, 
2009) 
- Know your customers. 
- Update the customers’ data. 
- Monitor the customers’ activities.  
- Such activities help to verify 
the genuine customer 





- Organisations should have fast 
mitigation process.  
- Involve third parties for different 
verifications such as; phone number 
verification, address check, tax 
number and other identity-related 
information. 
- It helps to minimise the 
extent of IDF losses. 
- Out-sourced verifications 





- Organisations should have a real-
time mitigation system. 
- Continuously train the staff: 
- On emerging trends in identity 
frauds.  
- To effectively deal with red-flagged 
transactions. 
 
- The judgemental criteria should be 
based on the experiences and 
specialities of the fraud investigators. 
- The seniors should investigate the 
high-value transactions. 
- In online business, a fast and 
accurate mitigation system is 
inevitable. 
- Staff training on emerging 
fraud trends and 
countermeasures helps 
improving the detection of ID 
frauds. 
- Investigators should be 
specialised in respected 
fields. 
- High value transactions need 
more expertise to deal with.  
Table 2.8 mentions the practices in the mitigation of the frauds. These practices are 
focused on banking, insurance, mortgage and telecommunication organisations and 
government agencies for application fraud, mobile payment fraud, identity fraud and 
internal frauds. Furthermore, most of these studies have been investigated in a 
technological context. Moreover, managerial practice on how e-tail organisations 
mitigate identity fraud and verify the genuineness of customer identity are missing. 
Therefore, research will try to answer these questions by analysing the managerial 
practices that effectively mitigate the identity frauds in e-tail organisations.  
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2.8.5 Analysis 
This stage is critical, as it evaluates the performance of the other stages of fraud 
management. The importance of this stage lies in its function of reviewing the 
performance of each stage in fraud management and providing them with the feedback 
for improvement (Jamieson et al., 2007; Wilhelm, 2004). This stage also works on the 
analysis of the fraud, its type, nature, methods used to commit it and losses incurred. It 
also suggests strategies and measures to cope with such frauds in future (Apel and Nagin, 
2017; Rose et al., 2015) 
The analysis process includes the assessment of fraud risks and suggestions to minimise 
these risks. These suggestions may relate to allocating more funds, staff availability, 
training and sophisticated technology, so it is necessary to involve senior management in 
analysis process (Coulson-Thomas, 2017; Yelland, 2013). Additionally, organisations are 
suggested to evaluate the performance of employees, their strength and weakness and 
quality of work in fraud management, which will help the management to improve the 
human aspects of fraud management (Vahdati and Yasini, 2015). This shows that the 
senior managers should regularly evaluate the performance of employees who are 
involved in fraud management, which can increase the effectiveness of its process in e-
tail organisations. However, the managerial practices regarding the evaluation of 
employee’s performance and their factors for identity fraud management have not been 
analysed in e-tail organisations. 
The fraud vulnerability review helps organisations to improve prevention and detection 
strategies (Seda, 2014). Such reviews analyse the organisational exposure to the fraud 
attempts and help predict possible ways of fraud attempts, based on that review; 
organisations can establish effective prevention and detection strategies (Bierstaker et al., 
2006). Organisations should also analyse the performance of detection system through 
statistical and false positive ratio analysis, to locate the weaknesses of the technology. 
Furthermore, evaluation of prevention system is also suggested, for which penetration 
test and vulnerability assessment are recommended (Rogers, 1975; Seda, 2014).  
For the effectiveness of overall fraud management, organisations should analyse the 
performance of the tools, techniques and processes used in identity fraud management, 
as it would help to enhance their performance (Dorminey et al., 2012; Phan and Vogel, 
2010). Additionally, Fraud analysis may also include risk assessment, knowing fraud 
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trends, diagnosing patterns and methods of frauds and calculating the fraud losses (Apel 
and Nagin, 2017; Rose et al., 2015; Yelland, 2013). The fraud risks and emerging trends 
should continuously be monitored as with the technological advancements, online fraud 
and its trends are rapidly changing Weisman and Brodsky (2011). The literature findings 
on fraud analysis are given in the following table. 
Table 2. 9 List of the practices suggested for fraud analysis 
Source Practices Interpretations 
(Coulson-
Thomas, 2017) 
- Involve the top-level 
management in the analysis of 
frauds, to seek their input into fraud 
management. 
- Involvement of top-level 
management will ensure input 
from all areas of business. 
(Apel and 
Nagin, 2017) 
- Fraud analysis should include risk 
assessment, knowing fraud trends, 
diagnosing patterns and methods of 
frauds, calculating fraud losses and 
evaluating the system. 
- Fraud analysis should be 
comprehensive enough to 





-  For the effectiveness of identity 
fraud management, organisations 
should analyse the performance of 
tools, techniques and process 
involved in it.  
- Such practice would help in 
improving the performance of 







- Analysis process should help to 
improve the management of 
identity theft. 
- Suggestions for 
improvement should be the 
outcome of IDF analysis 
process. (Yelland, 2013) 
(Vahdati and 
Yasini, 2015) 
- Organisations should analyse the 
performance of employees, their 
strength and weakness and quality 
of work in fraud management. 
- Such analysis would help to 
improve the staff 
performance in IDFM. 
(Seda, 2014)  - The performance of prevention 
tools should be analysed by 
penetration testing and 
vulnerability assessment. 
- These tests can identify 
limitations of the system and 
may help improving them.  
 (Weisman and 
Brodsky, 2011) 
- Organisations should 
continuously monitor the frauds 
risks, and its management practices 
as the fraud are dynamic and 
evolving.  
- Continuous monitoring of 
fraud risks and management 
would help to cope with 
emerging fraud trends and 
their management. 
(Jamieson et al., 
2007) 
- Review the performance of stages 
of identity fraud management and 
suggest improvements. 
 
- Organisations should analyse the 
past and suggest improvements in 
future practices in IDFM. 
- Performance review of each 
stage of fraud management 
would help to identity and 
redress their limitations. 
- Base on previous 
arrangements and 
countermeasures, analysis 
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- Analyse the vulnerability of 
organisation for fraud risks. 
 
- Analyse the performance of 
detection system through statistical 
and false positive ratio analysis.   
- It would help to develop 
countermeasures to manage 
IDFs. 
- Performance analysis of 





- Review the performance of each 
fraud management stage and 
provide feedback and measures to 
improve it. 
- Such review practice would 
help improving overall 
management of IDFs. 
The practices at the analysis stage (see Table 2.9) are related to fraud risk management, 
review of the performance of tools, techniques and process and that of the staff members 
in fraud management. Accordingly, an analysis stage helps to improve management of 
identity frauds.  
Although, these suggestions are significant to improve identity fraud management, 
however managerial practices on how e-tail organisations analyse their systems and staff 
performance, are missing. Therefore, this study tries to analyse managerial practices in 
identity fraud analyses in e-tail sector and forwards some improvements for an effective 
analysis. 
2.8.6 Policy 
The managerial practices under the policy may include the creation, evaluation, 
communication and compliance with the policies to manage the frauds effectively 
(Wilhelm, 2004). Creating and maintaining an anti-fraud policy is necessary to guide the 
employees and to maintain the organisational performance. So while making an anti-fraud 
policy, the organisations should consider all the stages in fraud management and ensure 
its compliance to safeguard against identity frauds (Njenga and Osiemo, 2013).  
Fraud management policies are the matter of survival for business organisations, therefore 
these should be dealt at the higher ranks and should be included in boardroom agenda 
(Coulson-Thomas, 2017) as they can consider all the fields in the area and the overall 
business needs. In addition, employees’ participation is also necessary because it has a 
two-fold advantage (Chen et al., 2015). First, they input their initial information gained 
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through their personal experiences and second, their involvement in the policy 
development can be a motivating factor to its compliance (Chen et al., 2015).  
Furthermore, fraud policies should include the technical, organisational and human 
aspects of fraud management, as an absence of any aspect would limit its effectiveness 
(Ji et al., 2007; Rhee et al., 2012). In addition, organisations that share their information 
with other parties and contractors should also ensure same information security protocols 
and anti-fraud policies for them (Liu et al., 2010). 
After devising fraud management policies, the organisation should regularly evaluate and 
update those (Bechtsoudis and Sklavos, 2012). This helps to ensure that the policies are 
helping to achieve their purpose. Updating policies in response to emerging threats are 
critical for ensuring that the objectives of the policies are being achieved, but how e-tail 
organisations update identity fraud policies, and frequency of their review is not known 
in the literature.   
Without proper compliance the developed policies will not yield desired results. For 
effective compliance, policy awareness is the first step. To this end, organisations should 
communicate the policies to each related staff member and ensure that the recipient read 
and understood the policies (Bierstaker et al., 2006; Siponen et al., 2014; Soomro et al., 
2016).  
Additionally, awareness training is also suggested by Singh, et al., (2013). The 
suggestions for policy communication and creating awareness through training are pre-
requisite for any policy compliance, but what channels are effective for policy 
communication and how to ensure that staff read and understood identity fraud policies 
in e-tail organisations had not been analysed. 
In addition to policy communication and awareness, organisations should have a 
mechanism to monitor and audit policy compliance (Chen et al., 2015; Parsons et al., 
2014; Singh et al., 2013). Monitoring is a continuous process implemented by the 
immediate supervisors to ensure that the staff is complying with fraud policies effectively. 
For this it is necessary that the senior staff should be aware of related policies (Njenga 
and Osiemo, 2013; Wright, 2007).  
In addition, the organisations should provide training and awareness to their staff on 
policy compliance methods and processes (Chen et al., 2015; Singh et al., 2013; Soomro 
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et al., 2016). Such training and awareness influence the employees’ perceptions and 
assumptions on identity frauds, which result in compliance behaviour of fraud policies. 
The literature findings on the managerial practices regarding IDFM policies and related 
issues are summarised in the following table.  
Table 2. 10 List of the practices suggested for fraud policy 
Source Practices Interpretations 
(Coulson-
Thomas, 2017) 
- Fraud management policies 
should be dealt at highest ranks 
in organisations 
- Involvement of top level 
management may ensure 
comprehensive policies on 
IDFM. 
(Soomro et al., 
2016) 
- Organisations should have 
comprehensive policies on 
information security. 
- Organizations should create 
policy awareness. 
- Train the employees on policy 
compliance methods. 
- It would cover a wider 
aspects of IDFM. 
 
- Policy awareness is a key to 
compliance. 
- It would help them to 
comply with IDFM policies. 
(Chen et al., 
2015) 
- Encourage employees’ 
participation in the design and 
development of information 
security policies. 
- Ensure policy compliance 
through close monitoring. 
- It’s a motivational 
technique for effective policy 
compliance. 
 
- Immediate supervisors 
should ensure policy 
compliance.  
(Parsons et al., 
2014) 
 
- Make the employees aware of 
the information security policies. 
 
- Train the staff to develop their 
positive attitude towards the 
policy compliance. 
- Organisations should have 
policy compliance mechanism. 
- Policy awareness is first 
step toward policy 
compliance. 
- It enhances staff motivation 
toward the compliance. 
 
- It would help ensuring 
effective compliance. 
(Siponen et al., 
2014) 
- Create awareness, as it is a 
useful mechanism for policy 
compliance. 
- Unless staff know the 




- Create and maintain an anti-
fraud policy to guide the 
employees. 
- While making an anti-fraud 
policy, consider all stages of 
fraud management and overall 
business objectives. 
- Anti-fraud policies should 
apply to all members of staff 
including the senior managers. 
- Management should create 
policies for all to comply 
with. 
- IDFM policies should be 
comprehensive to cover every 
aspect of fraud management. 
 
- Every staff member should 
comply with the IDFM 
policies regardless of their 
designation. 
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(Singh et al., 
2013) 
- Organisations should have 
comprehensive policies on 
information security. 
- For the compliance of policies, 
awareness and training programs 
should be implemented. 
-  There should be an effective 
mechanism for policy 
compliance. 
- Firms should have a set of 
policies on information 
security. 
- Policy awareness and 
training are necessary for 
compliance. 
- Staff should know the 




- Update the policies regularly.  
 
- The policies should be 
evaluated to ensure their 
effectiveness for the purpose. 
- It helps to counter emerging 
challenges. 
- Such evaluation would 
result in the effectiveness of 
the policies. 
(Ji et al., 2007)  - The policies should focus on 
technical, organisational and 
human aspects of fraud 
management.  
- Such policies would be 
comprehensive to encompass 
every aspect of fraud 
management. 
(Rhee et al., 
2012) 
(Liu et al., 2010) - Regularly update the policies 
for their effectiveness. 
 
- Organisations should ensure the 
same policy for third party 
contractors regarding the IS and 
fraud management. 
- With the emerging fraud 
trends, policies become 
obsolete. 
- Shared customer data has 
similar risks at other firms, so 
businesses should ensure 
similar policies with partners.  
(Albrechtsen and 
Hovden, 2010) 
- Involve the employees in policy 
development. 
 
- Enhance the employees’ 
knowledge of policy and 
compliance methods. 
- It helps to develop effective 
policies and is a motivational 
technique for compliance. 
- Having knowledge on 
compliance methods would 
create a complying culture. 
(Wright, 2007) - Anti-fraud policies should also 
apply to the senior management. 
 
- Anti-fraud policies should 
establish the organisation’s 
commitment to combating frauds 
and communicate organisational 
stance against frauds. 
- Every staff member should 
comply with anti-fraud 
policies. 
- Anti-fraud polices should 
reflect firms standing against 
frauds. 
(Bierstaker et al., 
2006) 
- Organisations should develop 
and maintain anti-fraud policies. 
- Anti-fraud policies should be 
stand-alone and distinct from 
firm’s code of conduct. 
-  A written acknowledgement 
should be ensured that all the 
staff have received a copy and 
understood it.   
- Having policies is the first 
step towards IDFM. 
- Anti-fraud policies should 
have a separate recognition. 
 
- It helps to ensure policy 
compliance. 
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Anti-fraud policies have a significant impact on the management of information security 
and frauds. Table 2.10 presents the managerial practices suggested by various authors in 
information security, internal, banking and accounting frauds.  The extant literature 
suggests various managerial practices on policy development, updating, communication 
and awareness and compliance, but the literature on managerial practices in e-tail sector 
is missing. Therefore this study tries to analyse managerial practices in e-tail sector to 
give an insight into the sector and suggest some improvements in identity fraud related 
policies and related issues.  
2.8.7 Investigation 
In the fraud management domain, investigation refers to practices related to inquiries into 
the facts about the fraud, collecting physical and digital evidence to identify the fraudsters 
(Jamieson et al., 2007). So far, the fraud investigations should be focused on collecting 
sufficient evidence for effective prosecution and means for the recovery of losses (Furlan 
and Bajec, 2008; Rose et al., 2015).  
Wilhelm (2004) suggests three sets of practices, i.e., internal investigations, external 
investigations and coordination with law enforcing agencies. The internal investigation 
practices refer to investigations of employees, contractors and vendors. Investigation of 
customers for fraudulent claims and practices to find facts on committed frauds are the 
part of external investigations. The coordination with law enforcing agencies refers to 
providing information, evidence and sources of the frauds, and to maintain a partnership 
with every level of the law enforcing entities. Such practice of coordinating with law 
enforcing agencies is also recommended as inevitable for online fraud investigation by 
Cross and Blackshaw (2014).  
Law enforcement agencies face problems when gathering and preserving evidence from 
live systems, electronic devices, search and seize the devices and other technological 
issues (Cross and Blackshaw, 2014). Business organisations should help them in 
technological areas and build a close partnership for effective investigation (Gogolin and 
Jones, 2010). The law enforcing agencies may lack interest in small financial frauds as 
they have some other important responsibilities (Cross and Blackshaw, 2014). However, 
the collaboration and effectiveness of investigation can be enhanced by employing a team 
of specialist investigators (Amori, 2008). These specialist investigators should have a 
background in fraud investigations and knowledge on technological systems to extract 
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evidence and build a case for prosecution (Lewis et al., 2014). These suggestions are 
based on studies on the ability of law enforcing agencies in dealing with digital crime. 
Despite the fact that these studies show the significance of employing private 
investigators, literature is missing on what should be their specialities, their working 
background and how to enable them working with e-tail organisation-specific 
technological systems in identity fraud investigations domain.  
With a team of specialist investigators, business organisations should conduct the 
investigations at their end and be involved in a further investigation conducted by law 
enforcement agencies (Brooks and Button, 2011; Lewis et al., 2014). Only financial 
aspect is involved in identity frauds in e-tail sector, and with a small amount involved, 
the law enforcing agencies are reluctant to take the cases and investigate (Cross and 
Blackshaw, 2014). Sometimes the local police are not interested in online frauds, because 
of lacking technical expertise in digital investigations, so identity fraud investigations at 
the business end are inevitable (Lewis et al., 2014). Investigations of identity frauds at 
the organisational end is significant, but no study presents a clearer picture of how e-tail 
organisations investigate identity frauds.      
The collection of evidence is a critical part of investigations; organisations are advised to 
collect evidence from internal and external sources and field investigations (Cross and 
Blackshaw, 2014). The internal investigations refer to extracting evidence from live 
information systems, databases and other sources. The use of internal and external sources 
is significant to collect evidence. The external sources may include telephone directories, 
financial databases, credit history and any other data bases available through external 
organisations. 
The investigation should include a complete set of documents, description of the 
activities, contact information, and physical and digital evidence (Wilhelm, 2004). After 
collecting the evidence, it is necessary to preserve it. Online organisations should have an 
authentic electronic evidence preservation system to preserve the evidence for the courts 
of law (Gogolin and Jones, 2010). The collection and preservation of digital evidence 
need technical expertise and forensic resources. The availability of these resources 
requires sufficient funds, so organisations should invest in human resources and 
technology to make its investigations more effective (Wang et al., 2006). Collecting and 
preserving digital evidence and documentation of frauds is critical in investigations, but 
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how e-tail organisations document, collect and preserve digital evidence is missing in the 
literature. Furthermore, it has not been analysed that what evidences are required to justify 
and prosecute the fraudsters. Therefore, this study analyses these managerial practices to 
verify their significance in identity fraud investigations in e-tail sector and suggest 
improvements. 
Table 2. 11 List of the practices suggested for fraud investigation 





- For effective investigations, 
close coordination with police 
should be established. 
- Law enforcing agencies may not 
investigate all frauds, so business 
organisations should come 
forward to investigate privately.  
- Collect evidence from internal 
and external sources for field 
investigation and prosecution.  
- It helps to take legal action 
against fraudsters. 
 
- E-tailers should assume the 
responsibilities of IDF 
investigations. 
 
- Evidence collection should be 
the core function of fraud 
investigations. 
(Amori, 2008) - For better investigations and 
prosecution, organisations should 
consider private agencies or 
appoint expert team. 
- Government agencies are less 
interested in small scale 
business frauds, so firms 
should take such responsibility. 
(Brooks and 
Button, 2011) 
- Conduct investigations at the 
business end. 
- Be involved in further 
investigations conducted by law 
enforcement agencies.  
- E-tailers should assume the 
responsibility of fraud 
investigations and coordinate 
with law enforcing agencies for 
further actions. 




- Fruad investigations should be 
aimed at collecting evidence, 
which supports for effective 
prosecution.  
- Fraud investigations should also 
focus on recovery of losses.  
- Evidence collection during 
fraud investigations should be 
supporing for prosecution. 
 
- It would help businesses to 
controll fraud losses.  




- Develop strong coordination 
with law enforcing organisations 
by helping them in technological 
areas. 
- Build a close partnership with 
law enforcing organisations for 
effective investigation.   
- Authentic electronic evidence 
preservation system should be 
adopted. 
- Law enforcing agencies may 
lack required technologies to 
collect digital evidence, so 
firms should come a step ahead. 
- Help law enforcing agencies 
in fraud investigations. 
 
- Firms should have a system to 
preserve electronic evidences. 
(Jamieson et 
al., 2007)    
- Police lack interest in online 
frauds because of lack of 
resources and IT skills. 
- E-tailers should assume the 
responsibility of fraud 
investigations. 
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(Lewis et al., 
2014) 
 
- For investigations, organisations 
should have skilled and 
experienced investigators and 
forensic experts. 
-  Organisations should have 
knowledge of state laws on 
investigation and prosecution.  
- Organisations should have an 
expert system on preserving and 
presenting the evidence.  
- Business firms are expected 
to have specialist fraud 
investigators. 
 
- Knowledge on state law 
regarding on fraud is pivotal for 
effective investigations. 
- E-tailers should assume 
responsibility to preserve and 
present digital evidence. 
(Wang et al., 
2006) 
- Invest in resources for effective 
investigations of frauds.  
- Sufficient investment is 




- Investigations should include a 
complete set of documents, 
description of the activities, 
contact information, any physical 
and digital evidence. 
- Investigation practices should 
include the coordination with law 
enforcing agencies. 
- Investigation reports should 
be comprehensive, to include 
all the information required for 
prosecution. 
 
- Without coordination with 
law enforcing agencies, fraud 
may not give required outcome. 
Table 2.11 presents the managerial practices for effective investigations of digital crime, 
business and identity frauds. Most of these practices are focused on information security 
attacks and other technological aspects. A few of these are focused on police role and 
organisations arrangements, but the practices on how online retail organisations 
investigate identity fraud are still missing. Further, the practices on how online retail 
organisations cooperate with police and other law enforcing agencies are also missing. 
Therefore, this research analyses the managerial practices on how these organisations 
investigate identity frauds and cooperate with law enforcing agencies. This research also 
suggests some improvements in fraud investigations to e-tail organisations. 
2.8.8 Prosecution 
The prosecution stage refers to the litigation with the fraudsters in the courts of law to get 
the fraudsters punished and request the court for appropriate compensation (Wilhelm, 
2004). Successful prosecutions send explicit messages to potential fraudsters, which 
enhance the deterrence and business reputation against fraudsters (Dorminey, 2012). The 
fraudsters are sanctioned and punished according to the state laws, which vary from 
country to country (Brook and button 2012). As this study is based in the UK, so the 
fraudsters are prosecuted according to the laws of this country. Related to the identity 
frauds, UK has Fraud act 2006 to prosecute the fraudsters.  
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According to the Fraud Act, 2006 section 1, “A person is guilty of fraud if he is in breach 
of any of the sections listed in subsection (2) (which provide for different ways of 
committing the offence”. Regarding the Identity fraud sub-section 2 (a) mentions that any 
false representation is a fraud, and its result would be a fine or an imprisonment or both 
(Savirimuthu and Savirimuthu, 2007). 
The business organisations should involve in prosecution process as the law enforcing 
agencies have less expertise in collecting, preserving and presenting the digital evidence 
(Gogolin and Jones, 2010). In the absence of state intervention frauds are growing. 
Therefore, private organisations should involve in investigation and prosecution (Lewis 
et al., 2014). Although, the successful prosecution has a direct impact on deterrence 
through creating fear of punishment which helps to reduce the frauds. However, it 
depends upon the role of e-tail organisations how aggressively they involve in prosecution 
to get fraudsters punished. Moreover, the prosecution is the process in which various 
external organisations and law enforcement agencies are involved, such as police and 
private investigation and recovery firms. Nevertheless, managerial practices for 
information sharing with outside organisations have not been analysed. In addition, it has 
also not been analysed what and how they present the information based on evidence with 
the court and other entities to prosecute the fraudsters. Therefore, this study analyses the 
managerial practices for the prosecution of identity fraudsters in e-tail organisation.  
2.9 Finding a Research Gap 
Identity frauds have a critical impact on online business organisations. They constitutes 
more than half of total frauds faced by the business industry. Every year a significant 
amount of revenues is lost through fraud. This has a negative impact on the customers’ 
buying behaviour and a significant obstacle towards the growth of the online business 
industry.  
The extant literature has many studies on identity fraud, but only a few studies present a 
comprehensive approach to identity fraud management. However, the few practices 
discussed in identity fraud management literature do not have a direct focus on e-tail 
organisations. For a comprehensive approach to identity fraud management, previously 
mentioned stages are commonly suggested. The literature at each stage of fraud 
management has been reviewed, and some related frameworks were also discussed giving 
a meaningful insight into the state of the literature.  
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Deterrence has been focused on as the first line of defence. The extant literature (see 
Table 2.4) has many studies on the importance of deterrence in fraud management. 
Various studies have focused on the significance of deterrence and suggested actions to 
make the deterrence more effective (see Table 2.4). At the same time, investigation of 
managerial practice in identity fraud deterrence in e-tail organisations is still missing. 
This indicates a research gap that needs to be bridged to promote improvements in fraud 
deterrence in e-tail firms. 
Similarly, there are numerous studies that are focused on customer education and 
awareness as measures of information theft prevention and fraud deterrence (Amori, 
2008; McGee and Byington, 2015; Arachchilage and Love, 2014; Dorminey et al., 2012; 
He et al., 2014; Seda, 2014), but there are no studies investigating these issues in realtion 
to the e-tail industry. To rectify this situation, the present study investigates managerial 
practices in customer education for effective identity fraud deterrence, and forwards some 
suggestions to improve these practices in e-tailing. 
Prevention is a critical stage in IDFM. At this stage measures are taken to prevent any 
IDT and securing customers’ account from unauthorised access. For preventing the IDT 
various studies have been carried out (Albrecht et al., 2011; Alrashed, 2016; Baz et al., 
2017; Copes et al., 2010; Devos and Pipan, 2009; Holt and Turner, 2012; Meinert, 2016; 
Prosch, 2009; Seda, 2014; Usman and Shah, 2013; Vijaya Geeta, 2011), but no significant 
research has been carried to investigate IDT prevention issues in the e-tail sector. 
Additionally, there have been some studies on preventing unauthoirsed access on 
customers’ accounts (Mansfield-Devine, 2013; Prakash et al., 2015; Teh et al., 2016), 
however, no study has been found on the prevention of unauthorised access on e-tail 
customers’ account. Thus, the managerial practices on identity fraud prevention are still 
missing in e-tail sector. To help bridging this gap, the present study analyses managerial 
practices in preventing IDT and unauthorised access on customers’ account for effective 
IDF prevention and suggests improvements in these practices in e-tailing.  
Table 2.6 presents the managerial practices for detection as suggested by various authors. 
The practices of having automated detection system and verification of suspicious 
transactions are recommended by various reserchers (Al-Jumeily et al., 2015; Allan and 
Zhan, 2010; Becker et al., 2010; Carneiro et al., 2017; Dorfleitner and Jahnes, 2014; 
Ghosh, 2010; Hardouin, 2009; Njenga and Osiemo, 2013; Peotta et al., 2011; Swathi and 
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Kalpana, 2013) in different contexts. Additionally, some studies (Phua et al., 2010; Tan 
et al., 2016) on fraud detection are focused on technological aspects only. So far, no study 
has been found focusing on the detection of IDFs in the e-tail industry. To rectify this 
situation, the present research analyses managerial practices and forwards suggestions to 
improve these practices for an effective IDF detection in e-tail sector. 
Similarly, no substantial work covering the mitigation of identity frauds in online retail 
organisations has been found. None of the studies on IDF mitigation (Jamieson et al., 
2007; Power and Power, 2015; Wilhelm, 2004) has investigated managerial practice in 
IDF mitigation in e-tailing. This study responds to the challenge by understanding IDFM, 
analysing the managerial practices in IDF mitigation and forwards suggestion to improve 
these practices in e-tail industry.  
Analysis of IDFs is a critical stage that helps to develop policies and strategies for 
effective IDFM. The extant literature has some studies on fraud analysis (Bierstaker et 
al., 2006; Coulson-Thomas, 2017; Rose et al., 2015; Seda, 2014; Vahdati and Yasini, 
2015; Vidalis and Angelopoulou, 2014) but none of these studies have focused on IDF 
analysis in e-tail sector. In the absence of any research, the e-tailers have no significant 
practices to control IDF through effective fraud analysis. To correct that situation, this 
research investigates the managerial practices in IDF analysis in e-tail industry. The 
present study suggests some improvements in existing managerial practices, which will 
help e-tailers to improve IDF analysis process leading to adopt better anti-fraud strategies.   
Policies have critical role in driving the behaviour of staff towards the achievement of 
organisational objectives. In IDFM, policies have significant role to adopt anti-fraud 
practices. The extant literature has some studies (Chen et al., 2015; Coulson-Thomas, 
2017; Njenga and Osiemo, 2013; Parsons et al., 2014; Singh et al., 2013; Soomro et al., 
2016) but none of these have investigated managerial practices related to policy issues in 
e-tail sector. To help bridging this gap, the present research analyses the managerial 
practices in IDFM policies and related issues. This study suggests improvements in 
existing managerial practices and adds some more practices for the development, 
communication, awareness and compliance of IDFM policies in e-tail sectorIn the same 
vein, studies on investigation and prosecution (see table 2.10) are not focused on the 
identity fraud management in e-tail sector. The absence of such practices in e-tail industry 
results in lack of proper investigation and prosecution of IDFs. To rectify this situation, 
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the present study analyses the managerial practices in investigation and prosecution of 
IDFs in e-tail sector. 
This study helps to understand the management of identity fraud, analyses the managerial 
practices in e-tailing and suggest improvements. The issue of identity fraud relates to 
online sales of e-tailers, so better managerial practices may help in effective management 
of identity frauds (Jamieson et al., 2007; Wilhelm, 2004). Researching the firms at 
grassroots level may be effective to help improving their core functions. However, 
effective management of identity frauds needs a comprehensive set of managerial 
practices at each stage of fraud management. The grassroots level study may help better 
in incorporating the basic functions related to production, human resources management, 
financial and operational management, whereas IDFM is more focused on managerial 
practices limited to combat online frauds based on stolen or fictitious identities. Such 
study may not be helpful in management of identity frauds as it requires a set of advanced 
managerial practices with support from IT and information sharing with outside industry. 
Therefore, this study is limited to understand IDFM, analyse managerial practices and 
suggest improvements for e-tail sector.  
To summarise, there have been some studies on comprehensive fraud management. The 
extant literature also has some studies focusing on one or more stages of fraud 
management. These studies have suggested various managerial practices at each stage of 
fraud management in various contexts. Although, there are numerous managerial 
practices at each stage of fraud management, however, these have not been analysed in 
identity fraud management in e-tail context. These are some questions awaiting 
resolution: What managerial practices are there to manage each stage of identity fraud 
management? Are the practices of fraud management existing outside e-tailing going to 
be effective in the e-tail context? Moreover, how can these practices be improved to make 
identity fraud management effective in e-tail sector? To investigate these issues, this study 
aims at understanding IDFM, analysing the managerial practices at each stage of the fraud 
management and suggest improvements, through an empirical study. Thus, the objectives 
of this research are: a) to explore identity fraud types facing the e-tail sector in the UK, 
b) to investigate the existing managerial practices of IDFM in e-tail sector and c) to extend 
the fraud management lifecycle framework (Wilhelm, 2004) for improving managerial 
practices in IDFM in e-tail sector. The Fraud management lifecycle framework has also 
been extended in the current context, the proposed framework is presented below. 
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Figure 2. 6 A Conceptual Framework for Management of Identity Fraud. 
 
2.10 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter presented an overall view of the existing state of the art in fraud 
management. At the beginning, literature was reviewed and significance of managerial 
practices was explored in business management. The types and the impact of identity 
frauds on UK’s economy were presented. The picture of identity fraud types and its trends 
were also conceptualised to understand the frauds, trends and implications. The literature 
on the management of fraud was reviewed to understand what constitutes an effective 
fraud management. Thus, the eight stages were found to be critical for fraud management. 
Based on the understandings on a holistic approach for fraud management, the literature 
was reviewed to explore frameworks. After exploring fraud management frameworks, 
these were reviewed to evaluate their appropriateness for extension in identity fraud 
management. Thus, selection of an appropriate framework would help to explore 
managerial practices in fraud management at each stage and analysis of empirical results 
from e-tail organisations. 
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Managerial practices at each of the eight stages were explored in fraud management. 
Reviewing literature on these managerial practices helped to understand the current state 
of the art in fraud management and their limitations. During the review process, it was 
found that no study has been focused on IDFM in e-tail sector. Although, no research was 
found in IDFM in e-tail context, yet the literature on managerial practices in different 
contexts would help to analyse empirical data, to know their significance and limitations. 
In the absence of IDFM practices in e-tail sector, the process of integrating the literature 
and empirical data would result in suggesting effective managerial practices.    
The extant literature helped to understand the weaknesses in IDFM system, not only in 
relation  to having or not having any system but the issues related to how  these systems 
are implemented in the current domain, and what makes these systems work effectively, 
are more critical. So far, how and what about the technology, people and process directed 
this study towards an in-depth enquiry into the issues of IDFM. Therefore, the qualitative 
method has been adopted, and semi-structured interviews were conducted to know how 
what and why about IDFM practices. Furthermore, the review process also helped to 
understand that separate management of the stages is not possible in small and medium 
organisations, therefore, large organisations were selected for data collection. The 
methodology of this study is presented in the next chapter. 
  





The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the philosophy adopted in this research as well 
as to explain and justify the choice of specific research methods used for data collection. 
Methodology is a critical part of any research as it helps to attain the research objective. 
Selection of appropriate methods and approaches is a critical decision, which can affect 
the reliability and validity of the research. Therefore, each selected approach or method 
has to be justified with the aims and objectives of this research in mind.     
This research is aimed at understanding IDFM, analysing the managerial practices in e-
tail organisations based in the UK and suggesting improvements by extending the fraud 
management lifecycle framework proposed by Wilhelm (2004). To achieve the research 
objectives the qualitative approach of data collection is used. In the previous chapter, a 
comprehensive review of the literature was carried out, which allowed to identify a 
research gap.  
In this chapter, relevant research philosophies are discussed and the most appropriate one 
is selected. Furthermore, the two main research methodologies, quantitative and 
qualitative, are analysed from the point of view of their potential use in this study. The 
quantitative methodology is associated with the positivist philosophy and is preoccupied 
with quantification, replicability, objectivity and causality (Bryman, 2015). On the other 
hand, qualitative research helps to understand the real world in actions. As a result, 
qualitative methods help the researcher to understand the problem under investigation by 
collecting the data in a natural setting (Creswell and Poth, 2017). Within a qualitative 
dataset, ethnography, grounded theory and case study are the most common research 
designs. In this chapter I examine these research designs in terms of their appropriateness 
for this study and conclude in favour of a case study design. A detailed presentation of 
the implemented case study design that follows ensures the replicability of my research.     
This research uses the identity fraud management lifecycle framework proposed by 
Wilhelm (2004) as an underpinning theory. This requires the adoption of a deductive 
approach to extracting themes from primary sources. The findings are prodiced through 
thematic analysis based on coding, categorising and extracting themes from a qualitative 
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dataset. This research uses three real-life case studies for data collection, and predefined 
criteria were setup for the selection of the cases. A pilot study was conducted to test the 
research instrument for validity. Figure 3.1 presents approaches adopted for this study, 
and each section is detailed in this chapter.  
 
Figure 3. 1 The Honey Comb of the Research Methodology (Wilson, 2014) 
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3.2 Research Philosophy 
According to Easterby-Smith et al. (2013), research philosophy is important because it 
helps to choose the research design, the types of evidence required for research and the 
method of their collection. It also assists the researcher to recognise the subject 
constraints. Every academic research is guided by a set of beliefs, or paradigm, which is 
based on ontological and epistemological assumptions (Wilson, 2014).  
3.2.1 Ontology 
Ontology is concerned with the assumptions, researchers make about reality and the 
theoretical perspective they employ in their research. It is concerned with the research 
ideas about the relationships between people, society and the world (Eriksson and 
Kovalainen, 2015).  
There are different ontological schools. According to the subjective school, the reality is 
based on perceptions and experiences, which differ from person to person and may vary 
over a period of time. From this perspective, the reality is multiple because it is observed 
through many individual points of views (Creswell and Poth, 2017). By contrast, 
objectivism assumes that the social world has an independent existence and is not affected 
by people and their actions. The present research is focused on the managerial practices 
implemented by peoples. These practices are based on the actions and experiences of 
individuals, which are grounded in transmission of information. Therefore, this study 
assumes reality as a contextual field of information, whereby individuals share and 
process information, related to certain contexts. Furthermore, the present study assumes 
that managerial practices are the reflections of the information process in IDFM context, 
so this research tries to analyse these practices.  
3.2.2 Epistemology 
Epistemology is related to the investigations of the nature of knowledge and customs of 
inquiring into the social and physical worlds (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015). 
Epistemological assumptions within research relate to the understanding of the 
knowledge, the ways it is created and the methods to learn it (Ritchie et al., 2014).  
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Epistemological assumptions within research relate to the understanding of the 
knowledge and the ways it is created. Much scholarly debate has surrounded the issue of 
whether social science can be studied in the same manner as the natural science is studied. 
Within business research, those who agree with applying scientific methods to business 
research tend to follow the positivist position, which “advocates the application of the 
methods of the natural sciences to the study of social reality” ((Bryman and Bell, 2015). 
Others oppose the replication of such methods to social processes because they believe 
that society cannot be investigated in the same way as nature. They advocate an 
interpretivist approach. Both approaches are discussed below.   
a) Positivism 
Positivism uses the scientific approach for investigations, which assumes reality as an 
objective construct and may not be affected by human actions ((Orlikowski and Baroudi, 
1991).  This paradigm is also used to investigate phenomena of a fixed relationship 
through a structured instrument. Additionally, positivism is more related to understand 
the process and actions without knowing the subjective information behind these 
processes and actions.  
Positivism may not be an appropriate paradigm for this research as it would create a 
problem if respondents are considered as autonomous, which overlooks their capability 
to reflect on the problem and their reaction to it (Robinson, 2002). Further, under the 
positivism, principal data collection methods are the experiments and sample surveys, 
which are carried out while the researcher being remote (Christie et al., 2000). Contrary 
to it, the aim of this research is to understand IDFM, analyse the managerial practices and 
suggest improvements, so scientific methods of inequity may not be workable to achieve 
the objectives of this study. 
b) Interpretivism 
Interpretivism refers that reality is determined by human actions and perceptions. It is 
also termed as ‘social construction’ or ‘constructionism’. The concept of interpretivism 
is rooted in Hermeneutics and Phenomenology (Blaikie, 2007). Hermeneutics relates to 
the interpretation of the text and linking a meaning to that text (Delanty, 2005). The 
Phenomenology refers to the perceptions of the individuals for making sense of the world 
they live in, so it assumes reality as subjective, constructed by people (Bryman, 2015).  
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Interpretivism believes that access to reality is through social constructions such as 
language, consciousness, and shared meaning (Myers and Avison, 1997). Social 
constructionism believes that reality is determined by peoples, rather than objectives or 
external factors (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015). Thus, the bases for determining the reality 
are the acquired information and experiences gained in the related contexts.  
The interpretivism significantly differentiates between the research objectives of social 
and natural sciences. In natural sciences, the researcher develops some hypothesis and 
theories and tries to fix any of these with the phenomena under investigations. Contrarily, 
a social science researcher investigates phenomena to understand the social world, 
developed by the individuals through their perceptions and actions. This view of 
interpretivism rejects the objective reality and assumes reality as subjective and socially 
constructed by human actors.       
The subject matter of this study is managerial practices within e-tail organisations in 
reaction to a new and developing contextual challenges. These managerial practices are 
based on the perceptions, knowledge and experiences of individuals within certain 
contexts. Peoples have different perceptions based on their experiences and various other 
factors. After all, this research is to understand IDFM and analyse managerial practices, 
which are based on the perceptions, knowledge and experiences of individuals in e-tail 
industry, so the scientific principles of knowing the reality might not help to attain the 
objectives of this research. Therefore, the philosophy of epistemology with interpretivism 
paradigm was the best choice to analyse the managerial practices in real world setting. 
3.3 Selection of research methods 
This research investigates reality as an ever-changing activity based on the transmission 
of information. In this reality human beings are constantly involved in interaction with 
their contexts on the basis of receiving, interpreting and acting on information they obtain 
through this interaction. Following this ontological outlook, this study investigates the 
informed opinions of managers regarding identity fraud management as an operational 
challenge, managerial response and reasons behind their actions and practices. Qualitative 
research suits these objectives best because it gives details of events and reasons of 
happenings (Bryman, 2013; Gray, 2013; Myers, 2013). Qualitative research explores 
answers to “how”, “why” and “what” aspects of problems and issues (Yin, 2014). This 
study seeks to highlight on what managerial practices are effective and why by 
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investigating such practices in relation to real life settings. The qualitative strategy of data 
collection is the most appropriate for the purpose (Gray, 2013). 
This project is undertaken in the area of study, which is new and under-researched. Thus, 
it is not limited to understand IDFM and existing managerial practices but also explore 
new ones at each stage of identity fraud management. The extant literature suggests that 
qualitative research is a good choice for an exploratory study like this (Myers, 2013).  
Qualitative research methods are highly flexible; they allow a variety of research 
strategies and data collection methods (Gray, 2013). These strategies and data collection 
methods are detailed in next section.  
 3.4 Research strategy 
The extant literature offers various research strategies including ethnography, grounded 
theory and case study (Boss et al., 2015; Gonzalez and Tacorante, 2004; Mithas and Rust, 
2016; Subramony, 2006).  These research strategies and their relevance to the present 
study are discussed below.   
3.4.1 Ethnography 
 Ethnography is a qualitative strategy of data collection in which the researcher tries to 
understand the shared values and patterns of a group (Creswell and Poth, 2017). It is based 
on extended time spent in the field, frequent interactions with community under study, 
building relationships with them and participating in community life, such observations 
and experiences are then transformed into a meaningful study (Cunliffe, 2010). Thus, the 
ethnographic method requires the researcher to become part of the group under study and 
collects data through direct experiences. Consequently, it is instrumental in investigating 
complex interactions and patterns within groups and societies. The key role of 
ethnography is to highlight visible working patterns of social behaviour of the groups 
under study.  
Ethnographic studies avoid the early use of theories and concepts that may poorly fit with 
the participants’ perceptions (Silverman, 2016). The primary source of data collection is 
the researcher’s observation; therefore, it is also called as participant observation. It also 
includes interviews, symbols and some other sources (Atkinson, 2015). In ethnography, 
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the researchers are is directly involved and become  active observers, they should have 
knowledge on the shared culture and the values of the group under study. 
Therefore, Ethnographic approach is appropriate for research on the shared cultures, 
values, and behaviour of the individuals. This research is not aimed at investigating the 
cultures or values of groups of individuals, rather it’s focused to understand and analyse 
the managerial practices and management actions, so ethnography is not an appropriate 
strategy. Furthermore, direct observation is not possible because of limited access, 
privacy issues, and time constraints. Thus, it will not help to attain the objectives of the 
study. Finally, the results of an ethnographic study sometimes cannot be generalised from 
a few cases (Silverman, 2016) whereas, this study uses only three cases.  
3.4.2 Grounded Theory 
Grounded theory was suggested by two American philosophers, Barney Glaser and 
Anselm Strauss, in 1976. Grounded theory challenged the dominance of positivism using 
quantitative methods in social sciences. Since the qualitative methods were challenged to 
be an unsystematic and narrative, rather than theory generating (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2011).The grounded theory rejects it and provides a comprehensive and systematic 
approach using qualitative data collection and analysis for theory development (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1990).  
Grounded theory supports an inductive approach and suggests a theoretical explanation 
of the aspects of the research. These explanations should be grounded in the data and 
observation in a real world setting (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Concepts are developed 
solely from primary data by systematically driving codes and themes. Grounded theory 
requires researchers to collect data in multiple steps using a zigzag approach to compare 
constantly the collected data with emerging themes for similarities and variations 
(Creswell and Poth, 2017).  
Grounded theory may be the best option for a qualitative research when no previous 
theories exist explaining the phenomena, or very little is known about it (Creswell and 
Poth, 2017). Furthermore, it is limited to inductive approach for qualitative data analysis. 
However, this study extends the existing framework suggested by Wilhelm (2004). 
Additionally, the data was collected and analysed using the framework. Finally, grounded 
theory requires multiple data collection stages, so researcher needs to return continuously 
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to the natural setting until data saturation stage is achieved, which is not possible, due to 
the limited access to the company, time constraints, and privacy issues. Hence, grounded 
theory may not be appropriate for this research. 
3.4.3 Case Study 
Case study is a practical inquiry to examine a contemporary phenomenon, (a case) in its 
real life setting (Yin, 2014). It is a widely used investigative strategy in business and 
information management. It is a comprehensive process for research, which offers 
customised case design, a variety of data collection methods, data analysis approaches 
and presentation of results in an appropriate way (Yin, 2011). The case study strategy has 
wide applicability in various disciplines such as psychology, sociology, economics, 
business, management, information management, information security, knowledge 
sharing, and many other fields.  
Investigation based on the scrutiny of cases gives the researcher the advantage of 
examining phenomena in a real life situation. Research may involve a single case or 
multiple cases. In a single case situation, the data are collected from a set of respondents 
from one unit or organisation, while in multiple cases designs data are collected from sets 
belonging to two or more units or organisations. This characteristic of a multiple case 
design makes it particularly appropriate for the purpose of this research. 
Online retail companies have adopted various managerial practices for identity fraud 
management. To analyse these practices with a view to improve them, a multiple case 
study research is the most appropriate method. The case study method also offers both 
deductive and inductive approaches as the foundation for data analysis, whereas, 
grounded theory supports the inductive approach only. Additionally, grounded theory 
supports theory building, while this research test existing fraud management practices in 
given context and extends the framework which is only possible through case study. 
Adopting a case study approach also helps to carry out a close interaction with real world 
practitioners, which helps to create knowledge relevant to managerial aspects of the 
practices involved in IDFM. This provides an in depth understanding of organisational 
problems, culture and its psychology and clarifies management decisions by explaining 
why they were taken, how these decisions were carried out and what their outcomes were? 
(Stake, 2005).  
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Furthermore, case study offers a flexible and multifaceted strategy that provides the 
option to adopt the inductive or deductive approach, using qualitative or quantitative data 
collection method, interpretive and positive analytical approach and use of single or 
multiple cases at a time (Cavaye, 1996). Data triangulation is also possible in case study, 
because it relies on more than one source of data collection. 
Additionally, prior theories and theoretical propositions can also be adopted in case study 
method to develop the research questionnaire and to get guidance on data collection and 
analysis (Yin, 2014). Benbasat and Zmud, (1999) has pointed out some advantages of 
doing case study research. Such as; it helps to analyse the phenomena in real world 
setting, use of multiple sources of data collection, option of a single and multiple cases, 
it supports the pre-adoption of a theory of propositions and also helps to develop a new 
theory.  
Moreover, Cavaye, (1996) also advocates the case study method and affirms that it allows 
refining the existing theories, helps the researcher for in-depth understanding of the 
phenomena under study, and allows the researchers to understand the already discovered 
and newly discovered facets of the phenomena and multiple case study helps the 
researcher to relate the differences in various settings. Finally, the case study was a better 
option and the reasons for applying it are explained below. 
a) It helps to investigate the phenomena in real world setting The case study 
method helped to investigate IDFM practices in real world setting. It also 
made possible to personally visit the staff involved in IDFM process, and 
investigate issues and problems in real setting. During the process staff was 
inquired of practical steps taken to manage IDFs in their respective 
organisations. 
b) Multiple sources of data collection can be used: Under the case study 
approach it was possible to collect data through multiple sources. In this study, 
in addition to the interviews, some documents were also collected in relation 
to IDFM. The case study approach also helped to collect some policy  
documents and see wall posters for communication of policies and promotion 
of IS culture.   
c) Data triangulation is possible with multiple data sources: Data triangulation 
helps to verify the data collected through various sources, which is supported 
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in case study method. Thus, it helped to verify some interview information 
with documents collected from the source person. 
d) Case study offers option of a single and multiple cases: The single case study 
approach offers depth of the data, while multiple case study method offers in-
depth and broader aspects of data to encompass maximum possible themes. 
Both the options were used as single case analysis for each firm were made to 
get deeper insight into the issue under investigation. The data collected 
through multiple case option were also compared to get meaningful insights 
into the variations among the case companies.. Such option is only offered by 
case study approach.   
e) It supports the adoption of theories or theoretical assumptions for data 
collection: Adoption of a theory or theoretical assumption is significant to set 
the boundaries and focus on the issues under study.   In the present research, 
fraud management framework was used as underpinning for data collection. 
It helped to cover comprehensive area of information for an effective IDFM. 
f) It supports the exploratory, explanatory and descriptive types of research. In 
this research new managerial practices were explored, the effectiveness of 
existing practices were explained with their impact of fraud management. The 
significance and impact of managerial practices were also described in detail. 
Thus, the case study approach helped to attain the objectives of this study.  
g) A Case study helps in refining a theory or evolving it for further studies. In 
this study, the framework was applied into a new context and further studies 
are also suggested. Thus, case study method supported to adopt an 
underpinning framework, extending in a new context and opening a new 
avenue for future research. 
Although, case study is a comprehensive research approach (Merriam and Tisdell, 2015; 
Yin, 2014) with a number of advantages, it has two weaknesses in current context: lack 
of generalisability and lack of rigour.  
The major concern is the methodological rigour, as often researchers fail to follow a 
systematic procedure (Yin, 2014). One of the possible reasons for such failure may be the 
availability of fewer research studies, covering the similar fashion (Yin, 2014). The lack 
of rigour is presumably less of an issue with other methods of research because of rich 
literature providing step-by-step guidance to researchers. Therefore, to ensure the 
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methodological rigour for this research, the case study was fully designed, and methods 
of data collection, interview protocols, and analysis approaches and patterns are strictly 
followed and documented. 
With regard to generalisability, the results of a single or a few cases are unlikely to be 
sufficiently comprehensive. However, similar to experimental outcomes, such results 
have value because they may expand and generalise theories (analytical generalisation), 
rather than infer probabilities (statistical generalisation) (Yin, 2014). Therefore, the 
present research tried to generalise the underpin framework in e-tail sector.       
This research aims at understanding IDFM and analysing the managerial practices  in e-
tail organisations. That is only possible by investigating the phenomena in real world 
setting. A multiple case study approach helped to compare and contrast the data, which 
ultimately enabled the researcher to relate these variations in managerial practices. 
Therefore, case study was the best fit for attaining the objectives of this study.    
 3.5 Case Study Design 
Yin (2014) describes the case study design as a logical system that connects empirical 
data to research’s preliminary questions and finally to its conclusions. There are some 
critical components of a case research design, which include a case study’s questions, 
propositions if any, units of analysis, the logic for linking the data to the propositions and 
criteria for interpreting the findings. Such component pertained to my research are 
discussed below. 
3.5.1 Purpose of the Case Study 
Case studies may be exploratory, explanatory and descriptive (Yin, (2014) depending on 
the objectives pursued by the investigator. This research is exploratory in nature. On the 
one hand, this study explores new insights into managerial practices in identity fraud 
management, thus analysing these practices for their effectiveness in current domain, 
which is not done yet. On the other hand, this study describes the real-world phenomenon 
of UK’s e-tail sector in relation to IDFM. This study also provides insights on what 
managerial practices are adopted by the case organisations to manage IDFs.  
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3.5.2 Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis (case) may be a person, a process, a program, a decision a group, 
organisation or anything to study. Following the aim and objectives of this study, online 
retail organisations have been selected as cases for this study. With multiple case study 
approach, three cases have been selected. A large number of research projects use 2-3 
cases to study a business practice in depth (for example, (Palmberg, 2010; Schafermeyer 
et al., 2010), while this research used three cases of UK e-tailors. Unlike the survey, 
organisations for study were selected for analytical generalisation, because, in multiple 
case study research, cases are not selected to be the representative of the whole but for 
the literal or theoretical replication (Yin, 2014).  
For this study, cases were selected for similarities (literal replication) because with a few 
number of cases; these are to be selected for predicted similar results (Yin, 2014). The 
selection criteria for case organisation were: a) the organisation must be engaged in online 
retailing, b) must be based in UK and c) must be an independent organisation not a market 
place. 
3.5.3 Validity and Reliability of the Research Design   
Trustworthiness, credibility, conformability and data dependability of any study depends 
upon its research design. To judge the quality of a social research design, Yin (2014) and 
Wilson (2014) suggest four logical tests, construct validity, internal validity, external 
validity and reliability.  
a)  Validity 
Validity in this research is limited to the generalizability of research findings beyond the 
immediate study. The generalizability is an important aspect of positivist approach that 
uses sampling, while case study research designs are not intended to generalise the 
findings (Wilson, 2014). On the other hand, Yin (2014) explains that unlike the survey, 
case study results cannot be statistically generalised. In this study, analytical 
generalisation is done, that is to generalise the application of the framework, and with 
three cases, replication logic is achieved by exploring the similarities in managerial 
practices for IDFM.  
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b)  Reliability 
The reliability of a case study depends upon consistency and repeatability of research 
procedures used. The purpose of reliability is to make certain that, later if a researcher 
follows the same method as described by earlier researcher and conduct the same case 
study again, later researchers should achieve same findings and conclude same ideas.  Yin 
(2014) suggests that for reliability, a researcher should document whole procedure of case 
study, by using case study protocol and developing case study database.  
A case study protocol as suggested by Yin, (2014) has four important sections; first an 
overview of the case study, which relates to objectives of research, issues of case study 
and readings on topic under study. To attain first section objective, the overview of cases 
is given, and literature review chapter is evident for readings on topic under study. 
Second, data collection procedures, which include process for protecting human subjects, 
identification of data sources, and sources of data other than interviews. In this regards, 
identities of human subjects are kept undisclosed, selection criteria were developed for 
cases as data sources and documents are mentioned as other source of data.  The third 
section is about data collection questions and sources of evidence, for which a 
questionnaire was developed and transcription of interviews are presented as evidence of 
data. Finally, for case study report, it is important to mention that the university’s 
guidance for, thesis format, outlines, bibliography and other aspects are well incorporated 
in final thesis. Thus, reliability of this research is attained. 
3.5.4 Sources of Data Collection 
Yin (2014) discusses six sources of data in the case study: documentation, archival 
records, interviews, direct observation, participant-observation and physical artefacts. 
This research is aimed at understanding IDFM and analysing the managerial practices to 
suggest improvements, therefore the data were collected through interviews and 
documents (where possible).  
The semi-structured interviews were helpful to enquire in-depth on what, why and how 
about real life situation and documents helped to know in detail about the policies and 
procedures on the issue under study. Such in depth inquiry on how and why about the 
adopted managerial practices is best offered by the semi-structured interviews. The 
interviews also helped in probing further on any matter either explored during the 
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interview or already focused. Thus, interviews were more appropriate way to collect in 
depth data on managerial practices in IDFM. To some extent the documents also helped 
in data triangulation but these were offered by only one firm.    
3.5.5 Development of the Questionnaire  
Research questionnaire has a critical role in the collection of data appropriate to achieve 
the aim and objectives of this study. As already mentioned, IDFM consists of eight stages, 
so the questionnaire has the same parts.  
The formation of questions is based on the stages of the framework. The framework has 
eight stages, so the questionnaire was also divided accordingly (see annexure 1). As 
already mentioned, semi-structured interviews were conducted, only basic questions were 
formulated according to the stages. These basic questions were to enquire what and how 
of each stage, while following questions were about the existing practices in the literature 
and developed from their responses. The questions related to the each stage were kept 
separate. At first, primary questions on what and how on the each stage of fraud 
management were designed. Mostly, these questions were based on the literature findings. 
Making the most of semi-structured interviews further in-depth questions were asked 
based on the answers of the respondents.  
The verification and the validation of a research questionnaire is critical to justify its 
outcomes. For the verification of the questionnaire, it was dually checked by the 
supervisory team and also peer review was sought from senior PhD scholars in the related 
field to confirm the pre-construct and pre-content validity. The pre-construct and pre-
content validities relate to the research questionnaire before seeking its validity through 
a pilot study (Colton and Covert, 2007). Furthermore, a pilot study was also conducted to 
confirm its content and construct validity. The questionnaire was refined as per the 
feedback from the supervisory team, peers and the pilot study. 
Content validity refers to the logical link between the questions and the objectives of the 
study or the topic under study (Kumar, 2014). To ensure the content validity of the 
questionnaire, the related literature was thoroughly reviewed to include the factors 
leading to the management of IDFs. Additionally, the questionnaire was also reviewed 
by the supervisory team to ensure its validity as suggested by Colton and covert (2007). 
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To demonstrate the content validity of the research questionnaire, it has been divided into 
eight sections representing the each stage of IDFM. 
Construct validity is related to the quality of research questionnaire to measure what it is 
supposed to (Kumar, 2014). Such validity is determined by confirming that each construct 
of the questionnaire contributes to the whole of variance in the phenomenon. The validity 
of the questionnaire was confirmed by including the questions related to all the stages of 
IDFM. For this purpose the questionnaire was divided into eight parts according to the 
number of stages in IDFM. Hence each part (construct) of the questionnaire contributes 
to the whole of IDFM (total variance). Thus, the construct validity was sought.       
3.6 Pilot Study and Changes in Research Questionnaire 
Before interviews in the case firms were arranged, a pilot was conducted to test the 
interview questions, data collection techniques, time management and data analysis 
methods. The research instrument (interview guide) was designed and developed on the 
basis of research objectives, stages of the selected framework and the literature findings. 
Potential respondents were purposely selected to have some knowledge on information 
security, online business and management.  
Overall, for the pilot nine participants were contacted through email and personally. One 
of the participants did not responded the email, two other participants did not agree for 
an interview. Therefore, interviews were conducted with six participants. Five of them 
were postgraduate research students and one was taught course student. During the pilot 
study all protocols suggested by (Von Glinow et al., 2002) were strictly followed, which 
included persuasion of participants, consent for the study and their selection based on 
their knowledge and experience in the relevant field.  The study took six weeks to 
complete due to Christmas holidays.  
The participants were fully informed about the project and the purpose of the interview. 
They were informed that such participations were voluntary and they were also informed 
about their right to quit the interview at any time. The time and venue was fixed with each 
respondent and then study studios in the university’s central library were booked.  All the 
interviews were conducted face-to-face. The participants were also asked to look at the 
research instrument for grammatical accuracy, repetition, clarity and sequence of the 
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questions. The logic or the reasons of the questions were also discussed with the 
participants to confirm the required outcome of each question.   
The feedback regarding repeated questions, grammatical mistakes, and complexity of 
questions was welcomed. The comments and feedback of participants were considered 
and suggestions were incorporated accordingly. In the light of their suggestions a few 
questions were removed and some were rephrased for clarity and grammatical accuracy.  
Furthermore, as all the interviews were conducted in semi-structured style, so some 
additional questions were also asked on the responses of the participants which were also 
added in final version of the questionnaire.  
Moreover, various things were also noted which helped in real world case studies such 
as; interview timing and performance of recording tool in different circumstances. The 
minimum time of interview was 20 minutes and maximum time was 55 minutes. This 
will help to schedule interviews in real environment. The recording tool was tested 
through face-to-face interviews for the clarity of sound. The pilot study process also 
proved to be a training for better interview conduct. Listening of the interviews was 
helpful to realise unnecessary interception, and to learn tact to get more information 
through additional questions, which will make future interviews more effective.  
Finally, two sample interviews were also transcribed with a view to improve the 
interviewer role, tone, speed and style of asking questions. This process enabled to 
improve the interviewer’s role, speed, tone, undue interception and additional questions 
development. 
Although, the pilot study took some time but it helped to develop the final questionnaire 
and provided information about the utility and trustworthiness of the information 
produced. The pilot study was also helpful to confirm the construct and content validity 
of the questionnaire (Colton and Covert, 2007). As already mentioned, the respondents 
were students from the related field, their feedback on the interview questions was 
determinant for the acquisition of desired information.       
3.7 Data Collection Methods 
As mentioned earlier, a case study approach offers a variety of sources for data collection. 
Yin, (2014) mentions documentations, archival records, interviews, direct observations, 
participant observation and physical artefacts as major sources of data in case study 
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method. This study used interviews and documentation (where possible) as sources of 
collecting data from cases. Detailed review of literature was also done for developing 
instrument and refining methodology of this research. The next section discusses in detail 
about sources of data collection for this study. 
3.7.1 Interviews 
As a method of data collection, the interview offers some unique characteristics, which 
other sources may fail to offer. To begin with, only the interview makes further probing 
possible, allowing to get deeper insights into the issues in fraud management and related 
managerial practices. Secondly, it provides a chance for the respondents to make their 
response rich with details. Finally, face-to-face communication also helps the respondents 
to understand the research objectives and remain focused on the issue. Face-to-face 
interviews also make it easier for the researcher to control the situation and keep the focus 
of respondents towards the asked questions. The semi-structured interviews have been 
proved to be a flexible tool delivering in-depth information without losing a consistent 
line of enquiry. The semi-structured interviews have helped the respondents to discuss 
important issues related to the context, and to show their personal attitude and views about 
the situation or context under study.  
The interviewees were selected on the basis of their job description and position in the 
organisational hierarchy. Managers of different levels and employees involved with 
information technology, information security, human resources management, finance 
management and fraud management were selected for interviews. Direct, face-to-face 
interviews were conducted and recorded in a device for transcription to ensure validity 
and reliability of the study. Time and venue for interview was set at the convenience of 
interviewee. Duration for each interview remained between 40-60 minutes. The 
interviews remained open-ended and conversational manner yet case study protocol was 
followed closely. Total number of interviews were 33, which is a good number for a PhD 
thesis (Mason, 2010).  
3.7.2 Documents  
Documents contain a significant amount of information necessary to clarify the 
organisational process and managerial practices in identity fraud management. With this 
in mind, this researcher also collected some documents from a case organisation. Under 
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the process, the key contact person was formally asked to provide the documents related 
to this study.  
Only a small number of documents was received because of privacy and confidentiality 
issues. Most of the documents received were related to security policies and guidelines 
on some day-to-day business activities related to this research. These documents were 
helpful for in-depth and comparative analysis of the organisational practices in identity 
fraud management and related contexts. Some information was also taken from the 
organisational websites.   
3.8 Selection of Case Firms and Participants 
As already mentioned, the data was collected from three online retail organisations. It 
was observed that mostly the large firms have similar type of business process and online 
sales, which made it easy to select any large firm. All large e-tail firms in the UK have 
websites and mobile applications for online sales. It was also known that nearly all of the 
large e-tail firms offer their customer credit purchase without interest for a certain period 
of time. The customers are asked to open an account with these firms and some personal 
information is collected. Considering various situations, these firms offer varying credit 
limits to their customers. Similarities in business processes in large firms made the 
selection process easier.  
The criteria for selection were set as follows: a) the organisation must be engaged in 
online retailing, b) must be based in UK and c) must be an independent organisation and 
not a market place, d) information security and identity frauds must be managed in house. 
These criteria helped to ensure that the chosen organisations would have an identity fraud 
management system. Three organisations were chosen for data collection. At the initial 
stage, these organisations were sent letters explaining the nature of the study, an interview 
questionnaire and a list of potential interviewees.  
The organisations were also assured of the confidentiality of the respondents and the 
organisation. The organisations responded with the list of potential interviewees and their 
contact detail to arrange interviews with them. Afterwards, each individual respondent 
was contacted and interview schedule was fixed. All the interviews were conducted at the 
respondents’ offices at an agreed time. Table 3.1 presents the source of data collection 
and number of respondents. 
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Table 3. 1 List of the case organisations with the nature of their business and data 
collection sources 
Code of the 
organisation 
Nature of the 
organisation 
Sources of Data Number of 
respondents 
Organisation1 Online retailer selling 





Organisation2 Online retailer with a 
chain of stores, selling 
many brands. 
Interviews 16 
Organisation3 Online retailer with a 
chain of stores, selling 
own brand. 
Interviews 6 
Table above presents the nature of the case organisation, sources used for data collection 
and the number of respondents. The detailed introduction of each case organisation and 
the results are presented in the following chapter. 
3.8.1 Data Access 
The potential respondents were approached through key people within the case 
organisations. The target respondents were fraud managers, fraud analysts, fraud 
advisors, fraud investigators, information security and data compliance managers, loss 
prevention and recovery managers, and managers from human resources and finance 
departments. The respondents belonged to various managerial levels.  
Face-to-face interviews were conducted on a one to one basis at agreed time and venue. 
The consent forms, interviewer’s CV, short summary of the project and list of job titles 
of the potential respondents were sent to the case organisations. An agreement on data 
privacy and protection was duly signed by the researcher and the representatives of the 
case organisations.  Data protection act 1998 and the university’s guidelines regarding 
privacy and data protection were also well understood to comply with. 
 3.8.2 Participant Selection and Theoretical Saturation 
In the process of selection of the participants, the key person from each case firm was 
briefed about the project in order to get access on the appropriate participants. During that 
process the researcher was informed about the staff and their responsibilities working in 
the IDFM related area. Such information helped to obtain the appropriate participants. 
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Furthermore, the potential participants were finally selected on the bases of their role in 
relation to the project under study.  
The number of participants does have a significant role to obtain sufficient data required 
for a research study. Bryman (2015), suggests that sample size in qualitative research 
should be appropriate to achieve theoretical saturation, which is not possible in a small 
sample, while a large sample size will make it difficult to undertake a deep case oriented 
analysis. Theoretical saturation is a point where additional data do not lead to emergent 
theme (Saunders et al., 2018). In this study, the interviews were conducted with intervals, 
which provided the researcher sufficient time to transcribe and process the already 
collected data. Such practice helped to understand the level of the collected data and 
selection of further participants. So the practice of reading and processing the already 
collected data, helped to obtain further necessary data. Once theoretical saturation point 
was achieved (the data related to each of the stage of IDFM was obtained and further 
interviews were not adding a new information) the data collection process was assumed 
completed, so no further interviews were conducted. The variation in the number of 
participants at each case study is due to the achievement of theoretical saturation point at 
different levels (Kumar, 2014).   
  3.9 Qualitative Data Analysis Approach 
The qualitative data analysis methods available to this research were content analysis and 
thematic analysis (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Content analysis is a systematic approach 
for coding and categorising the data, it helps to determine the trends and patterns of words 
used in data set and to know the frequency of words, their relationships, structures and 
discourses of communication (Grbich, 2013; Pope et al., 2006). This approach is used 
mostly to describe the characteristics of the contents of documents and themes are 
developed based on the frequency of their occurrences (Bloor and Wood, 2006). Content 
analysis is a simple method for reporting common issues and problems mentioned in data. 
It offers possibility of quantifying the data along with qualitative analysis (Grbich, 2013).  
Although, content analysis has some potential for being used in this study, there are some 
limitations to be considered. Firstly, the codes are developed on the bases of their 
frequency in the dataset, which may left some important but less mentioned codes. 
Secondly, the use of frequency technique is objective and concerned with surface 
meaning of the document, rather than hidden agenda or contextual meaning (Bloor and 
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Wood, 2006). Furthermore, content analysis is more suitable for the analysis of 
communications and the characteristics of the contents, whereas this study seeks to extract 
the managerial practices. Thus, the content analysis approach was deemed not flexible 
enough for the purpose of this study and restricted in its application. 
By contrast, thematic analysis was found to be more appropriate for this study. Thematic 
analysis has a distinction from content analysis. As already mentioned, content analysis 
is based on the frequency of words, which limits its usability for this research. However, 
the thematic analysis provides for an in-depth data analysis for each theme. Thus, 
thematic analysis explores each theme irrespective of its frequency. It is an independent 
approach for identifying, analysing and reporting the patterns and themes within the 
qualitative data set.  It is a flexible analytical tool, which provides a detailed and in-depth 
account of qualitative data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Therefore, Vaismoradi, et al. (2013) 
suggest that qualitative researchers should be more familiar with this approach.  
The aim of this study is to understand IDFM and analyse the managerial practice, which 
needs both manifest and latent content analysis in order to explore and describe the 
significance of the managerial practices. The analysis of manifest and latent contents of 
the qualitative data set is only possible in thematic analysis approach (Braun and Clarke, 
2006). Therefore, this study used thematic analysis approach, which offered flexibility in 
developing themes by thoroughly reading and re-reading of the data set. The managerial 
practices could also be extracted through in-depth study of the data; such approach helps 
in exploring and analysing the managerial practices. Therefore, thematic analysis 
approach was a better choice for this study.    
3.9.1 Data Analysis Process 
As already mentioned, a thematic approach has been adopted to analyse the data set. This 
approach is based on the decisions regarding the identification of themes and richness of 
the data to support these themes. For identification of the themes in data set, inductive 
and deductive approaches were used, which are also termed as bottom-up or top-down.  
There are no pre-determined rules for the identification of themes in the thematic 
approach, so such flexibility allows the researcher to identify the themes based on their 
significance in relation to the aim and objectives of the research. The flexibility in 
identifying the themes made it possible to set themes based on the theoretical framework 
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using deductive (top-down) approach, and some themes were also developed from the 
empirical data through inductive (bottom-up) approach.  
Under the deductive process of themes identification, this research relied on the fraud 
management lifecycle framework proposed by Wilhelm (2004). Nevertheless, the 
deductive approach helped in identifying themes from the data sate but it is limited to 
already existing themes. To overcome such limitation, the inductive approach was also 
used to identify those themes, which were not cropped in literature. Thus, both the 
approaches were used not to miss the important themes.  
The data set of this study include 33 semi-structured interviews and some documents, 
from three online retailers based in the UK. At first, the codes were identified based on 
the themes mentioned in selected framework and literature discussed in chapter two. 
These codes reflect the first objective of this research, which is to explore existing 
managerial practices in fraud management at various business contexts. However, the 
novel managerial practices and emerging trends from the data set were also deduced. It 
reflects the second objective of this study, which is to analyse the managerial practices in 
case organisations.  Use of the both approaches confirms that the data set is 
comprehensively covered to explore and analyse each managerial practice either already 
known or the novel ones. 
Social research involves ideas and experiences with shared meaning within the context 
under study (Myers and Avison, 1997). Therefore, being a social researcher, the answers 
of the respondents were interpreted on the reflections of the aim and objectives of this 
research. The respondents were well informed about the aim and objectives of this 
research, before the interviews, so each answer was interpreted in the context under study, 
which reflects the shared meaning of the terms and practices. The quotations taken form 
the responses of the interviews are interpreted in accordance with the shared meaning of 
the terms and managerial practices reflecting the aim and objectives of this study.   
The computer aided qualitative data analysis system (NVivo 10.0) was employed to assist 
with coding and developing themes from the dataset. The software helped to highlight 
and assign the managerial practices related to the each stage of the framework. At first, 
the primary nodes were developed in accordance with the underpinning framework 
stages. In the next phase, further sub-nodes were developed for individual managerial 
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practices under each node. Then after the data was imported from the word files and were 
read and reread word by word with a view to not missing any theme.  
During the readings, managerial practices were extracted and copied into the related 
nodes and sub-nodes. New sub-nodes were also developed to capture the novel 
managerial practices emerging from the data-set. Thus, all the managerial practices were 
extracted and were exported to word file for further analysis.   After the initial coding, 
these were checked for duplication and similar texts in more than one code. Than after 
the data were segregated to represent every aspect of the data and a rich explanation of 
data-set (Grbich, 2013). Finally, the nodes, emerged themes and sub-themes were 
checked for any duplication and relevance with other codes at each stage of the 
framework. Thus, the managerial practices at each stage of the fraud management were 
identified. 
3.10 Chapter Summary 
So far, this chapter discussed the possible research methods and available options to attain 
the objectives of this study. It started with the introduction of possible research 
philosophies and the selected philosophy is justified for its significance in this research. 
In research strategy section, both qualitative and quantitative forms of data collection 
were discussed and the former was selected to be the promising approach to meet the 
objectives of this study. Ethnography, grounded theory and case study are the most 
common research designs. The uses of these research designs were discussed and the case 
study was selected as an appropriate design to attain the objectives of this study. The case 
study design section is a detail on the process adopted for the accomplishment of this 
research. Pilot study and update of the research questionnaire is also mentioned in this 
chapter. Afterwards, data collection methods and analysis approaches are mentioned and 
finally, the analysis process of this research is explained in detail. The results and the 
analysis of the data are mentioned in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS 
 4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the analysis of the empirical results collected from the three large 
UK based e-tailers. First, the list of respondents is detailed with their job titles and area 
of responsibilities. The introduction of each case firm is presented at the start of the 
analysis of the results. The results are presented in accordance with the underpinning 
framework. 
4.2 Case Organisations and Respondents 
For data collection three large online UK based e-tailers were selected. These firms have 
significant arrangements in place for identity fraud management, including dedicated 
teams of employees. First, a list of large UK based online firms was prepared and then 
invitation letters were sent to the registered contact as stated on their websites. When 
these data were not available, emails invitations were sent to senior managers. As a result, 
only five positive responses were received, of which three were eventually selected for 
investigation. The following selection criteria were applied: a) the organisation must be 
engaged in online retailing, b) must be based in UK and c) must be an independent 
organisation and not a market place, d) information security and identity frauds must be 
managed in house. The characteristics of the selected organisations are presented below 
in Table 4.1. 
Table 4. 1 Case firms staff, business channel, revenue and data sources 
Firm Staff Methods of data collection Business 
channels 




Semi structured Interviews, 




Over £1.5 bn. 
C2 Over 
25000 




Over £4 bn. 
C3 Over 
25000 





Over £3 bn. 
The selected organisations sell their own brands and many other brands. They all 
confirmed that they practice comprehensive fraud management activities. All three case 
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organisations have separate teams to manage frauds. The list of respondents within each 
firm is given in Table 4.2. 
Table 4. 2 The List of Respondents 





Head of IT Security 
2 System Administrator 




Loss Prevention Manager 
5 Senior Security Consultant 
6 Investigation Officer 




Head of Fraud Prevention Team 
9 Fraud Advisor 
10 Fraud Advisor 





Director IT Security 
13 Operations Manager 
14 System Administrator 
15 Database Administrator 




Head of Investigation Team 
18 Fraud Investigator 
19 Liaison Officer 




22 Head of Fraud Prevention 
23 Fraud Analyst 
24 Fraud Risk Manager 
25 Business Operations 
 
Manager E-Business 
26 Senior Manager operations 
C3 
27 IT Security 
 
Head of IT Team 





30 Fraud Advisor 
31 Fraud Manager 
32 Group Security 
 
Head of Group Security 
33 Fraud Investigator 
Because each respondent had an assigned field of responsibility, it was not possible to get 
answers concerning each stage of the fraud management from every respondent. The case 
firms are coded as C1, C2 and C3, and respondents are coded as C1-R01……, C2-R02…. 
and so on. The results from each case study are presented individually below.  
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4.3 Case Organisation C1 
Organisation C1 is one of the largest online retailers in the UK. It came into existence 
after a merger of two large rival businesses. It has a vast customer network throughout 
the UK and Ireland. More than 90% of its business is done online, yet it has some stores. 
It is a multi-brand online retailer. In addition to selling its own brands, it also deals with 
hundreds of other famous brands. C1 is a credit lending business, which offers its 
customers some interest free period when purchasing a product. Customers open accounts 
with the firm by providing personal information and they get login credentials to access 
their account in the future. The collected customer information is extremely sensitive as 
it includes the dates of birth, banking details and credit card details. The possession of 
customers’ personal and financial information creates risk of IDT and fraud for the case 
firm.  
4.3.1 Types of IDFs Faced by C1 
The results obtained by this investigation reveal that IDF is a significant challenge for 
C1. It was established that the business was facing various types of IDFs, including 
application fraud, account takeover fraud, first party fraud and delivery fraud. It was also 
confirmed that most of these frauds are committed with stolen or fictitious identities, 
while first party frauds are based on the customer’s false statement of not receiving any 
parcel.  
The interviewees at C1 also confirmed that their firm faces the use of stolen identities, 
but they never knew how such information had been stolen, as they assumed the IDT 
occurred at the customer side. In spite of arrangements, some respondents mentioned that 
the firm was still losing significant amount of money to identity frauds. Furthermore, the 
results confirm that all the stages of fraud management are implemented by the case 
organisation. The results for managerial practices at C1 at each stage of IDFM are 
presented below. 
4.3.2 Deterrence 
Deterrence is related to stopping fraudsters before attempting any fraud (Leasure and 
Zhang, 2017; Shamsi et al., 2016). The findings confirm that C1 has adopted some 
managerial practices focused on deterrence because effective deterrence results in saving 
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future costs and other resources. In response to a question on the significance of 
deterrence, respondent C1-R01 stated: 
“So there is stake on both that if you can't stop it (fraud), the fraudsters try it again and 
again so more resource is being used all the times so it could get bigger”. 
It reveals that with every successful fraud, the chances of recurrences are multiplied. The 
statement establishes that the firm is aware of the importance of stopping frauds and one 
way of doing it is deterrence, so C1 has certain managerial practices to deter identity 
frauds. Deterrence is an anticipatory stage in identity fraud management that helps the 
organisation to minimise the potential fraud attempts (Jamieson et al., 2007). For 
deterrence of identity frauds, C1 has some managerial practices related to the customer 
education and creating the fear of being caught and punished, which are mentioned below.  
a) Customer Education 
Educating the customers is an essential aspect of identity fraud deterrence (Sperdea et al., 
2011). According to respondent C1-R09:  
“We have advice and guidance, so we also provide customers by saying do not show your 
credentials, don’t show your password, make sure it’s a strong password, and ensure 
your password is changed on a periodic basis.  All that kind of advice and guidance is 
also provided by the e-commerce site”.  
This shows that the case organisation has a process in place of educating its customers. 
For this purpose the case organisation has adopted various practices. These include 
instructing them not to disclose their account credentials, to use a strong password and to 
change the passwords periodically. For customer education, the case organisation uses its 
website, and respondent also mentioned: 
“We do send out regular e-mails and reminders regarding ID theft or ID frauds, that you 
should change your passwords regularly for security point of view”. 
Furthermore, the findings show that the e-tailer informs the customers regarding identity 
related frauds to enhance their awareness. Although, these practices help customer 
education, the persistence of these frauds indicates that some additional practices are 
required such as; advising customers to regularly check their bank account transactions, 
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the credit file and not to share their personal information on social media (Seda, 2014; 
Arachchilage and Love, 2014). Also, Copes et al. (2010) propose that organisations 
should send specific messages to a targeted group of customers and victims. However, 
these practices are missing in C1. Adopting these recommendations may help improving 
customer education on IDFM. Therefore, the firm may be advised to improve its customer 
education by adopting the suggested practices. 
The findings also reveal that C1 is using only a website and emails as instruments of 
customer education. In doing so they miss many other opportunities. The use of additional 
communication channels, such as text messages, push messages through a mobile app 
(McGee and Byington, 2015; Wright, 2007) and mass media (Bai and Chen, 2013) may 
help them to increase the impact of customer education. These channels have not been 
tested in e-tailing so far, which may be a deterrent for their use, but they have shown good 
results in other domains.   
This study has also found out that customer education in C1 is limited to the matters of 
password protection and information sharing. However, the literature advises that 
customers should be educated on the trends and methods of identity theft and frauds, and 
measures to avoid such risks (Arachchilage and Love, 2014; Seda, 2014). Therefore, the 
case organisation may be advised to educate its customers about the emerging trends and 
methods of identity theft and related frauds to enhance their awareness, which would be 
more effective in prevention of IDT. In addition, the business may share with its 
customers, the knowledge about the practices and technological methods that help to 
minimise the risk of identity theft.  
b) Creating Fear Among the Potential Fraudsters 
According to the literature, fear has a critical impact on the behaviour of potential 
fraudsters, so it is a significant practice to create the fear of being caught and punished to 
deter identity fraudsters (Akers, 2013; Leasure and Zhang, 2017). To this end, C1 has the 
practice of publicising some information on successful prosecutions, as mentioned by 
respondent C1-R05: 
“We do not name, but what we do in figures, 17 peoples prosecuted, 14 people arrested, 
this amount recovered”. 
Another interviewee (C1-R07) commented: 
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“The deterrence that we as a group security department can apply is arrest and successful 
prosecution and highlight in the local papers, from where they were arrested”. 
The statements show that the case organisation makes steps to create fear among the 
potential fraudsters by publicising news on arrests and prosecutions. At the same time, 
C1 does not publicise information on fraud attacks despite available recommendations, 
e.g., Shamsi et al. (2016), to make the public aware of attacks, the methods used, the 
origin of attack, including the identification of the fraudsters. As already mentioned, the 
publication of such information may create fear among the potential fraudsters, which 
may deter and de-motivate the fraudsters. In response to the question about the benefits 
of trying to stop potential fraudsters, respondent C1-R09 replied: 
“We know from past experiences, that if we don’t stop them, they will come back every 
time”.   
The above statements show that C1 works on fraud deterrence. The results establish that 
the case organisation only publicises the successful prosecutions and arrests, which is not 
enough to create fear. For creating fear among the potential fraudsters, Leasure and Zhang 
(2017) and Sperdea et al. (2011) suggest publicising more explicit messages regarding 
catching and punishing the fraudsters. Furthermore, the online organisations are 
suggested to make the potential fraudsters aware of the organisational arrangements and 
efforts on fraud management (Zadig and Tejay, 2010), which can deter the fraudster’s 
behaviour on account of the alertness and countermeasures.  
In addition to sending deterrent messages to an outsider, internal staff should also be 
informed (Workman and Gathegi, 2007). Finally, the channel of communication of the 
fear appeals by C1 is limited to the local newspaper, which may limit the impact of the 
arrangements, as the organisation works nationally, the full employment of mass media 
is suggested by Bai and Chen (2013), to maximise the impact of deterrence 
communication.  
Moreover, the case organisation manages fraudulent deliveries in order to arrest the 
fraudsters with the help of police. For example, respondent C1-R01 explains:  
Once you [the fraudster] ordered that goods we believe if it is a fraud item what we then 
do we set up delivery, we know you are a fraudster we will attempt to deliver the goods 
for you. Once you signed for the goods, with the police help, we arrest the individual. 
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The statement shows that the case organisation manages the fraudulent deliveries in order 
to catch the fraudsters red-handed. Such organisational practice creates fear amongst the 
fraudsters as told by the informant C1-R06: 
“If you capture, if you arrest him [the fraudster] and you see the trend stops, the volume 
of fraud in that area disappear very quickly because they know they’re being watched”.  
The data shows that with every arrest the number of frauds coming from a particular area 
comes down very quickly. Arrest creates fear among fraudster and sends a message that 
the organisation has a watch over the fraudsters. Thus, the practice of catching the 
fraudsters under controlled delivery system has a significant impact on the creation of 
fear of being caught and punished, which leads to reduced number of fraud attempts. 
However, C1 does not publicise that it possesses systems that detect identity frauds in 
real time and catch the fraudster using managed deliveries, despite available 
recommendations, e.g. Zadig and Tajay (2010). Therefore, the case organisation should 
publicise that they are using advanced systems and managed delivery system to arrest the 
fraudsters with the help of local police. Such practices can increase the fear of being 
caught and punished among potential fraudsters and enhance deterrence of identity fraud.   
4.3.3 Prevention 
Prevention is a critical stage in identity fraud management. It helps the organisations to 
safeguard their information systems and avert any identity theft attempt, which may lead 
to identity frauds. Responding to a question about their prevention system, interviewee 
C1-R04 mentioned:  
“Obviously we are concerned as a company, and we've got to put in the right sort of 
prevention methods to stop identity theft happening to us”. 
According to another respondent:  
“There's a lot of upfront prevention techniques to stop identity theft attacks”. (C1-R07) 
The comments above illustrate that the case organisation has some technology to prevent 
any identity theft, which also confirms that C1 is working on the prevention stage of the 
fraud management. For prevention, the case organisation has adopted various methods 
and practices that are discussed below.  
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a) Sufficient Investments in Prevention Systems 
The size of investment in the prevention system has a direct and significant impact on its 
effectiveness (Boyer, 2007). Regarding investments in fraud prevention systems, 
respondent C1-R04 informed: 
“We do invest heavily into fraud prevention systems”. 
However, these investments may be limited to acquiring new technologies because 
findings indicate that the firm is still facing some security challenges resulting in fraud 
losses. Therefore, it may be deduced that the firm is significantly investing into 
technology, but more focus in needed on related issues, as suggested by interviewee C1-
R05:  
“More money and the availability of manpower, the more systems with IT security that 
are put in place, you find that it does prevent. 
Above statement indicates understanding that for better prevention, investments in human 
resources to have experts in the field is also critical along with the technologies. It refers 
that for the effectiveness of technological system businesses should also invest into the 
human resources acquisition and development. Therefore, e-tailers may be advised to 
ensure the availability of experts in addition to the acquisition of sophisticated 
technologies, because only related experts can ensure the deployment of technologies in 
appropriate domain to get desired results. 
b) Securing Customers’ Information 
The security of customers’ information, especially their bank details and credit/debit card 
details, is critical for the business continuity and reputation. A single data breach or an 
identity theft occurrence may cost organisations millions of pounds and a huge 
reputational damage (Soomro et al., 2016). Interviewee C1-R09 gave the following 
answer to the question “How do you secure customers’ information?”  
“So the internal network is protected all its entry and exit points via a number of managed 
firewall services”.   
These arrangements were also confirmed by respondents C1-R10 and C1-R07. The policy 
document D07 regarding the security of data during communication demands: 
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“All email and internet traffic must be virus checked, and any malware found should be 
removed or quarantined on detection”. 
Furthermore, for the safety of customer information, policy document D03 states:   
“Data that requires encryption:  Any confidential data that as stated in the data 
classification policy requires encrypting must adhere to this policy.” 
These results show that the case organisation has various measures in place to secure the 
customers’ data at every step in communication and storage. Nevertheless, C1 has various 
arrangements to protect customers’ data, it still suffers from IDF losses. One of the 
possible reasons may be IDT at the customer side, who are assumed as a weakest link in 
IDT (Da Veiga and Martins, 2015; Tøndel et al., 2014). Therefore, in addition to having 
measures to secure customers’ data at the business end, e-tailers should also educate their 
customers on methods of IDT and the countermeasures. Such practice of educating the 
customers on how to take technological measures to prevent identity theft is 
recommended by Arachchilage and Love (2014) and Seda (2014). Furthermore, 
customers may be offered free anti-virus software and other security software (Devos and 
Pipan, 2009). Such practice has already been adopted by banks. 
c) Updating the Prevention System Regularly 
Information technologies are evolving rapidly, so the prevention systems need to be 
updated regularly to prevent the identity fraud attempts effectively. According to C1-R10   
“There’s a business need that identifies sort of a gap or an item of technology which is 
out of date and obsolete.  So we have lifecycle management for all of the 
systems……everything is patched to maintain its current levels, and full version upgrade 
happens periodically.” 
The statement shows that the case organisation identifies the need for technical systems 
or assess the need for upgrading the existing IT systems. Although, it may help in getting 
some sophisticated systems and upgrading of the existing ones, but technology is 
evolving at a pace. To get the benefits of evolving technologies the firm should keep an 
eye on the IT market for newer developments, as the need for these may not be realised 
through internal assessment. Additionally, C1 may also be advised to develop close 
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coordination with the related IT industry to get tailored hardware and software, which can 
meet the firm’s specific needs, related to the management of IDFs. 
d) Having a Secure Authentication System 
The authentication of the credentials is significant to prevent any identity fraud. The 
authentication system verifies login information with pre-stored data. Upon matching the 
information, the user is allowed for further processing (Usman and Shah, 2013). 
Regarding the authentication, respondent C1-R03 reported: 
“We have standard authentication system, which is based on account ID and password”. 
Regarding the failure of the authentication system, participant C1-R06 commented: 
“Mostly fraudsters hijack the customer accounts and ask for alternate address or a 
collection point, which makes fraud easy”. 
The statement shows that the case organisation has a standard account authentication 
procedure that requires the customer’s account ID and a password. Respondents also 
confirmed that fraudsters mostly takeover the customer accounts by stealing their 
credentials and opt for a different delivery address than the one on the account, which 
makes the identity fraud easier to commit. This shows that standard authentication system 
may not work effectively, with stolen information and hijacked accounts.  
The literature findings show that fraudsters steal login information and hijack the 
accounts, and alternate delivery or collection options make the frauds easier. The case 
organisation may be advised for a more robust authentication system (Prakash et al., 
2015; Sharma et al., 2015). To make the authentication system more effective Mansfield-
Devine (2013), Teh et al. (2016) and Usman and Shah, (2013) propose to use a bio-metric 
authentication system. This, however, may put extra financial burden on the firm. In 
addition, such a system can reduce the ease of online shopping.  
Therefore, management of e-tailers should look for an improved authentication system 
that should have economic advantages without compromising the customer’s comfort of 
online shopping.  Furthermore, Bang et al. (2012), suggest sending customers one-time 
password on their registered contact, Kumar and Goyal (2016) and Wang et al. (2015) 
recommend sending login alerts to make authentication system more secure. 
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4.3.4 Detection 
As already mentioned, detection is a process intended to identify the suspicious and 
fraudulent activities before, during or after the completion (Jamieson et al., 2007; 
Wilhelm, 2004). Commenting on the significance of detection, participant R1-04 
reported: 
“It's more through the detection of frauds that you can gauge, how successful you are”. 
 This indicates that the detection of identity frauds is a significant measure of the success 
of the organisational efforts against the frauds and confirms that detection is a critical 
stage in identity fraud management as other stages like mitigation, analysis, investigation 
and prosecution depend on it. Early detection of identity frauds also results in no loss to 
the organisations. Therefore, effective fraud detection is treated as a significant stage in 
identity fraud management.  
a) Having a Fraud Screening System 
Online business organisations process a large number of orders at one time, for which 
they need an automated screening system. The automated fraud screening system is based 
on fraud rules, which highlight any suspicious activity (Carneiro et al., 2017; Dorfleitner 
and Jahnes, 2014). This view was echoed by participant C1-R04 as: 
“So basically, the fraud rules decide whether or not the transaction looks suspicious.  It 
then goes into what are called fraud cues”. 
Talking about this issue, another interview, C1-R01 said: 
“We say that an individual who has been ordering goods say five years, soft goods, and 
at a sudden, he apply for expensive items, our systems flag it out”.  
Further to it, respondent C1-R05 told: 
“They employ across all accounts, that identifies fraudulent activity or indeed orders 
which are oversize, over price and non-natural to that account. 
These statements show that the case organisation has an automated screening system that 
identifies any suspicious orders. The system is based on fraud rules, which are pre-
installed on the system. Based on these rules, the system flags out suspicious orders as 
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frauds. The findings reveal that these fraud rules are based on the nature of the ordered 
items and cost of the goods. These rules are the parameters built into the order process 
system, which flags out every order for which these rules are prescribed. That is an 
effective system for online orders, as it processes every order in a real-time and detects 
any suspicious order for further verifications.  
Although, the fraud screening system helps to detect suspicious fraudulent order based 
on parameters related to the online orders but the rules, conditions and parameters 
regarding identity frauds are missing in screening system.  furthermore, the screening 
system reviews every order and detect suspicious or fraudulent activities, based on the 
pre-set fraud cues.  
Nevertheless, identity fraud trends and methods are continuously changing over the time. 
In addition, screening system becomes ineffective with stolen identity information, 
because it depends upon the verification of order information, which is available in pre-
exist dataset. For example, interviewee (C1-R05) mentioned that: 
“With regard to response and reaction to any compromise on our customer’s account, it 
would be very difficult to mitigate to zero fraud”. 
The statement shows that the detection system is not effective in detecting IDFs on 
compromised customers’ accounts. Because the information used is accurate so detection 
system would not work. In this situation the firm may use additional checks on suspecious 
orders. Additionally, e-tailers may also adopt the practices of linking all the previously 
used customers’ devices with their accounts (Al-Jumeily et al., 2015), which is not being 
practiced   currently.   
b) Updating Fraud Rules 
Methods and trends in IDFs are ever changing, so to detect emerging frauds, organisations 
need to update the fraud rules (Carneiro et al., 2017). Talking about this issue, the 
interviewee C1-R11 said: 
“If we then see a pattern, then obviously we can put that pattern in place, then will build 
a rule into the system that will then reject that type of activity 
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It confirms that the fraud screening patterns are updated in accordance with new fraud 
patterns. It also shows that new fraud rules are developed and implemented into the fraud 
screening system to detect that type of frauds. Thus, the practice of updating the screening 
system with new fraud rules helps the case organisation to detect fraud with matching 
patterns.   
c) Having a Device Recognition System 
The practice of having a device recognition system is significant to detect the recurring 
frauds. Such a system helps organisations to recognise the devices used by its customers 
or fraudsters. Regarding it, respondent C1-R02 informed: 
“We’ve got the device recognition that we use, which we brought in a couple of years ago 
which is really a big deal, device recognition is because we can see who’s using what 
computers and their IP addresses”. 
This shows that the device recognition system is an effective step towards the recognition 
of the customers’ devices. The system also helps detection of devices previously used in 
frauds, as told by the interviewee C1-R03: 
“Our (Device recognition) system helps to detect multiple applications or transactions 
using the same device”. 
The statement reveals that the device recognition system helps the case organisation to 
detect multiple applications or orders made through one device. Furthermore, on the 
significance of the device recognition system regarding the detection of recurring identity 
frauds, participant C1-R07 said: 
“Our systems put cookies on the customers’ devices, which detect the devices previously 
used in any fraud”.   
It suggests that the case organisation is using a device recognition system. First, it detects 
the use of the same device in more than one account. Second, the system also helps to 
detect any device, which has previously been used in fraud. Thus, it is significant in 
detecting identity frauds using the same device.  
The results also show that the device recognition system installed by C1 can also identify 
the IP address of the customer or the fraudster. It is unique and identifiable and may be 
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linked to each individual customer. However, the analysis reveals that C1 does not link 
customer devices with their accounts because customers may have access to different 
devices. Although, customers may not be limited to the use of one device, C1 may link 
all the used devices and IP addresses with customer accounts. Thus, any new devices may 
be confirmed through varius channels before processing the orders. Therefore, linking 
customers’ devices with their accounts will also help to detect IDFs, which is also advised 
by Al-Jumeily, et al. (2015). 
d) Receiving Customer Complaints on Identity Frauds 
The interviews reveal that sometimes identity frauds are detected by the customers 
themselves. In this situation the case organisation receives complaints from the 
customers: 
“Sometimes customers call and inform us that they haven’t purchased this item, or I 
haven’t spent that amount or things like that….”. (C1-R10) 
A similar response was given by some other respondents, indicating that the case 
organisation is still facing a significant number of identity fraud occurrences. The 
detection of identity frauds at the customer end may be a result of the customer education 
enticing to check their bank accounts and credit card transactions regularly. Although, 
it’s a good practice to know on identity frauds, to start mitigation process, however, it 
also shows that the case organisation’s arrangements to detect frauds may be improved. 
For effective detection of IDFs, e-tailers may be suggested measures, such as Kumar and 
Goyal, (2016) and Wang et al. (2015) advised to send login alerts to the customers soon 
after their account is logged in. In case of any identity fraud, the customer will contact 
back. Thus, the fraud would be detected at the early stage. Therefore, case organisation 
should adopt the practice of sending login alerts to its customers through their preferred 
channel of communication. 
4.3.5 Mitigation 
Mitigation starts once a suspicious activity is detected in a customer’s account during the 
proceeding stage. An effective mitigation system is necessary for a speedy termination of 
fraud attempts and keeping the fraud losses at a minimum (Jamieson et al., 2007; 
Wilhelm, 2004).  
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The findings show that in spite of deterrence, prevention and detection, fraudsters succeed 
in committing IDFs. In this situation mitigation practices are necessary to keep the fraud 
losses minimum, as these losses cannot be fully tolerated. The respondent also informed 
that any fraud detected at an earlier stage would be mitigated to a zero loss. The processes 
and procedures regarding the mitigation of identity frauds in the case organisation are 
discussed below.  
a) Verifying the Identity Information 
The first and foremost practice against any identity fraud is the verification of identity 
information of the customers. Once an order is labelled as suspicious, the first thing the 
case organisation does is the verification of the identity information. According to C1-
R04: 
“We report all of our fraud onto CIFAS.  So if you are a member that is another search 
tool that we use when an account is open, and an order is placed.  We will check on 
CIFAS to see if there is a record on there of misuse of that address or that name is being 
used and stuff like that….”   
The statement shows that the case organisation has the practice of verifying the address 
and the name of the customer through CIFAS database, to check if that ID information 
has already been used in fraud. This helps the case organisation to decide on the order 
whether, it is genuine or fraudulent. Furthermore, the case organisation also verifies the 
identity information when account is opened:  
“We use systems such as we would check BT people finder.  straight forward; check if 
they are on the electoral roll.  Check if they are on a mortality database if they are 
registered as deceased” (C1-R07). 
Talking about this issue, the interviewee C1-R03 said: 
“Sometimes we do a credit file search.  We can actually search a credit file, have a look 
at the data that’s on there, and question the caller around the credit information”.  
The statements show that the case organisation has the practice of verifying the identity 
information at the time of a new account opening and in case of any suspicious 
transaction. As mentioned earlier, the case organisation shares identity fraud related 
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information with CIFAS and get its help to check if any of the account identity has 
previously been used in a fraud. It helps C1 to reduce the identity fraud chances. 
Moreover, the findings also show that the case organisation also uses phone directories, 
electoral roll and mortality database to challenge identity fraudster before any fraud takes 
place (Jamieson et al., 2007). 
These verifications help the case organisation to mitigate any identity fraud before it 
happens. Although, these records help C1 to verify the identity information, there are 
some limitations related to these usability of these record. Thus, these records may not be 
updated frequently, fraudsters can use it as their advantage.  
Next the information on the credit file may be actually logged by the fraudsters. To 
prevent this, the literature suggests collecting documentary proof such as driving licence, 
passport, etc. at the time of account opening, which will help to mitigate any fraud at that 
moment and the later stage (Kahn and Liñares-Zegarra, 2016). 
b) Order Reconfirmation 
Reconfirmation of suspicious order helps to ensure that the purchase order has been 
placed by a genuine customer. The case organisation has that practice in action, which 
helps it to mitigate any fraudulent attempt. In response to a question on reconfirmation of 
suspicious orders, respondent R1-C04 replied: 
“They will manually do it, they will pick up a phone, and they will speak to the customers 
on the genuine customer's telephone number to confirm if the order is genuine”. 
Responding to the same question C1-R07 informed:   
“There be certain queues that accept such as a high value based order which may be 
suspicious, such as a thousand-pound laptop goes into an address that has not ordered 
such item before and further checks may be needed to be done on that just to clarify and 
even if it is genuine.” 
The statements show that the red-flagged transactions are then manually verified by 
calling the actual customers via their already given contact numbers. This practice can 
mitigate the frauds, which are attempted with original but stolen identity information, as 
it will confirm the genuineness of the customer. 
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c) Sharing Information on Incurred Frauds 
Sharing information with other organisations makes it easier to detect identity frauds in 
any organisation. Regarding the significance of information sharing respondent C1-R08 
stated:  
Information sharing is very beneficial because whatever frauds they have, we get the 
cross-reference in our systems 
Above statement claims that information sharing on incurred frauds is helpful to detect 
identity frauds using identical information. Further to that, respondent C1-R04 told: 
“We report all of our fraud onto CIFAS.  So if you are a member that is another search 
tool that we use when an account is open, and an order is placed.  We will check on 
CIFAS to see if there is a record on there of misuse of that address or that name is being 
used and stuff. 
The results show that the case organisation has the practice of sharing the information on 
incurred identity frauds with CIFAS. Such information sharing practice helps the case 
organisation to detect any identity frauds with the credentials used previously with any 
other CIFAS member for committing a fraud. Thus, the practice of information sharing 
on the incurred frauds helps all the member organisations  in detection of identity frauds. 
d) Having a Victims Support System 
In some instances, the identity frauds are unearthed by the customers when they check 
their business or bank accounts or credit card transactions. In such a situation the accounts 
show an activity, which has not been done by a genuine customer but a confirmed identity 
fraud. Soon after receiving the victim’s complaint about an identity fraud, the case 
organisation tries to mitigate it. This is the response of C1-R05 to the question about how 
the form deals with the victim of identity frauds: 
“The account will be secured and be given another account and loss will be given back 
to customer financially, and they will also be given above and beyond that as well as a 
mark of respect for letting them down”. 
The statement shows that the case organisation has a victim support system that helps 
them to continue their business with them. The results show that the amount involved in 
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identity fraud is credited to the victim and a new account is assigned for onward business. 
This shows that the case organisation victim support system helps the customers avoid 
the loss, and continued business. 
e) Mitigation Training 
In identity fraud mitigation, training has a critical impact on the performance of 
employees responsible for mitigating identity frauds. This is recognised by the managers 
of C1. According to C1-R11: 
“We take them [the trainees] on to the systems to understand what an account looks like, 
what a customer’s account looks like and what actually happens on the process of a 
customer, customer journey, and then to understand from initially opening an account, 
what information and what data we ask for so then how we use that data and how 
themselves can use that data to help them recognise”. 
Similar views were expressed by interviewee C1-R07:  
“Fraud team obviously need more training than ourselves because the other ones are 
experts in initially spotting the frauds”. 
The results show that the staff in the mitigation department is given training on customers’ 
accounts and the related activities. They are also given training on the nature and the type 
of collectable information from the customers and how to use it successfully to mitigate 
any identity fraud. Furthermore, the training of mitigation staff should take into 
consideration the quality of their past decisions as advised by Becker et al. (2010). Such 
customised training would help mitigation staff to enhance their capabilities. Therefore, 
the case organisation may be recommended to customise the training programme for each 
staff member to improve their productivity in IDF mitigation. 
f) Dealing with Compromised Customer Accounts 
Identity frauds are mostly executed by taking over the victim’s account. The case 
organisation deals differently with these accounts. In response to a question about how 
their organisation deals with an account associated with a confirmed fraud, respondent 
C1-R02 replied: 
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“We will just reject it, close it, and then, send a letter to the person whose name has been 
used to say ‘Sorry we think you’d been a victim of fraud”. 
The statement shows that the case organisation has the practice of closing the accounts, 
which have been taken-over by identity fraudsters. Such practice, as mentioned by 
respondent, is adopted when no loss is reported on the account. Any account with incurred 
identity fraud is dealt differently as mentioned by respondent C1-R05: 
“We will call it purpling the account, then we stop that account we give the customer 
another account to use continuously, but we keep this fraudulently obtained account 
opened so that we can catch the fraudster”. 
It is apparent that the case organisation deals differently with accounts involved in certain 
losses. Such practice of keeping the taken-over accounts opened to catch the fraudsters is 
helpful in mitigating the fraud losses through recovery. On the other hand, this practice 
helps in catching the fraudsters and prosecution. It leads to the fraudster being punished 
and recovery of losses. Such practice of keeping the taken over account opened to catch 
the fraudsters is critical to fraud deterrence.  
4.3.6 Analysis 
The analysis stage in IDFs helps to understand the fraud type, methods, trends and losses. 
It also determines the weaknesses of prevention and detection systems that result in fraud 
occurrence (Jamieson et al., 2007; Kumar et al., 2007; Wilhelm, 2004). Furthermore, 
Wilhelm (2004) argues that fraud analysis reports help to develop and update fraud 
policies and also work as a base for further investigations and prosecution. The following 
results confirm that the analysis stage is a critical part of IDFM. Processes and managerial 
practices at analysis stage at case organisation are discussed as under.  
a) Hiring Experienced Fraud Analysists 
The job of identity fraud analyst is critical to the overall management of identity frauds. 
The skills and capabilities of a fraud analyst significantly affect the performance of 
identity fraud management. Therefore, a fraud analysist should be an expert in their field. 
Regarding the speciality of fraud analysts, respondent C1-R06 pointed out: 
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“So these fraud analysts are either ex-military or ex-police, so they know how to deal, 
most of them have been ten years in police, so they know the business well”.  
The statement highlights that the case organisation has a practice of hiring experienced 
professionals for effective fraud analysis.  This helps the organisation to analyse the 
frauds in a better way, as the experienced professionals input their expertise and 
experiences. Although, the practice of hiring experienced fraud analysts has a positive 
impact on fraud analysis, Coulson-Thomas (2017) suggests organisations to involve top-
level management to seek their input for the improvement of identity fraud management. 
Therefore, the case organisations in addition to employing expert analysts, should also 
involve senior management to get their input to make fraud management more effective.  
b) Reviewing Identity Frauds 
The practice of reviewing identity frauds is helpful in its management. The case 
organisation has the practice of reviewing each identity fraud reported by the detection 
team. According to interviewee CA-R08: 
“We receive information pack on frauds to see the trends and methods of frauds, all 
related information, including the personal and delivery address…….what we do is to 
suggest the weakness of the system or staff negligence if any and fraud cues to detect 
similar frauds…”. 
In turn, respondent C1-R05 stated: 
“So wherever we find new trends that get communicated to everyone in specialised 
position”. 
These statements indicate that the case organisation has the process of reviewing identity 
frauds, which help it to improve its fraud system. Information on identity frauds is sent 
by the mitigation team to analysists, who review the information on frauds and diagnose 
the weaknesses in the functioning of the systems and staff. The analysis process also 
identifies new fraud trends and methods. Based on the review, these experts develop 
proposal on how to improve the systems; they also suggest fraud cues to embed into the 
fraud screening system to detect frauds in future.  
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As mentioned in the detection section, these fraud cues are significant to detect suspicious 
transactions. Thus, the process of identity fraud review is critical to enhancing the 
effectiveness of identity fraud detection.  
c) Setting Identity Fraud as Management Priority  
Putting identity fraud on the management priority list would help to get input from the 
top management. According to respondent C1-R05: 
“We hold weekly  meetings for IT security breach and internal frauds, this, therefore, 
highlights the existing cases and also highlights progress of existing prosecution and also 
highlight any new fraudulent activity”. 
In addition, the same respondent argued: 
“It is  important because on the executive board there is with CEO and COO they have 
weekly Monday morning meetings that identify any threat any major problems. That’s 
two big risks in our business; one is through dishonesty and serious data breach that’s 
discussed every Monday morning”. 
The results show that C1 has the practice of organising regular meetings to review the 
position on security risks and internal frauds. Such meetings are attended by senior staff 
from different fields in the business, thus it’s a significant practice to get the  input from 
related  fields to develop a comprehensive programme to manage the IT security risks. 
This shows that identity frauds are not given much priority, and the results are evident 
that still, the case organisation is suffering from significant identity fraud losses. 
Therefore, the case organisation should priorities issues related to identity fraud 
management, which will ensure a better management of identity frauds, and is also 
suggested by Coulson-Thomas (2017). 
d) Managing the Identity Fraud Risk 
Identity fraud is one of the most significant business risks faced by online retail 
organisations. The risk is not limited to financial losses. There is also reputational 
damage, which may result in a complete business failure. The starting point in risk 
management is to know the potential risk as mentioned by respondent C1-R05: 
“Fraudsters now know that they can get away with more success on online fraud and 
that’s not to say that our systems are weak…. I never underestimate the intelligence of 
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any criminal because they make the decision to cross the invisible line and also take 
conviction, so never underestimate the fraudsters”. 
Confirming the fraud risks, respondent C1-R07 informed:  
“Yes, we (are) still losing significant and lot of money on fraud, they still get in through”. 
The results also show that even after many arrangements, case organisation is still losing 
on identity frauds, which confirm the prevalence of fraud risks. Furthermore, the findings 
demonstrate that the case organisation is aware that its IT systems are always under attack, 
such sense of risk helps to take measures to manage these risks. Regarding the 
management of information security risk, respondent C1-R10 informed: 
We have a security risk management function which, the name suggests, handles all 
operational and business-based, IT-based risks”. 
On the same issue, respondent C1-R05 stated: 
“The business risk director, head of group security, head of IT security and head of fraud 
prevention, all work together, but ultimately it would be the business risk director 
responsibility to not only mitigate the risk but bring ideas how to reduce even further. 
The statements show that the case organisation has the practice of managing the 
information security risk, which leads to the security the customers’ information. The 
results reveal that the case organisation has the practice of risk analysis, but that practice 
is limited to the security of information regarding identity theft or information breach 
risk. So far, the case organisation is still facing identity frauds and is losing a significant 
amount of these frauds. Therefore, the organisation should focus on the potential risks at 
each stage of fraud management to improve its effectiveness (Wilhelm, 2004; Jamieson 
et al., 2007). 
e) Evaluation of the Prevention and Detection Systems 
The performance evaluation of any system helps to improve its performance.  Regarding 
the evaluation of technical systems, respondent C1-R09 stated: 
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“As health checking where we validate all of the control requirements defined in that 
policy against all systems within the environment and confirm any violations to that policy 
exist, and those violations are then fully investigated and ameliorated where possible”. 
And the other interviewee C1-R06) commented: 
“We also have a vulnerability scan service which again, on a cyclic basis, runs on 
intervals”. 
The statements show that the case organisation has the practice of evaluating its 
prevention system to ensure its performance in the light of related policy. The policy 
document (D07) regarding the evaluation of prevention system states: 
“Vulnerability Testing: All public facing services must be vulnerability tested at least bi-
annually including but not limited to: E-Commerce website · Remote Access portals · Web 
services · Firewalls”. 
This shows that the case organisation has the policy of vulnerability testing of the website, 
access portals, web services and firewalls, twice a year. These are the interacting points, 
where the fraudsters and hackers attack to breach information or any other malicious 
attack. The test helps the organisation to evaluate the vulnerability of prevention and 
detection systems and take necessary actions to enhance their performance. 
f) Performance Measurement of the Mitigation Staff 
The importance of IDF detection system lies in the performance of fraud advisors, who 
deal with the suspicious frauds and go through various checks to confirm any fraud. So 
far, the performance measurement of mitigation staff is advised by (Becker et al., 2010). 
As explained by interviewee C1-R04:  
“We’ll actually then evaluate that persons (fraud advisors) to see actually, have they 
achieved that competent level. If they achieved the competent level, that’s fine. If they 
haven't, then we’ll do what we call a personal development plan”. 
The statement shows that the case organisation has in place, the process of measuring the 
performance of fraud advisors, who are dealing with the suspicious frauds. It helps to 
ensure that the staff is performing at par to detect IDFs. This process also determines the 
training needs of individual staff members and making development plans. The results 
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also show that these advisors are also sent for further training if their performance is not 
found satisfactory. Thus, the practice of the performance measurement of mitigation staff 
helps the organisation to enhance its effectiveness. Such process helps the case 
organisation improving the performance of mitigation staff, which leads to better IDFs 
detection. 
4.3.7 Policy 
A policy has a significant impact on practices and activities carried out within an 
organisation, so organisations should create and maintain antifraud policies (Njenga and 
Osiemo, 2013; Bierstaker et al., 2006). On having policies, respondent C1-R05 informed:  
“We even have group security investigation policy; we have an IT security policy, email 
security policy (and) internet security policy”.  
The statement shows that the case organisation is aware of the importance of policies. It 
has policies related to the security of IT infrastructure, information security, e-mail and 
internet security. The extant literature has many studies on the importance of policies for 
the effectiveness of the related operations.  Regarding the importance of security policy, 
Puhamainen and Siponen (2010)  and Siponen, et al.  (2014)  argue that the visibility of 
an information security policy has a significant and positive impact on the behaviour of 
staff to comply with the policy. The case organisation’s practices on policy development, 
updating, and compliance are mentioned in following sections.  
a) Having Identity Fraud Management Policies 
The practice of having IDFM policies has a significant impact on its management. 
Respondents from the case organisation have confirmed the existence of a number of 
policies. Thus, respondent C1-R05 pointed out: 
“Most definitely, we have an IT security policy, email security policy internet security 
policy”. 
In turn, respondent C1-R10 confirmed: 
“There is a reasonably robust information security policy which defines a whole post of 
external security and system basically to control”. 
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The statements show that the case organisation has some policies but are mostly related 
to the information security. Furthermore, the case organisations has developed policy 
documents which include Information Security Mobile Computing (D-01), Information 
Security Email Acceptable Use Policy (D-01), Information Security Encryption Policy 
(D-03), Information Security Network Security Policy (D-04), Information Security 
Incident Management Policy (D-05), Information Security Protecting Employee & 
Customer Data Policy (D-06) and Information Security Internet Acceptable Use Policy 
(D-07). These policies are aimed to secure the customer information from theft and breach 
at the prevention stage. However, similar policies at other stages of IDFM are not 
developed and implemented, which may be a reason for the occurrence of IDFs. 
For effective management, the significance of policies has also been highlighted by Singh 
et al. (2013) and Soomro et al.  (2016). Furthermore, regarding the effective management 
of frauds, some researchers (Jamieson et al., 2007; Kumar et al., 2007; Njenga and 
Osiemo, 2013) have suggested having related policies. Therefore, the case organisation 
should develop policies related to each stage of the fraud management.  
b) Data Access Management Policy 
In addition to the arrangements for prevention of external threats, the case organisation 
also has the policy to protect critical information from internal threats. In this regards the 
case organisation has a data access management policy, through which the staff is 
permitted limited access to organisational and customers’ data. Regarding the data access 
policy C1-R09 informed: 
“We endeavour to operate the least privilege policy.  So we are only granted the 
privileges which you require to conduct the activity associated with your job with your 
role”. 
Regarding the validation of such access and updating the access, the same respondent 
said the following:  
“We have a process which runs six monthly, which is called ‘continued business need’ 
which extracts everyone’s user ID on the privileges associated with those IDs and the 
individual’s manager is contacted and asked to revalidate whether the access of the 
individual hold is still conformed to the role that they hold”.    
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These statements reveal that the case organisation operates the policy of least privilege 
on data access, which is helpful to minimise the internal information theft. The practice 
of regularly updating the data access privilege is also critical to comply with the data 
access management policy. Nevertheless, the case organisation has a data access policy, 
however, it is re-implemented every six months, which may lease some risks, so the case 
organisation should change the access of staff once their roles are changed, without 
waiting for six months to be completed  
c) Policy Compliance 
Although, the practice of having IDFM policies is significant but worthless without 
compliance with these policies. Such compliance is a guarantee of the fulfilment of the 
purpose of the policy in question. This is what C1-R09 said about compliance: 
“We validate all of the control requirements defined in that policy against all systems 
within the environment and confirm any violations of that policy exist, and those 
violations are then fully investigated”. 
In response to the question of how the firm ensures policy compliance respondent C1-
R10 stated: 
“We have a full compliance team with quite a lot of people, and they look at different 
areas of the business”.  
This shows that the case organisation has a practice of ensuring the compliance of every 
policy, investigate any violation and take corrective actions. The results also show that 
the case organisation has a devoted team to monitor policies compliance. Although, the 
case organisation monitors the compliance it does not provide any training on compliance 
methods and process. Such training is strongly advised by Soomro et al. (2016). The 
training helps the staff to understand the compliance methods and process, which leads 
to positive compliance behaviour. Therefore, the case organisation should develop a 
training programme to enhance the policy compliance.  
d) Compliance Audit 
The audit has a significant role in ensuring policies compliance. It helps to locate any 
non-compliance and those aspects of the compliance procedure which make the 
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compliance easier. In response to a question on compliance audit, respondent C1-R06 
replied:    
“Audits take place in the business to make sure that they comply; internal audit team 
themselves they do on a regular bases, and third party comes in every year to make sure 
(that) we are complying with our policies. 
On the compliance and audit, respondent C1-R05 pointed out: 
“Each department has to succeed and has to provide evidence of their compliance, so we 
internally audit the compliance and we externally audit”. 
The statements show that the case organisation has the practice of internal and external 
audit to ensure compliance with its policies. However, it was also confirmed during the 
interviews that customer data is shared with some contractors and vendors, for which no 
such arrangement has been found. The customer data may be stolen or breached at these 
third party organisations. Therefore it is recommended that the case organisations should 
conduct an audit of third party organisations to ensure the similar policies on information 
security and identity frauds, which is also advised by Liu et al. (2010) 
e) Policy Awareness 
A policy lacks its importance if the staff is not aware of it. So the policies should be 
communicated properly, and staff should be well aware of these policies. Talking about 
policy awareness and ready access, respondent C1-R09 said the following: 
“There are internal e-learning packages, which are deployed throughout the 
organisation so that it gives individuals an overview of the content of the policy and 
directs them to the full portion of document should they wish to read further”. 
The results show that the case organisation has made the policies available to each staff 
member, which help them to discharge their duties in accordance with the policy 
guidelines. Although, the availability of policies may help the staff to go through the 
contents of the policies, but, there is no sure that the staff will read and comprehend these 
policies, to act accordingly, which is a significant weakness in the policy awareness. So 
far, training programs should be arranged to enhance the employee awareness and 
comprehension on policies, which is also recommended by Parsons, et al. (2014), Singh, 
et al. (2013), Siponen, et al. (2014) and Soomro, et al. (2016). 
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f) Policy Update 
The updating of any policy is necessary to coup with emerging challenges. According to 
C1-R05, in C1: 
“Any policy is … reviewed every twelve month, and it can only be an active live policy”. 
The statement shows that the organisation has the practice of updating the policies on a 
yearly basis. Annual review of policies may not be effective in identity fraud management 
as the trends and methods of the frauds are ever-changing. Therefore, after having policies 
on identity fraud management, the case organisation should update its policies more 
frequently to counter the emerging changes. 
4.3.8 Investigation  
Investigation of identity frauds is a significant part of its management. It helps the 
organisations to collect the evidence, locate the fraudsters and litigate for the recovery of 
losses and punishment of fraudsters. The investigations in the case organisation are 
carried out by fraud prevention team. The investigation is a fundamental step towards 
prosecution, so, for effective prosecution, there should be a sound investigation and 
evidence preservation practices. This is what respondent C1-R05 had to say about identity 
fraud investigations: 
“We are working towards minimising the police investigation and fraudulent house 
courts …that fraud is sold to an independent organisation they do on their behalf, we do 
not do, we investigate” 
The statement shows that the case organisation has the practice of investigating identity 
frauds by itself. Investigating at the organisational end is a significant practice that 
minimises the police role, which enhances the coordination with police and help in better 
investigations and prosecution. Thus, the results show that investigation is a critical part 
of identity fraud management.  
a) Employing Specialist Investigators 
The effectiveness of investigations depends on the expertise of the investigators. The case 
organisation has employed a team of specialist investigators to conduct investigations on 
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the organisational end. This is how the situation was described by respondent C1-R05 
informed: 
“It’s not a role that is civilian and without police background, without HM customs and 
revenue, military background you can’t train someone to be a fraud manager who wasn’t 
at the experience for conducting investigations”.  
A similar statement was made by respondent C1-R09: 
“There is a dedicated fraud investigator team which is comprised primarily of former 
enforcement operatives and ex-military officers who are able to go and further investigate 
and directly engage with law enforcement bodies throughout UK”. 
It follows that C1 has employed a team of expert investigators. These investigators have 
related background in the police, revenue and military. The first statement underscores 
that the role of investigators is critical and for being an expert investigator in identity 
frauds they should have vast experience in investigations.  
The statements also show that investigators should have a sound knowledge of state laws 
and legal procedures and investigation experience. Therefore, the case organisation has 
employed specialists with a sound experience in investigations, state laws and legal 
procedures. With background specialities, these investigators should also have 
knowledge of the organisational specific systems to work with as argued by respondent 
C1-R04: 
“So basically, the people that we employ, who come into my team have always got some 
sort of law enforcement background.  So their knowledge of the law and how to deal with 
the police is already there…the bit that I have to train my team up on is the systems within 
the company.  
It follows that the fraud investigators are well experienced in the field, but company-
specific training is necessary to understand the systems within the case organisation. So 
far, the case organisation, after hiring these professionals trains them on the organisational 
specific systems. Such training helps them to understand the organisational process and 
technologies available to get help in investigations and collection of digital evidence. 
b) Investigate with Prosecution in Mind 
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Investigation of the fraud cases is significant to find the facts/evidence and to locate the 
fraudsters. The case organisation has the practice of investigating the identity frauds for 
prosecutions, as mentioned by respondent C1-R05: 
“It is in our nature to investigate and produce those papers to prosecute” 
Also the respondent C1-R09 told that: 
“We take the evidence; we present that in such a way that it’s enough for prosecution”. 
The statements show that in the case organisation, identity frauds are investigated 
privately, and evidence is collected to prosecute the fraudsters. This evidence is then 
given to the police for further investigations and prosecution. Thus, all the evidence are 
collected and preserved to be useful for prosecution.  
c) Collection of Evidence 
Collection of evidence is a critical part of investigations to proceed with legal action to 
recover the losses and prosecute the fraudsters. Regarding the collection of evidence, 
respondent C1-R05 stated:  
“Very first thing we do is gain as much information and evidence we possibly can, to 
ensure that the allegation is beyond reasonable doubt” 
Similarly, C1-R06 described the firm’s tactic in the following way: 
“We will piece everything together; where the fraud took place, IP addresses, IPs link to 
anything, look at things such as device ID, so the cookies on the device has been using 
more than once, use social media, eBay, Facebook and tweeter trying to get a bit of profile 
of the person potentially involved, profile of delivery address, like student 
accommodation. Once we get it, we will build a package”. 
The statements show that the case organisation collects evidence and identity fraud 
related information to ensure that the allegation is beyond any doubt. For evidence, the 
investigators at the case organisation collect IP address, which helps to identify its links 
with any device, geo-position of the IP address and use cookies to identify the device used 
in frauds. Further findings show that the case organisation also uses social media to check 
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the profile of the fraudsters, and information on the delivery address. After collecting 
evidence, the case is prepared for prosecution. 
d) Reporting Fraud Cases to the Police 
The legal action against fraudsters is not possible without reporting these cases to police. 
Such reporting is necessary for police investigations and their actions for the arrest of the 
fraudster and prosecution. Regarding the reporting of frauds to local police, respondent 
C1-R01 informed:  
“We give the police statements and all the evidence …: when the account was opened, 
how it was, by telephone or internet, IP addresses and all the information we can put 
together”. 
Respondents C1-R05 and C1-R06 had the following to add: 
“We are working towards minimising the police investigation and fraudulent house 
courts”. 
 “We do all the work for police so for the job for them we do everything so from the police 
force perspective it is an easy arrest”.  
The statements show that the case organisation reports the fraud cases to police with all 
available evidence collected by specialist investigators. The police are also given 
statements of the victims confirming an identity fraud, with account details, contact 
details, IP address and other related information. The findings also show that the conduct 
of investigations at the organisational end helps to minimise the burden of police 
investigations.  
The results show that all these arrangements regarding the investigations and preparation 
of the fraud case makes it easier for the police to arrest the fraudster and process the case. 
Such process of providing the statements and evidence helps to increase coordination 
with the police as they sometimes lack interest in small financial frauds. Thus, reporting 
a fraud case with a ready set of evidence based on investigation, leaves least for police, 
which enhances the coordination between police and the business organisations. 
Therefore, this study suggests e-tailers to conduct investigation at their end, and collect 
as many as evidence to enhance collaboration with law enforcement agencies.   
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e) Catching the Fraudsters 
After collecting sufficient evidence, the case organisation tries to catch the fraudsters with 
the help of police. If the fraud is confirmed before the delivery of goods, the organisation 
tries to catch the fraudster upon the delivery, as told by respondent C1-R01:  
Once you [the fraudster] ordered that goods we believe if it is a fraud item what we then 
do we set up delivery, we know you are a fraudster we will attempt to deliver the goods 
for you. Once you signed for the goods, with the police help, we arrest the individual. 
The statement shows that once the case organisation is confirmed by the transition being 
a fraud, then a controlled delivery is set up. The police are also involved in this process, 
and once the fraudster accepts and signs for the delivery, the police arrest him. Doing 
such delivery is significant in arresting the fraudsters and leads to a successful prosecution 
based on collected evidence.   
4.3.9 Prosecution 
An effective prosecution has multiple advantages, as it helps the organisation to recover 
the losses, builds customer trust, reduces the operational losses and disseminates a 
warning message to potential fraudsters. It also results in effective deterrence. The case 
organisation works on the prosecution stage of identity fraud management: 
“Last year we took 435 people to court, and we got 415 prosecutions, very good success”.  
(C1-R05) 
 “We prosecute on every single occasion, whether that is internal theft or customer’s 
account is being fraudulent compromised”. (C1-R02) 
“If they (the fraud managers) take it to the police and police wants to take it on we will 
prosecute definitely. (C1-R07) 
These statements reveal that the case organisation has the practice of prosecuting the 
identity fraudsters. The results also show that the decision of prosecuting any fraud is at 
the discretion of fraud managers. Once they decide to take the fraud onward for 
prosecution, they give it to the police, and they decide whether they want to prosecute or 
not. As already mentioned that the decision on whether to prosecute depends on the 
effectiveness of the investigations and the supporting evidence. Thus, this shows that all 
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the fraud cases are not litigated but once the fraud managers decide to take any fraud to 
prosecution the next step is to prepare it in such a way that the police department is ready 
to take it for prosecution.  
A) Involvemen in the Prosecution Process 
For prosecution to be effective, e-tail organisations should be involved in the process to 
present their case and defend their position in the courts of law. Continued follow-up of 
the prosecution process is also necessary to attain the objectives of the prosecution. The 
management of C1 fully understands this as follows from the comment of respondent C1-
R04: 
“We follow it right the way through until they get sentenced, and hopefully we get 
compensation given back to us”.  
The statement shows that the case organisation has the practice of being involved in the 
prosecution process and defend their standing, which results in successful prosecution. 
The practice of following up the fraud cases in the courts of law also helps the 
organisations to make a claim for compensations. The fraudsters’ punishment turns into 
a significant identity fraud deterrence, which is the first line of defence against any fraud. 
Secondly, prosecutions help the organisations to recover their losses, and build a sense of 
security for their legitimate customers. The practice of being involved in the prosecution 
process is also recommended by Lewis et al. (2014) and Gogolin and Jones (2010).  
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4.4 Case Organisation C2 
Organisation C2 is a large online retail organisation based in the UK. It also has a chain 
of stores throughout the UK and the Ireland. It has millions of online customers. The firm 
deals in a wide range of items from household to jewellery. It sales famous national and 
international brands in addition to its own brands. C2 offers credit purchase to its 
customers for a limited period and also charges a fixed interest rate after free period. To 
get such facility, customers have to open account with it by providing personal, banking 
and credit card information. The account holders set some login credentials to access their 
accounts, and theft of these credentials result in IDF losses to the case organisations. On 
the other hand, C2 also has some risks related to IDT and data breach because of 
possessing sensitive customer information.  
4.4.1 Types of Identity Frauds Faced by C2 
The findings show that the case firm assumes IDFs as a critical challenge to the business 
that results in significant losses. Although, C2 has no mechanism to categories the frauds 
by types, yet the findings reveal that IDF is the leading fraud type in the organisation. The 
results show that application fraud, account takeover, first party fraud and delivery fraud 
are commonly found in C2. This e-tailer is losing a significant amount of money every 
year as fraud losses, so is engaged in online IDFM process. It has a devoted team that 
deals online fraud issues and liaisons with other organisations.  
The results reveal that despite of the arrangements in place, the firm was still losing 
significant amount of its revenues to identity frauds. Additionally, the results also confirm 
that identity fraud management at the case organisation consists of the eight stages earlier 
mentioned in the literature. 
4.4.2 Deterrence 
Deterrence was identified as a critical part of IDFM in C2. Thus, regarding the 
significance of deterrence, respondent C2-R07 had the following to say: 
“I also know that these amateur fraudsters are really not worth our time in dealing with 
because once they get a scare, they never do it again”. 
Another interviewee C2-R04 pointed out:  
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“We disrupt the frauds by carrying them out.  By disrupting that network, we may see 
fraud dropped in that area by maybe 10 to 20 times a month”.  
The statements show that case organisation has the deterrence related practices, which 
lead to a reduced number of fraud attempts. The findings suggest that some amateur 
fraudsters can easily be deterred by scaring them. The case organisations also adopt 
various managerial practices to deter the fraudsters. As a result, the fraud attempts are 
declined significantly. For deterrence, the case organisation works on two aspects, 
customer education and creating the fear of being caught and punished. Managerial 
practices for customer education and creating the fear of being caught and punished are 
explained as under.  
a) Customer Education 
As already mentioned, customer education is a significant practice to make them aware 
of the risks and countermeasures to minimise these risks. The customer education is 
getting more importance on identity frauds as pointed out by respondent C2-R15: 
“The risk patterns are changing, a few years ago our systems were more vulnerable to 
identity theft, which are still at risk but now customer is more vulnerable to identity theft”. 
The statement signifies the importance of customer education in identity fraud 
management. Observing the importance of customer education, the C2 educates its 
customers regarding identity theft, as interviewee C2-R09 reported: 
“It is expressed on our website that beware of phishing emails and stuff like that….it 
suggests to protect password, periodically change it and set a strong one”. 
Other participant C2-R05 mentioned: 
“We sometimes email our customers suggesting them periodically changing their 
passwords and not to disclose their ID and password to anyone”. 
The results confirm that C2 has the practice of educating its customers on IDFs. First, the 
case organisation uses its website to make them aware them of phishing emails and other 
information security risks. The website also suggests the customers secure their 
passwords from stealing, periodically changing them and putting strong passwords. The 
case organisation also sends emails educating customers on changing passwords and not 
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sharing the passwords with anyone. Such customer education helps to secure the 
customer’s identity information, which is used for IDFs. In addition, for the education of 
victims of identity frauds, interviewee C2-R03 put it: 
“We would ask our customer to keep checking your credit file just in case if your account 
has been compromised anywhere else or anything else from many other credit lenders”. 
It reveals that educating the victims on checking their credit history regularly would help 
to detect further frauds with other organisations. Such managerial practice helps the 
customers to be vigilant on their credit record, thus any fraud may be identified earlier 
and it would be mitigated at an earlier stage, resulting in reduced losses. 
Nevertheless, these practices help in customer education, the persistence of these frauds 
indicate that some additional practices are required. First, the case organisation should 
create awareness of new identity theft trends and IDF methods and countermeasures, 
which are also suggested by Arachchilage and love (2014) and Seda (2014).  
Furthermore, C2 uses emails and website as instruments of customer education. The 
customer education may be improved by the use of some additional communication 
channels, such as text messages and push messages through mobile app (McGee and 
Byington, 2015; Wright, 2007)and mass media (Bai and Chen, 2013). These channels 
have not been tested in e-tailing so far, which may be deterrent for their use, but 
significant results have been achieved in other domains. 
This study also established that customer education is limited to the password protection 
and changing it periodically. However, the literature advises to educate customer on 
methods of identity theft and frauds and measures to avoid such risks (Arachchilage and 
Love, 2014; Seda, 2014).  Therefore, C2 may be advised to educate its customers about 
the emerging identity theft and fraud trends and methods and measures to counter to 
enhance their awareness for effective prevention of identity theft. 
The results also show that the case organisation recommends IDF victims to check their 
credit history. However, the literature suggests that all customers should be advised to 
check their bank account(s), credit/debit card transactions and credit history regularly and 
not to share personal information on social media (Arachchilage and Love, 2014; Seda, 
2014). Furthermore, organisations should also send customised messages to specific 
customers and IDF victims, which is advised by Copes, et al. (2010). Such practices 
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would secure the customers’ identity, help to detect frauds and create specific awareness 
in targeted customers/victims. Therefore, case organisation may be advised to improve 
its customer education by adopting the practices of suggesting the customers for regularly 
checking their bank details, credit/debit card transactions, credit history and send 
customised messages to targeted customers.    
b) Creating Fear Among the Potential Fraudsters 
The extant literature suggests that creating the fear of being caught and punished is 
significant to discourage fraudsters attempting frauds on any organisation. Regarding that 
participant C2-R02 mentioned: 
“Actually we go out and deal with the fraud.  So we will knock on your door.  We will 
come with the police.   You know that  we will chase anything that we believe to be fraud.  
We will gather evidence, and we will prosecute them.  So I think that sends out the best 
signal”.   
It reveals that after collecting sufficient evidence, the representatives of the case 
organisation visit the fraudsters’ addresses with police to arrest and prosecute them. The 
results also show the dealing with the frauds in that way sends a warning message to the 
potential fraudsters. 
According to C2-R01: 
“The first thing is we try to organise what we call a controlled delivery.  So with the 
police, our delivery company, and ourselves, we will deliver the parcel if even knowing 
that it is a fraud parcel, knowing that the person that is going to receive it is a fraudster.  
What we do is we will deliver the parcel, and once that parcel’s been delivered and signed 
for, the police will then arrest the individual”. 
The statement shows that C2 arranges a controlled delivery if a fraud is confirmed. In this 
process, once the fraud has been confirmed, a team of representative from case 
organisation deliver the goods, and once it is signed the fraudster is arrested by police. 
The arrest of fraudsters creates fear among other fraudsters. Thus, fraud attempts are 
deterred.  
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Although, the fraudsters are arrested, which turns it into a deterrent activity, such arrests 
are not publicised. Responding to a question regarding publicising such information, 
interviewee C2-R01 replied:  
“Well you see, that’s the problem.  You don’t really want to.  You don’t really want society 
knowing that you have all this fraud.  Because if they know, they may not do business with 
you”. 
The statement indicates that C2 does not publicise the information on arrests for creating 
the fear of being caught because it is assumed that such information will put a negative 
impact on the society and customer will refrain doing business with it. 
The results confirm that the case firm is not publicising the information on arrests and 
prosecutions, which would not create the fear, among other fraudsters. The literature 
suggests publicising such information as it has a critical impact on fraud deterrence 
(Akers, 2013; DeAngelo and Charness, 2012; Leasure and Zhang, 2017).  
Furthermore, Akers (2013) and Leasure and Zhang (2017) advise to create the fear of 
being caught and punished to deter the frauds. Additionally, publicising of information 
on fraud means and methods, origin and identity of fraudster’s are also suggested as 
significant to create the fear of being caught and punished (Shamsi et al., 2016). 
Additionally, Leasure and Zhang (2017) and Sperdea, et al. (2011) advise sending explicit 
messages to the society regarding the creation of fear and Zadig and Tejay (2010) 
suggests making potential fraudsters aware of organisational arrangements of frauds.  
The creation of fear among the potential fraudsters and making them aware of the anti-
fraud arrangements have a significant impact on fraud deterrence. Therefore, the case 
organisation may be advised to create fear through publicising the arrests and prosecution, 
and sending warning messages to potential fraudsters. The case firm may also publicise 
the detected frauds, their means and methods and identify the fraudsters and disseminate 
anti-fraud arrangements to make its identity fraud deterrence more effective.        
4.4.3 Prevention 
The extant literature has various studies on the significance of prevention as a critical 
stage in identity fraud management. It helps the organisation to fail any attempt at 
information theft, security breach and identity fraud. In identity fraud management 
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domain, prevention stage works at the cyber frontiers of the organisation. Regarding the 
preventive measures, respondent C2-R09 stated: 
“We are getting better at it, greater prevention systems we use now from our side”. 
The statement shows that the case organisation works on the prevention of identity frauds 
and is continuously improving the prevention systems. The need for effective systems to 
prevent information theft and identity frauds is also highlighted by Cordell, (2013) and 
Devos and Pipan (2009). On the risks related to information theft and identity frauds, 
interviewee C2-R07 gave the following comment: 
“The reputational damage, the stock share, the effect on the stock market would be 
extremely, extremely serious.  So again, there’s another good incentive not just to protect 
the customer, to protect everyone, everyone involved including the suppliers”.  
Thus, the results confirm that C2 has prevention practices to manage IDFs, which is also 
advised by Jamieson, et al, (2007), Kumar, et al. (2007) and Wilhelm, (2004). The 
processes and managerial practices for prevention of information theft and IDFs in the 
case firm are discussed in the following sections. 
a) Sufficient Investments in Prevention Systems 
Sufficient financial investment has a critical role in making the prevention system 
effective. The case firm in reflections of its customers’ expectations, invests sufficiently 
in its prevention systems. Regarding the customers’ expectations and investment in 
prevention system, interviewee C2-R05 reported: 
“If I was a customer, I would expect you to protect me to that level.  I have to say that we 
do and invest in that”. 
Talking about this issue, respondent C2-R09 mentioned: 
“I think if you see where we were five years ago to where we are now, there’s a massive 
improvement in the fraud loss.  So, every year we’re getting better and better at actually 
stopping fraud, and that’s possibly with the systems that we’re getting in all the time, 
newer systems, we’re being more proactive”.   
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The statements indicate that the case organisation is investing into its prevention system 
to meet the customers’ expectations for the protection of their data and safeguarding the 
information resources. The findings also show that the induction of sophisticated 
technology has a critical impact on prevention. The practice of investing sufficiently in 
prevention technologies enables the online organisations to have sophisticated systems, 
which can prevent identity theft and data breach attacks effectively. 
b) Having a Secure Authentication System 
A secure authentication system is a useful security layer to prevent fraudulent access to 
the customers’ accounts. Authentication system helps the e-tailers to verify the login 
credentials of customers with their records, thus prevent any unauthorised access (Usman 
and Shah, 2013).  In response to how do you prevent the fraudulent access to customers’ 
accounts? Participant C2-R013 said: 
“We have a username and password login criteria. So we are also looking for extra 
security with fingerprint [biometric login] eventually in this year”.  
This shows that at the moment C2 has a traditional user ID and password authentication 
system. It also reveals that the case firm is considering on developing fingerprint 
authentication system. Talking about this matter, interviewee C2-R10 argued: 
“We as a security, get the best authentication to sign in, we are trying for two tiers of 
authentication, we test every sort of password sign in, different functions, different 
usability, and pin codes”. 
The statement reveals that C2 tests various types of passwords and pin codes for secure 
authentication. Two layered authentication system is also under consideration. The results 
show that biometric authentication system is also being considered to improve the 
authentication system. The current authentication system is not much efficient, so it may 
be improved by adding another layer of security, such as a memorable word or a pin code, 
which is commonly used by banks and some other organisations.  
The literature findings reveal that the fraudsters steal account credentials and commit 
frauds, in this case, the traditional ID and password authentication fails to prevent the 
access. Therefore, the authentication system of e-tailers may be improved by sending 
login alerts to customers, as advised by Kumar & Goyal (2016) and Wang et al. (2015). 
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Sending login alerts to the customers’ registered contact may help in detecting any 
unauthorised access in real time, which will not result in IDF occurrence.  
Additionally, one-time password may also enhance the effectiveness of authentication 
system, which is suggested by Bang et al. (2012). One time password is sent to the 
registered contact once the customer credentials are verified, before allowing access to 
the account.  It adds an extra security layer to authentication system with least chances of 
fraudster’s access to it. Although, C2 is considering for biometric authentication, which 
is also advised by Mansfield-Devine (2013), Teh et al. (2016) and Usman and Shah 
(2013). 
However, the literature suggests some limitations related to biometric authentication. 
These may include as once biometric information is stolen, it is difficult to recover, legal 
issues, and limitations while using a desktop computer. Therefore, the case organisation 
may consider all related issues, before implementing biometric or any other layer for 
better authentication system.      
c) Securing Customers’ Information  
Protecting customers’ information from internal and external threats is the responsibility 
of organisations (Prosch, 2009). It is also a key to the prevention of identity frauds. The 
breach of such protection, not only results in identity fraud but a huge reputational and 
financial loss and sanctions from the regulatory authorities (Soomro et al., 2016). In 
response to the question on how your firm protects customers’ information, participant 
C2-R13 replied: 
“One of the other things we do is we run an encryption bureau service.  So that data 
going to and from third parties are secure.  We manage the email.  We manage the web. 
…. [name of third party organisation] manages our antivirus for us”. 
Interviewee C2-R05 confirmed the above statement:   
From protection of fraud-related incidents by use of the tablet and Android or indeed a 
mobile system is controlled by IT security of … [name of a third party organisation]  and 
a number of systems are employed in association with … [name of a third party 
organisation]  to protect the customer and indeed the business from any form of hostile 
intrusion. 
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These statements express that C2 is trying to protect customer information by 
implementing various in-house and third party arrangements. The results show that the 
case organisation uses encryption services to secure the customer information during the 
transaction period, its emails and website are also secured through antivirus provided by 
a third party organisation.  
Furthermore, the results also confirm that the customer information coming from their 
mobile or tablets is secured from any security attack. And also the third party organisation 
manages the prevention system to safeguard the customer database and the case 
organisation against any hostile intrusion.  
Although, the organisational arrangements may be satisfactory, but literature findings 
show that account credentials are stolen at the customer end, which is a weaker link in 
identity theft prevention, however business organisations bear the most losses in identity 
frauds. Therefore, e-tailers may be advised to educate their customers to create awareness 
on technological measures to prevent identity information, which is also advised by 
Arachchilage & Love (2014) and Seda (2014).  
Furthermore, in the interest of business organisations, Devos and Pipan (2009) suggest 
offering customers free information security software. Although, it may put extra burden 
on the businesses, yet e-tailers should analyse the cost and benefits and if reasonable, such 
security services may be extended to some customers. 
d) Updating the Prevention System Regularly 
Technologies are evolving very rapidly. Hence, new methods of identity theft and frauds 
are emerging. So updating the prevention system is necessary to intact its effectiveness 
as attested by respondent C2-R12: 
“We’re always bringing in new tools, and updating our prevention systems and we’re 
always looking at it for”. 
Talking about this, participant C2-R09 stated: 
“Our prevention system is latest one as we always bring in new technologies”. 
 The statements indicates that C2 is continuously updating its prevention system. The case 
firm brings emerging tools and technologies and replaces the obsolete ones. Such 
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continuous update needs investments, for which the results already mentioned that the 
case organisation sufficiently invests in technologies. The results also indicate that C2 
always looks for new technologies to update its prevention system. Thus, the management 
of C2 ensures a sophisticated system to prevent information theft and IDFs. 
4.4.4 Detection 
Managerial practices at this stage help to identify the suspicious and fraudulent 
transactions (Wilhelm, 2004; Jamieson et al., 2007). This is the borderline for fraud 
detection, if suspicious fraud is not identified at this stage, will turn into occurred fraud. 
The results confirm that the case organisation also observes this stage in IDFM. For 
identity fraud detection the managerial practices of the case organisation are detailed as 
under. 
a) Having a Fraud Screening Process 
The screening process highlight suspicious frauds based on embedded anti-fraud rules. 
E-tailers process hundreds of online transactions at one time, so to detect any suspected 
fraud, having a fraud screening process is inevitable (Carneiro et al., 2017; Dorfleitner 
and Jahnes, 2014). Talking about this, interviewee C2-R02 said: 
“They have different rules, trigger points that they set the system to pick up [suspicious 
frauds] and obviously, their workers in fraud prevention team, pick them up from the 
system, and then obviously deal with them as appropriate”. 
This shows that the case firm has implemented a screening process, which flags out the 
suspicious frauds and these transactions are then manually verified by the staff members 
in accordance with the nature of suspiciousness. On the functioning of the screening 
process, participant C2-R03 mentioned: 
“I've got a risk attached to them or just classes as high value; high products start, we 
know there’s a trend for fraud ...  So we work these cues, and they can refer due to the, 
they’re going to click store, alternative address, a high-value order that we know is a 
trend that fraudster may order”.   
The statement reveals that C2 puts queries on the screening system based on the IDF 
risks, which include, high-value orders, new customer starting with costly items, 
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collection options, and alternative delivery address.  Based on these queries, the screening 
process flags out the suspicious frauds, which are then manually checked at mitigation 
stage. Such process also helps the e-tailer to set up queries based on the information from 
previous frauds, as declared by participant, C2-R14: 
“Red flagging system of previously identified fraud is really important, and we use it a 
lot to detect frauds”. 
It reveals that the screening process is also a significant tool to detect the transactions that 
have any link with previous frauds. In addition, it also highlights new account 
applications. For example, interviewee C2-R14 informed: 
“However, the application comes through; it goes through like a filter [screening] system, 
and it needs to be checked by fraud analyst, then it’s basically red flagged for us to 
check”. 
This statement reveals that the screening process helps C2 to verify the identity 
information from various sources and to know the customers before starting any business 
with them. The effectiveness of screening process is based on anti-fraud rules, which are 
developed by the fraud managers based on the previous frauds, emerging trends high 
value orders and other parameters. In spite of having such a process, some frauds still go 
through it, as participant C2-R06 mentioned: 
“So obviously, we can't detect all frauds because I know it’s going to get through the 
systems. Because obviously, you're going to have, just in the system there’s going to be 
new ways of like fraudsters getting our systems.  But I'm sure some will get through until 
we detect them really”.  
It indicates that even having the fraud screening process, some fraudulent transactions 
still pass through it, which shows that still the process has some limitations. A possible, 
reason of its limitations may be the lack of focus on human aspects. This has also been 
advised by Vahadati and Yasini (2015) that expertise, skills and knowledge of fraud 
managers significantly affect the performance of the fraud detection systems. Therefore, 
C2 may be suggested to focus on the human aspects of fraud detection process to enhance 
their knowledge, skills and capabilities to increase the performance of identity fraud 
detection system.  
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b) Updating Anti-Fraud Rules 
The effectiveness of the fraud screening process depends on the anti-fraud rules 
implemented in it. With the passage of time new patterns of IDFs are emerging, so to 
keep the effectiveness of the process intact, firms need to update anti-fraud rules 
continuously (Carneiro et al., 2017). Regarding the update of anti-fraud rules, participant 
C2-R12 commented:  
“We do change our processes constantly, as patterns of the fraud do change.  So, for 
example, they could do something today and then change the way they do it tomorrow.  
So, we are constantly changing what we do to try and keep one step ahead”. 
This regular update of anti-fraud rules was also confirmed by interviewee C2-R04. 
Although, C2 is regularly updating its anti-fraud rules but the earlier section confirmed 
that still some frauds are not detected, which shows that there are still some issues related 
to updating anti-fraud rules. The results also confirm that these anti-fraud rules are based 
on previous fraud occurrences, which may not be effective on new fraud trends and 
involving information previously not known. Therefore, C2 may be advised for 
information sharing with other firms, to know emerging fraud trends and methods, well 
before any attempt, to update its screening rules. Furthermore, e-tailers may also be 
suggested to link customer devices with their account, which will help it to flag out any 
suspicious fraud initiated through the unregistered device, as suggested by Al-JUmeily, 
et al. (2015).  
c) Receiving Customer Complaints on Identity Frauds 
Sometimes IDFs are detected at the customer end, when they check their bank account, 
or credit card statements. Regarding customer complaints about IDFs, interviewee C2-
R07 mentioned that  
“Customers also call us and complain that they haven’t bought this item or they haven’t 
ordered anything from us”. 
It has been established that some frauds go through even when a mechanism for the 
detection of IDFs is engaged, causing customers to complain. At the time of customers’ 
complaint the frauds are completed, so mitigation would not result in zero losses. In this 
case, C2 may be suggested to adopt real-time detection of IDFs through sending login 
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alerts to respective customers, which is also advised by Kumar & Goyal (2016) and Wang 
et al. (2015). The practice of sending login alerts may help the case firm to let the 
customers know on their account access. Thus, any untheorized activity will be reported 
by the customer. In this way, any IDF will be detected in real time and mitigated as zero 
loss. 
4.4.5 Mitigation 
The literature findings show that mitigation is a critical stage in identity fraud 
management, as it helps to minimise the IDF losses as least as possible (Jamieson et al., 
2007; Wilhelm, 2004). On the mitigation process, interviewee C2-R08 said: 
“We deal with that, once we’ve confirmed its fraud and we’d remove that from the 
genuine part’s details.  We do that here, is try to stop the delivery.  If we felt there was an 
investigation needed, we’d send it to group security, and they could take a look at the 
address, possibly visit the address”. 
 The statement confirms that C2 performs the mitigation activities. First, it tries to remove 
it from actual customer records to minimise its impact on the customer and stop the 
delivery if it is detected in real time. Furthermore, that case is sent to the group security 
department for additional investigations are needed. Thus, investigations are initiated, and 
sometimes the delivery address is also visited. The purpose of visiting the fraudster's 
address is to collect the evidence for prosecutions. Therefore, the results confirm that 
mitigation is a significant stage in IDFM that deals with minimising the fraud impact. The 
mitigation process starts with detection of suspicious fraud, the processes and practices 
at mitigation stage are explained as under. 
a) Verifying the Identity Information 
After detecting suspicious fraud, first, the case organisation has a process of verifying the 
customer identity information to confirm, whether it is a legitimate customer or a 
fraudster. For example, interviewee C2-R03 remarked:  
“So we would then go in, check the account, use all the tools that we've got to check to 
device they use and what IP address that's come from, check if there's any links to the 
application and verify their information on the database that they are registered at the 
address, try and verify contact numbers that they’ve given”. 
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Talking about the same process, participant C2-R12 informed: 
 “We use Equifax to make sure that person has given us the correct information.  So, it’s 
more around, yeah, the address, what device they’re using, and obviously around the 
customer’s credit data, if you will, which would be on a credit report”. 
These statements indicate that after detecting a suspected fraud, the case firm starts 
verifying the customers’ identity information. For that device and IP address of the 
customer are verified with previously used, delivery address is verified with already 
registered address and contact numbers are also verified with previous records. 
Additionally, the credit history is also checked to verify the address and the credit history.  
Furthermore, the case organisation also calls the customers for some verifications as 
mentioned by participant C2-R09: 
“Again, that can verify details with the customer and sometimes when they ring, or we 
ring, we can ask them information from that credit file, so we might just ask them, “What’s 
your mother’s name?”  Sometimes, a fraudster won’t know your mother’s name, they 
might not know your mother’s date of birth, so we try and catch them out by using 
different questions”. 
Talking about the same matter, participant C2-R11 said: 
“As I said, we’d ask them to confirm previous orders on the account.  We’d ask them to 
confirm any previous payments, or returns, or….  Because if that fraudster had hacked 
into that account, they possibly wouldn’t be able to see all that information.  We’d ask 
them how long they’ve had the account”.   
This shows that C2 also calls the customers for identity verifications. The customers are 
asked to verify their details with their credit files, such as mother’s name, date of birth, 
previous orders, payments and returns. The findings show that such verifications help to 
identify hijacked accounts as the fraudsters will also not be able to know the period that 
the account was opened at.  
The results also show that the case organisation is using various sources to verify the 
customer's information. However, this can still be improved by using additional external 
sources of information. These external information sources include but not limited to, 
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electoral rolls, telephone directories, and address finder, which are also suggested by 
Jamieson, et al. (2007). Furthermore, C2 may be suggested to collect, a copy of driving 
licence or passport as a documentary proof of identity, to make verification more 
effective, as suggested by Kahn and Charles (2016). Therefore, the case organisation is 
suggested to use external sources of identity verification and collect any documentary 
proof of customer identity for better verification of customer identity.   
b) Order Reconfirmation 
The reconfirming the suspected purchase order helps to determine, whether it was placed 
by the genuine customer or a fraudster. Regarding that, in response to the question, how 
do you reconfirm a suspicious order from customers? Respondent C2-R08 replied:  
“Using our telephone or email with the applicant, we’d determine whether it was genuine 
or not”. 
Confirming the above statement, interviewee C2-R09 stated: 
“We try and contact the customer before the order is cancelled”. 
These statements indicate that C2 reconfirms any suspicious orders through a phone call 
or an email. It helps the organisation to validate if the purchase order was placed by a 
genuine customer. The case is a commercial organisation,so any sales refusal would result 
in negative impact on the customers and its business. Furthermore, the results show that 
the case organisation tries to contact the customers on any suspicious orders before any 
purchase transaction is cancelled on account of being a fraud. 
c) Sharing Information on Incurred Frauds 
Sharing the information on incurred frauds helps e-tail organisations to detect any identity 
fraud well before it occurs. Regarding that, respondent C2-R05 told: 
“We compiled a database of known fraudsters. We share that with other organisations 
and police constantly, constantly with many constabularies right throughout the United 
Kingdom”. 
Further to it, participant C2-R11 informed: 
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“We work with many other organisations such as online reporting, direct on National 
Crime Agency.  We have an online reporting system whereby if we have transactions of 
over a certain amount; we will report that to the National Crime Agency”.  
These statements represent that C2 has developed a database of known fraudsters, which 
it shares with other business organisations and law enforcing agencies. The practice of 
sharing such information especially among the e-tail organisations help them to detect 
any identity fraud in advance.  
Furthermore, sharing the fraud information with law enforcing agencies helps the 
organisations on broader aspects and help them to attract the attention of government 
agencies. In response, the law enforcement agencies may help the e-tail organisations in 
managing identity frauds and support for lawmaking on punishments on identity frauds. 
d) Having a Victim Support System 
Having a victim support system helps the business organisations to maintain a favourable 
customer relationship. Once an identity fraud is confirmed, the case organisation takes 
supportive measures to help the victimised customers. Regarding the victim support, 
interviewee C2-R11 mentioned: 
“So, we would then give you (the customer) a brand new account number…..  But we will 
then protect you (the customer) and register your details on CIFAS, which is UK’s fraud 
database, so then you’re protected as well”. 
As stated by participant C2-R12:  
“We also ensure that we deal with the victim of identity theft by making sure it’s removed 
from their credit report, and offering them onward support if they need it”. 
These statements describe that C2 has a victim support system. First, the victim is 
assigned a new account for continued business, which helps to retain the customer. 
Furthermore, the case organisation registers the victim information on CIFAS database, 
which would help to prevent any further fraud using the same identity information, within 
the member organisations.  
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Additionally, the case organisation removes the victim’s information-as defaulter-from 
the credit file and offers any further support.  Thus, these practices help the victims to 
reduce the fraud effects and retain the customers, which is critical for e-tail organisations. 
e) Mitigation Training 
The mitigation training has a significant impact on the performance improvement of fraud 
analysts regarding, decisions on confirmation of IDFs, and timely mitigation (Becker et 
al., 2010; Wilhelm, 2004). Regarding mitigation training, participant C2-R08 informed:  
“This shows us what to look for and what would be…and we’ve done training on that, to 
recognise that and then it’ll enable us to determine whether it’s fraud or not”? 
The training help the staff to recognise the suspiciousness in any transaction and effective 
means and methods to verify information and take the right decision. The results show 
that the training programme is continuous in relation to the performance of the fraud 
analysts regarding their decisions on transactions being fraudulent or not. For which 
respondent C2-R14 stated in detail: 
“You might carry out all the checks and all the systems all correctly, but the account still 
turns out to be fraud.  So if there is thing like that where an adviser okayed the account 
but then it turns out to be fraud, that can be captured in like reports basically.  Or if I 
said this account is fraud, I think its fraud and it turns out to be definitely fraud, we have 
all these different reports that the risk team could capture to say, “Yeah, that was the 
right decision this time.  When you did this that was the wrong decision.”  And obviously 
with wrong decisions we’d follow things like training and coaching”.  
It reveals that C2 evaluates the decisions taken by the fraud advisors, regarding the 
suspicious transactions to be a fraud or not. The results also show that regular reports on 
the decisions of fraud advisors are released that show the right and wrong decision. Based 
on these reports, the fraud advisors are given the training to improve their performance 
in mitigating the frauds. Such training improves the quality of decisions regarding the 
mitigation of identity frauds and continued business with letting the legitimate 
transactions being processed onwards for despatch of goods.  
Although, a continuous mitigation training is given to the fraud analysts, however, the 
results at detection stage show that still some frauds pass through the screening process. 
Page 139 of 254 
 
Therefore, the case organisation may be suggested to extend the training programme to 
the staff working at other stages, to improve the effectiveness of IDFM as a whole.  
f) Dealing with Compromised Customer Accounts 
Once an identity fraud is detected through a compromised customer account, the case 
organisation has to deal with that. On a question, how do you deal a compromised 
account? Respondent C2-R09 replied: 
“It’s fully secured, and it’s closed down, so no activity can take place on their [account] 
and we make notes as well to clearly state that this account has actually been 
compromised.  So, all notes are on there, it’s closed down. 
The statement shows that the case organisation closes any account that is compromised. 
The closing down of a compromised account will help to stop any recurring fraud on that 
account. Thus, the results show that permanently closing down the compromised accounts 
effectively help the organisations to stop any further frauds on that account. However, C2 
may use such accounts for arrest of fraudsters if they try to purchase any item. Such 
practices of arresting these fraudsters have multiple advantages in IDF deterrence. 
4.4.6 Analysis 
Analysis stage has significant value in identity fraud management on account of the 
variety of activities and their impact on other stages of the fraud management (Jamieson 
et al., 2007; Wilhelm, 2004). The case organisation analyses the frauds trends and 
organisational arrangements to improve fraud management, for that, participant C2-R09 
informed: 
“The risk team will look at the fraud incurred, the loss, for the previous week.  If it’s high 
for any reason, they’ll try and look for trends, is there anything that we could’ve done 
differently, so that’s more from the risk point of view that they’ll look into that to see what 
they can do to prevent it”. 
The statement indicates that the case organisation works on the fraud analysis, which 
helps it to know the fraud trends and take countermeasures to detect these types of frauds 
in future. So the primary focus of analysis is on the risk management and preventing 
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identity frauds. Thus, the results confirm that analysis is a significant stage in IDFM. The 
process of the case organisation regarding IDF mitigation is presented as follow. 
a) Managing the Identity Fraud Risk 
The management of IDF risk helps the organisations to assess the risks associated with 
identity frauds and suggest measures to minimise these risks. Describing the identity theft 
risks, interviewee C2-R05 mentioned: 
“I don’t think that the criminal organised gangs behind this virus will target the 
household.  I think they’ll target many large organisations at hold of personal information 
and data, NHS [National Health Services], hospitals, universities, the commercial online 
retailers”. 
The statement reveals that C2 is aware of the potential risk of identity theft, as the 
criminals may target them. Such risks arise on existing of personal and financial data of 
a large number of customers. In addition to assessing information theft risk, the case 
organisation also evaluates IDF related risks, as mentioned by respondent C2-R02: 
“I think that you’re obviously going to miss a certain amount because fraud changes so 
much at different times.  And if the fraudster thinks that you’re on to them, they may 
change the pattern of how they’re, you know, defrauding a company”. 
It confirms that C2 is aware that in spite of all the arrangements, there is still a risk of 
identity frauds. The earlier statements indicate that the case firm is more focused on 
website hack and information breach. Although, it would help to minimise the risks 
however, identity fraud risks are not given more attention so far, C2 fails to mitigate some 
identity frauds. Therefore, the case organisation may be suggested to focus more on IDF 
risks and develop countermeasures to minimise the ratio of successful frauds, and it 
should be a continuous process to update the IDFM systems in time. 
b) Reviewing Identity Frauds 
The process of reviewing identity frauds helps to update the systems and enhance their 
effectiveness in IDFM. Regarding the review process, interviewee C2-R05 said: 
“We’ll also look at the amount that we lost in a fraudulent or hostile attack.  We will 
review the frauds, types methods…..  We have to ensure that we review and record a 
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minute all the levels of protection that are invested upon to prevent the business from 
frauds”. 
Talking about the same, participant C2-R11 told: 
“Once we find any fraud trend and pattern, then what they are doing, then our risk team 
will change our systems so that certain orders or certain types of referrals are 
developed”. 
These statements indicate that C2 reviews identity frauds to know the trends and methods 
and incurred losses. Based on such reviews, the case organisation updates are security 
systems. New fraud cues are suggested, and existing ones are updated to counter the new 
identified methods and trends of IDFs. The feedback on fraud reviews helps the case firm 
to improve its detection system by putting some more filters and updating the existing 
ones. Thus, the process of reviewing identity frauds helps in updating the fraud systems 
to enhance their performance.   
c) Setting Identity Fraud as Management Priority 
The involvement of top management is already suggested in the literature, to enhance the 
effectiveness of fraud management (Coulson-Thomas, 2017). Regarding that, respondent 
C2-R14 informed: 
“Very senior level [is] being given the information on a regular basis.  How many hits, 
how many deters, how many loses, what is our good lost in transit, you know that, what 
is our debt record, and how are we managing the debt.  All these things are regularly 
reviewed by the risk assessment team”. 
Such practice would help to get more attention from senior executives for effective IDFM. 
These meetings are significant to enhance the effectiveness of identity fraud management 
through reviewing the existing identity fraud situation and managerial practices in action. 
The results show that top level management is not directly involved in the management 
of identity frauds, and they are given just the reposts on these frauds. The results also 
show that the case organisation is losing on identity frauds, which shows that these frauds 
need to be a management priority, which may lead to a better management of identity 
frauds. 
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d) Evaluation of the Prevention and Detection Systems 
The efficiency and the effectiveness of preventive and detection systems are significant 
to manage IDFs. Regarding the evaluation of these systems, interviewee C2-R13 
explained: 
“We get an independent third-party to come in and we ask them to, you know, effectively 
try and hack the website.  So we’re asking them to look for vulnerabilities.  So the normal 
method is that they will run an automated scan, which will identify potential areas of 
vulnerabilities.  And they will then handcraft attacks to see, whether those vulnerabilities 
are real or whether they’re just false positives.  So that tends to be how they are done.  
I’ve used a variety of firms to do those assessments”. 
Talking about the same issue, participant C2-R04 mentioned: 
“So that is the risk assessment, and vulnerability test and strategic assessment that we do 
on a regular basis”. 
The statements represent that C2 is actively evaluating its prevention system. For that, 
the services of an independent firm are hired to assess the vulnerabilities of these systems. 
Furthermore, these vulnerabilities are also checked through handcraft attacks. The system 
is not evaluated by the same organisation every time as to minimise the weaknesses 
related to any firm. These evaluations are done on a regular basis to keep the prevention 
system intact. Although, the prevention system is being evaluated in the case 
organisation, but, IDF detection system is not, which may leave several risks associated 
with it, and a possible reason for successful IDFs. The screening system is critical to 
detect identity frauds. Therefore, the case may be suggested to adopt the measures for the 
evaluation of detection system to enhance its performance, which is also advised by 
Wilhelm (2004). 
e) Learning New Fraud Trends 
Learning the new and emerging fraud trends significantly helps the organisations to take 
a better position to encounter these frauds. Talking on learning of new frauds, interviewee 
C2-R14 pointed out: 
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“So if an adviser gets a certain trend from a certain work type ………and we can feed 
that information back to our risk team to say we’ve had this trend.  It could be from 
anywhere…….  We can get that kind of information from absolutely any kind of source.  
Even things like things watched in the news…..”. 
This statement indicates that C2 is active in learning on fraud trends and methods. The 
fraud advisors actively seek to learn on new identity frauds from the inside organisation 
and outside, such as customer, any report, a friend outside the organisations, third party 
customer services, news and any other sources. Such learning on identity frauds is much 
helpful to develop countermeasures before any of these trends are applied to the case 
organisation. Based on this information, the risk team develops or make changes to the 
existing fraud cues to detect emerging frauds. The case firm communicates these fraud 
trends and methods through email, as stated by respondent C2-R08: 
“Well, we get emailed new frauds.  That’s emailed daily.  The fraudulent areas, things 
like that”.   
It reveals that C2, after learning on new fraud trends and methods communicates to related 
staff members. Such information is communicated on a daily basis and is much helpful 
to get ahead of the fraudsters, as the risk team take measures to encounter these fraud 
trends by developing new fraud cues and embedding into the screening system to detect 
such frauds.  
4.4.7 Policy 
The policy is a set of guidelines to perform day-to-day business activities. Organisations 
should create and maintain effective anti-fraud policies to guide the staff (Njenga and 
Osiemo, 2013). While asked about the fraud policies, respondent C2-R12 informed:    
“Our policies are a lot around about how we use our systems which is in our process 
document”. 
It indicates that the case organisation has a number of policies but mainly these policies 
are focused on the operations of the systems. Regarding the responsibilities of developing 
the policies, respondent C2-R01 maintained: 
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“So each individual area of the business has responsibility for their area’s policies and 
procedures”. 
The results indicate that C2 has policies related to various systems and are developed by 
the respective business area. Identity fraud management related policies and procedures 
are discussed as under.  
a) Having Fraud Management Policies 
Anti-fraud policies are critical to managing the identity frauds in any organisation 
effectively. These policies help firms for effective and uniform actions in IDFM. In 
response to a question on, whether they have identity fraud management policies, 
respondent C2-R14 informed: 
“We have a lot of different policies but not specifically for identity theft.  Obviously, we 
have information security policies and …. but not just an identity theft policy or a fraud 
prevention policy”. 
Answering the same question, respondent C2-R02 mentioned: 
“There’s money laundering policies, but as for the initial fraud policies, we don’t 
have…They may be available on the fraud intranet, but we don’t have them”. 
Furthermore, respondent C2-R13 informed of the policies: 
“There isn’t a specific e-commerce security policy now”. 
Although, these policies may somewhat help in identity theft prevention, however, the 
management of identity frauds is a broader field, for which the results show no policy. 
The absence of such policies is a critical weakness, which may result in inappropriate 
practices for effective management of identity frauds. Furthermore, in the absence of 
fraud management policies, the staff works in isolation and uncertain conditions to deal 
with any fraud related issue.  
The significance of related policies to effectively manage the issues has also been 
highlighted by Singh et al. (2013) and Soomro, et al. (2016). Furthermore, on effective 
management of frauds, many researchers such as; Jamieson et al. (2007), Kumar et al. 
(2007), Liu, et al, (2010), Njenga and Osiemo (2013) and Wilhelm, (2004) have 
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emphasised the existence of related policies. Therefore, e-tailers may be suggested to 
develop policies at each stage of IDFM. 
b) Policy Awareness 
Creation of policy awareness among the staff members is critical to achieving its 
objectives (Soomro et al., 2016; Parsons et al., 2014). Regarding that respondent C2-R01 
told: 
“All policies are made available on our internal communication system, so anyone can 
access the policies”. 
Although, it’s a good practice to make the policies available, however, it may not assure 
that all the staff members understand these policies. Therefore the case organisation 
should develop some policy awareness training programs and employee’s evaluation to 
ensure that the staff is well aware of existing policies. Such awareness training is also 
recommended by Albrechtsen and Hovden (2010), Parsons et al. (2014) and Soomro et 
al. (2016) in information security context.  Further on the awareness of any policy update, 
respondent C2-R12 told: 
“Any update in policy is communicated to the staff through emails”. 
Nevertheless, email is an efficient way to communicate any information but, policy 
updates require that the staff should fully understand the changes, for which the case 
organisation has no system. Therefore, C2 may be advised to get feedback from the staff, 
that they understood the changes (Bierstaker et al., 2006), and similar arrangements of 
policy awareness may also be made as discussed earlier. 
c) Data Access Management Policy 
Data access management policy is helpful in minimising the customers’ information theft 
from insiders. Readily available customers’ information to non-concerned staff increases 
the chances of the theft. In response to a question on data access policy, respondent C2-
R13 informed:  
“Well, access to customer data is only permitted to people, who are authorised and have 
demonstrated need in their job to have access to that customer data.  …people who have 
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access to that data should acknowledge to abide by the Data Protection Act, et cetera, et 
cetera”. 
It indicates that the access to data is linked to the nature of the job, if a job requires specific 
information, only related data access is given to staff to fulfil their jobs. Furthermore, the 
results show that anyone at access of customer information has to abide by the data 
protection act and other related laws. However, the literature suggests that organisations 
should have the system to monitor and keep the record of who accessed what information. 
Such system may help e-tailers to stop any unnecessary and unauthorised access to 
identity information, which is also suggested by Alrashed, (2016). Furthermore, data 
access may be re-evaluated on a regular basis, to keep it updated with changing roles of 
employees.   
d) Policy Compliance 
Policy compliance is critically important to attain the objectives of developing the policies 
(Chen et al., 2015). An effective compliance with anti-fraud policies can ensure the 
achievement of organisational goals on IDFM.  Regarding the policy compliance at the 
case organisation, interviewee C2-R05 told: 
“I can say that the business, its compliance is quite simple.  They will always operate 
above and beyond compliance as best practices”. 
It reveals that in C2, staff is expected to comply with policies and adopt the best practices. 
However, the results show that the case organisation has no system for monitoring the 
policy compliance. Compliance monitoring helps the organisation to ensure that policies 
are complied with, and any non-compliance will be resolved well in time. The close 
monitoring of policy compliance is also advised by Chen, et al. (2015). Furthermore, the 
case firm may be suggested to introduce compliance training, which will help the staff to 
understand the policies and learn how to comply efficiently (Soomro et al., 2016) 
Therefore, C2 may be suggested to implement a compliance monitoring system and train 
its staff to comply with anti-fraud policies as desired. 
e) Compliance Audit 
Audit is a useful measure to ensure that policies are adequately complied with. The 
literature shows that having a policy without compliance is the same as having no policy 
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at all (Soomro et al., 2016). Although, the case organisation has no specific policy related 
to the management of identity frauds, yet it has the audit procedures for the existing 
policies. In response to a question on policy compliance audit, respondent C2-R05 
replied: 
“It’s internally audited and externally audited, and any issues are dealt accordingly”. 
Further to compliance audit, respondent, C2-R07 told:   
“Our audit teams regularly check on the compliance of policies and violations are further 
investigated, and they take actions”. 
These statements indicate that the case firm has the process of compliance audit to ensure 
that the staff are adhered to the laid down policies. The compliance audit is conducted by 
internal and external auditors. In that process, auditors investigate, whether the policies 
are adequately complied with, issues with compliance process, and any violations. As a 
result of any policy violation or non-compliance, the auditors recommend the 
management for further investigations and management actions. However, C2 does not 
audit the policy compliance of third party organisations which are holding its customer 
information, which creates a risk of identity theft. Therefore, C2 may be suggested to 
conduct the audit to ensure the compliance of security policies of third party organisations 
to certify the security of its customers’ information, which is also suggested by Liu et al. 
(2010).  
f) Policy Updates 
The practice of regularly updating the policies is significant to ensure the continued 
effectiveness of the objectives of the policies (Bechtsoudis and Sklavos, 2012). On the 
question, how frequently do you update a policy? Respondent C2-R01 replied:   
“I think it’s every 12 months”. 
, policy update takes place regularly, however in identity fraud management domain, the 
technologies are ever-changing, and the methods and trends of fraud are also changing. 
In order to counter the ever-changing fraud conditions, C2 may be suggested to update its 
policies more frequently or continuously. Thus, frequent update of policies may enable 
the e-tailers to make better arrangements for IDFM. 
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4.4.8 Investigation 
It has a significant impact on the identity fraud management, as it helps the organisations 
to dig out the facts, collect the evidence and locate the offenders (Jamieson et al., 2007; 
Wilhelm, 2004). In response to a question regarding the investigations of frauds, 
participant C2-R14 offered the following information: 
“We will document everything about the accounts, everything about the address, whether 
there’s been account openings at the address, who lives at that address. Any deliveries 
from other accounts to that address… anything we can find, the type of orders, the orders 
they have placed, whether there’s been anything in the past delivered there which could 
be relevant”. 
The statement describes that the case organisation investigates the identity frauds, from 
the start and collects every bit of the information. During the investigation process the 
representatives also physically visit the address of goods delivery to investigate the fraud 
further. Therefore, the results confirm that the case organisation is also involved in IDF 
investigations, and it is a significant stage of IDFM. The investigation process and 
practices are explained as below.  
a) Employing Specialist Investigators 
The case firm has appointed a team of specialist investigators, and their responsibilities 
are to conduct investigations and catching the fraudsters with the help of police. 
Regarding these investigators, respondent C2-R02 mentioned: 
“A lot of our regional loss prevention managers, the investigators, a lot of them are ex-
police” 
Further to that, respondent C2-R09 told: 
“We get the special investigators [loss prevention managers], the group security to go out 
and actually investigate that to try and catch them out”.  
The statements confirm that C2 has appointed a team of specialist investigators. These 
investigators are designated as loss prevention managers. These investigators already 
have experience in crime and fraud investigations as the most of them are ex-police 
officers. These loss prevention managers conduct investigations inside the organisation 
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and got out physically for further investigations and trying to catch the fraudsters with the 
help of police. These managers help organisations to investigate at its end and reduce the 
dependency on the police force for closer cooperation with them. Regarding their role, 
respondent C2-R06 informed: 
“Sometime if the police won’t assist us, Well, we have the regional managers do knock 
on doors and investigate themselves.  Not everything goes to the police.  We do knock on 
and do jobs. That's what their job really investigating.  We do go with the police with 
some stuff going on that requires police involvement”. 
At this stage, as the results show, the loss prevention managers prepare the case for 
prosecution with the definite evidence necessary to catch and prosecute the fraudsters. 
Thus, the findings confirm that employing specialised investigators is significant to the 
field investigations and collection of as many as evidence and preparing the case for the 
prosecution, which also minimises the police role, enhances coordination with law 
enforcing agencies and make the police’s job easy. Therefore, e-tailers may be advised to 
have a team of specialist investigators for better cooperation with police in effective 
IDFM. 
b) Investigate with Prosecution in Mind  
The investigation of IDFs should lead to prosecution for effective management of frauds. 
Regarding the investigation process the interviewee, C2-R12 told: 
“Well, I would do all the investigation side here and put the case together.  It would then 
be sent to our group security team, and they will be the ones who would liaise with the 
police, attend court [for prosecution], stuff like that”. 
The statement shows that C2 has a process of investigation, which is initiated by 
collecting the evidence. First, the frauds are investigated inside the organisation, 
afterwards, these are handed over to group security team, who will collect field evidence 
and share with police for prosecution. This shows that the case firm investigates IDFs 
keeping the prosecution in mind. 
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c) Collection of Evidence 
The core purpose of the investigation is to collect the evidence and identify the fraudsters. 
In this regard, the case organisation uses its investigators to collect as much evidence to 
put out any chance of doubt. The case organisation uses internal and external information 
sources to collect as many as evidence. Regarding the internal sources, respondent C2-
R01 mentioned: 
“So we can look at all that type of information through our systems.  We then have a look 
to see any other information at all that we can get for the address or the individual.  If we 
get everything that we need, then again, it’s all statements, and that’s put into the police”. 
Similarly C2-R02 explained the process in the following words: 
“If we’re dealing with fraud deliveries, we use Teradata.  On Teradata, if we put the 
account number in, it will bring back the IP address, and the IP address, we’ll then 
obviously put the IP address into the internet, and it will give us the map location, and 
whatever, server, and the details that we pass to the regional loss prevention manager to 
deal with. Sometimes the police use that in their evidence”. 
For evidence collection, C2 uses internal data mining systems. The investigators put the 
account number in the database system to locate the IP address. That IP address helps to 
locate the geolocation of the fraudsters and identify the server used in the online 
transaction. Such information is further used as evidence and bases for field 
investigations. Therefore, the company uses it internal systems to collect evidence for 
further investigations and preserve these as evidence. In addition, C2 also keeps the proof 
of the delivery of goods, as mentioned by respondent C2-R01:  
“We have a GPS system.  So we’ll have a look where the delivery was made”.   
Further to the benefits of keeping the proof of delivery, interviewee, C2-R15 told: 
“So we can then have a look to see whereabouts that signature took place or did it take 
place at the address or did it take place a mile down the road…..  With the signatures, we 
check all the driver’s previous signatures….  Let’s have a look at what the signature looks 
like.  Is that the same as what the customer’s is normally? 
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The statements confirm that for evidence collection, C2 uses GPS to know about the exact 
location of delivery, which helps to check, whether the delivery was made at the 
customer’s door or any other place leading to the delivery driver’s fraud. The delivery 
driver also gets the recipient signature, which helps to match it with customer’s previous 
signatures. The results also indicate that these signatures help to identify any fraud 
committed by the delivery driver by matching it with deriver’s previous signatures.  
In addition, to collecting evidence from internal sources, C2 also uses social media. 
Regarding its use in the collection of identity fraud evidence, respondent C2-R01 
informed: 
“But the business can use this for other sellers as well, social media, tracking the 
activities on the social media, their shares, their locations.  They can use that data as well 
for investigation and prosecution”. 
The practice of using social media in identity fraud investigations helps e-tailers to know 
more about their customers and fraudsters, their geo locations and activities to collect 
adequate evidence. 
d) Reporting Fraud Cases to the Police 
Legal action against the fraudsters has multiple advantages in IDFM. It helps to get 
fraudsters punished, loss recovered and creates fear among the fraudsters.  Reporting the 
frauds is preliminary to the police investigations and prosecution. Regarding the reporting 
of fraud cases, respondent C2-R14 stated: 
“We generally take it to the police and then we’ll often find the police come back to us 
for more information”. 
Talking about the same, participant C2-R10 informed: 
“We pull everything from application all the way down to the fraud being committed.  All 
of that will be documented and provided to the police”. 
These statements indicate that C2 after preparing fraud case, reports to the police for 
further actions. Reporting identity frauds to the police helps to initiate an enquiry against 
the fraudsters. The reporting of identity fraud cases to the police sometimes is not enough 
to get their input, as informed by respondent C2-R10:  
Page 152 of 254 
 
“I mean the police are obviously more concerning to things like….  So, that’s why we fall 
so low down so that’s why we offer to do it ourselves rather than waiting in the queue.  
We offer to do it, give the results back to the police then show where it is.  Our technology 
is better than most police forces”.   
It reveals that the police are concerned with more critical issues and delay the business 
frauds. In that situation, the case organisation further investigates the frauds and collect 
more evidence. For online frauds, the police sometimes lack the technology to extract 
digital evidence. Further to reporting the police on identity frauds, interviewee C2-R04 
made the following point: 
“We’re the small cog in terms of the prosecution. We wouldn’t actually write up the 
statements for the police or obviously the government body but we would provide all the 
evidences and documentation, suggestions, and proposals to the regional loss prevention 
manager and then obviously it’s regional loss prevention manager as a representative of 
the business do obviously exhibit evidence to the police”. 
The statement indicates that the staff at C2 do not write the evidential statements, which 
are the base for prosecution. One of the primary reason for lack of the police interest in 
business issues may be the absence of such statements with the evidence pack. The loss 
prevention managers at the case firm collect the cases from the analysis team, investigate 
further and present to the police. 
The results confirm that C2 has the practice of providing evidence to the police. Such 
provision of evidence helps the police to prepare the case efficiently and prosecute the 
fraudsters on the basis of these evidences. Although, providing the evidence to the police 
is significant practice to get the police involved in fraud investigation and prosecution, 
but the findings indicate that C2 does not write customer statements, confirming the 
frauds and fraudsters’ statements on the false representation, which make a case 
prosecutable. The practice of not writing the statements puts a negative impact on the 
fraud cases, as being incomplete or not prosecutable.  
Therefore, C2 may be suggested to get involved in further investigations and write these 
statements to link it with the related state laws for making its cases prosecutable, which 
is also suggested by Jamieson, et al. (2007) and Mogaghan (2010). Furthermore, such 
practice may also minimise the police role, which is also recommended by Amori (2008), 
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Brooks & Button (2011), Cross & Blackshaw (2014) and Lewis et al. (2014) for getting 
more police involved in fraud issues.     
e) Catching the Fraudsters 
Catching the fraudster with the help of police is a significant part of fraud investigations. 
The case organisation, after collecting enough evidence, gets the police help to arrest the 
fraudsters, for that, participant C2-R09 told: 
“We get the special investigators, the group security to go out and actually investigate 
that to try and catch them out.  We sometimes liaise with the police as well to try and 
catch the fraudsters….  So, we’ve had a number of arrests over the years especially in the 
… [name of an area] area because that is the hotspot at the moment”. 
The statement shows that the investigators at C2 personally visit the delivery address of 
the fraudsters to collect more evidence, and based on this evidence try to catch the 
fraudsters with the help of police. For catching the fraudsters, the investigators liaise with 
the local police with evidence and satisfy them to take action for arresting the fraudsters. 
Further to catching the fraudsters where the goods are not yet delivered, the case 
organisation performs controlled deliveries, as mentioned by respondent C2-R01: 
“The first thing is we try to organise what we call a controlled delivery.  So with the 
police, our delivery company, and ourselves, we will deliver the parcel…. What we do is 
we will deliver the parcel, and once that parcel’s been delivered and signed for, the police 
will then arrest the individual”. 
Respondent C2-R11 had the following to add: 
“So, if we detect a confirmed fraud, if we can, we will do a controlled drop on that fraud 
and let that item go through.  And obviously, our intelligence unit in place are waiting to, 
obviously, intercept that parcel and capture that fraudster who is going to take that parcel 
in”.  
These statements confirm that to catch the fraudsters; the case organisation manages 
controlled deliveries. Furthermore, on the certainty of the arrested being fraudsters, the 
respondent was asked: “So how many among those deliveries are the fraudsters and are 
some real customers? Respondents confirmed that all those arrested through this delivery 
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system are the confirmed fraudsters. Thus, the case organisation actively seeks to arrest 
the fraudsters. Therefore, it may be confirmed that the controlled delivery system helps 
to catch the fraudsters and initiate litigation process, and arrest of fraudsters create the 
fear of being caught and punished among potential fraudsters, which lead to better 
deterrence. 
4.4.9 Prosecution 
The prosecution has multiple benefits in identity fraud domain. First, it helps the 
organisation to recover the losses. Secondly, it helps the organisations to develop a bold 
image against the potential fraudsters. It creates fear among the fraudsters, which has a 
significant impact on their behaviour. Regarding that, participant C2-R10 mentioned: 
“So if you can see, we don’t just care about stopping the identity theft, we will take you 
all the way, and we’re more than happy to stand up in court”. 
Respondent C2-R04 further added: 
“We do regularly get our regional loss prevention managers prosecuting fraudsters from 
numbers of years or suspended sentences or agreeing to pay the debt back basically”.   
Above statements confirm that C2 has been prosecuting the fraudsters since many years. 
The regional loss prevention managers are directly involved in the prosecution and try to 
recover the losses and get the fraudsters punished. Furthermore, on the recovery of losses 
respondent C2-R05 informed: 
“We don’t only want the money back for the items you stole, we want all the money back 
for the time you had cost us, and how much you had put this company at cost to prosecute 
you”.    
The statement indicate that C2 is serious in dealing with the fraudsters so actively 
prosecute the fraudsters. The case organisation does not only ask for direct losses, but the 
investigation and prosecution expenses are also claimed. Thus, the results confirm that 
C2 is actively involved in the prosecution process. It does not go for the recovery of losses 
but also tries to get the fraudsters punished. Such punishment of fraudsters creates fear 
among potential fraudsters. Hence, deterrence is enhanced and a positive picture of the 
case organisation is developed against identity frauds. 
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a) Involvement in the Prosecution Process 
To the organisational satisfaction and learning for effective prosecution, the 
representatives of the case organisation attend the courts during the prosecution process. 
Regarding such involvement, respondent C2-R01 informed: 
 “And what we then do is we then obviously prosecute with the police that individual in 
court…... I would then, my role would be then to, if prosecution goes ahead, is to go to 
court and stand up in court and give my evidence”.   
This shows that the case firm is actively involved in the prosecution process and its 
investigators attend the courts. The results confirm that such practice helps to represent 
the case in an effective way and learn to prosecute efficiently in future, so e-tailers may 
be advised to adopt this practice for better IDFM. 
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4.5 Case Organisation C3 
C3 is one of the large online retailers in the UK. It has a chain of stores and a website for 
online business. It sells its own and various other brands and deals a variety of clothing 
and other household items. It has over 25, 000 employees dealing in chain stores and 
online business. The firm revues for the year 2016/17 was over £4 billion. Like two other 
firms this also is a credit lending company that allows its customers to open an account 
with the company and make purchases on credit. The credit is granted free of interest for 
a certain period of time and a fixed interest is charged beyond the specified period. 
Although, credit lending is a good scheme to attract customers, it also is prone to IDFs. 
These frauds and organisational practices to manage them are explained in the following 
sections. 
4.5.1 Identity Fraud Types faced by C3. 
The findings confirm that C3 is suffering from significant losses on account of IDFs. 
Most of the respondents informed that IDF is one of the leading challenges in online 
business. Respondents C3-R02 and C3-R05 told that mostly they face frauds when the 
customers refuse to acknowledge any order and receipt of goods. Respondent C3-R06 
informed that fraudsters open accounts with stolen information, make a purchase and 
avoid the payments. The results also reveal that sometimes staff members steal the 
customer information and commit fraud within the company. Respondent C3-R07 told 
that sometimes friends of the victims steal the account credentials and make purchases to 
avoid the payments. Managerial practices to manage these frauds at C3 are detailed in the 
following sections.    
4.5.2 Deterrence 
As already mentioned, deterrence works to stop the fraudsters before any IDF attempt, 
for which customer education and creating the fear are critical aspects. The process and 
the practices of the case organisation at the deterrence stage are given below. 
a) Customer Education 
Customer education motivates them to take precautionary measures to reduce the 
chances of IDF attempts. The results disclose that C3 educate its customers on the 
Page 157 of 254 
 
security of their credentials through its website and emails, as mentioned by 
interviewees C3-R04 and C3-R02: 
“There is security guidance and security statements upon the e-commerce sites”. 
“We send emails to customers advising them to put a strong password and do not share 
with any”.  
This shows that C3 educates its customers to create awareness of security and protection 
of their credentials. Such guidance is given through the company website and emails. The 
findings show two major limitations in customer education. First, only website and emails 
are used to educate the customers. The extant literature suggests social media, mass media 
(Bai and Chen, 2013) and text messages enhance the impact of customer education 
(Wright, 2007). Furthermore, the customer education is limited to the security of the 
password. Although, it may help in IDF deterrence, however, the literature suggests 
educating customers on identity theft trends and IDF methods and measures 
(Arachchilage and Love, 2014; Seda, 2014). Additionally, respondent C3-R01 stated: 
“At the moment we use push messages through the mobile app but just for marketing 
purpose, not for education”. 
The statement indicates that C3 has a mobile app which is also used for messaging the 
customers, but, these messages are limited to marketing purpose only. However, such 
facility can be used for customer education to create awareness of identity frauds and 
countermeasures (McGee and Byington, 2015; Wright, 2007). Therefore, the case firm 
may be suggested to use push messages service to educate its customers on IDF issues 
and countermeasures, to enhance the deterrence.    
b) Creating Fear of Being Caught and Punished 
The literature findings suggest the creation of fear of being caught and punished to deter 
frauds. Regarding that, the results reveal that the case firm believes that any effort to 
create the fear among the potential fraudsters will put a negative impact on the business, 
as informed by C3-R06: 
“Really speaking as a business, we don’t want the society know that we are at risk”. 
Respondent C3-R02 further added: 
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“We don’t want customers know that we are at risk”. 
This shows that the case firm is not sending any warning messages to the society to 
enhance its deterrence through creating fear. Additionally, the results confirm that C3 
also gets the fraudsters arrested and prosecuted, however such information is again not 
publicised due to the reason that customers will assume that C3 is at risk of fraud attacks. 
Although, C3 is a business firm and does not want its customers to know that it is on the 
risk of frauds, however, C3 may still create fear. For that, C3 may not need to threat the 
fraudsters but publicise information on arrests and its measures to detect and prevent 
frauds. This will create fear for the fraudsters and will assure the customers that it has 
sufficient measures to secure its customers from being victims of IDFs. While publicising 
its measures against IDFs, C3 may consider the language and contents of the messages, 
as it should be ensuring the maximum security of its customers against IDFs, which will 
also result in the creation of fear for potential fraudsters. The practice of publicising the 
firm’s arrangements on fraud prevention and detection is also advised by Zadig and Tejay 
(2010) on account of its effectiveness in fraud deterrence.    
4.5.3 Prevention 
The purpose of prevention is to secure identity information from any theft or breach and 
stop any unauthorised access to customer’s’ account. Defining the significance of 
prevention in IDFM, participant C3-R04 stated: 
“I know it [IDF] is down a lot and its use all the prevention methods, especially we use 
the computerised methods”. 
The statement reveals that C3 has various arrangements at prevention stage, which are 
helpful to minimise identity frauds. These prevention methods are mostly technology-
based and work to fail any attempt at identity theft or security breach. For effective 
prevention, Boss, et al. (2015), Holt and Turner, (2012) and Meinert, (2016) advise for 
the creation of severity of IDT and create awareness and train staff. But the results do not 
show significant efforts to prepare staff to counter the challenges of internal IDT. 
Additionally, C3 may also be advised to educate its staff on IDT risk and measures to 
combat these threats, as recommended by Arachchilage and Love (2014) and Seda 
(2014). Therefore, C3 may be suggested to focus on human aspects of IDT prevention, 
which is a critical element in the security of information. 
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Additionally, the findings do not show significant measures on internal IDT prevention, 
which is a riskier exercise. In this regard, Alrashed (2016) and Wang et al. (2006) suggest 
the screening of staff handling the personal data, and a system that keeps the log of who 
accessed what information. Therefore, C3 may also implement staff screening procedure, 
which would be effective in preventing internal IDT. Some more preventive arrangements 
of C3 are mentioned below.  
a) Sufficient Investments in Prevention System 
A firm’s strength against IDT depends on the efficiency of its prevention system. For 
effective and efficient prevention system, businesses have to invest significantly. The 
literature is evident that higher investments have a direct impact on the efficiency of these 
systems (Boyer, 2007). Regarding investments in IDT prevention systems, respondent 
C3-R01 mentioned: 
“We have good trend of investing in our security systems; we try to get latest systems to 
prevent attacks on our systems”. 
The statement shows that C3 has the practice of investing in the technology that secures 
its IT systems and prevents information theft. But answering the same question another 
respondent claimed:   
“I think more investment in technology would be substantial to enhance the IT security 
and especially more investment in professionals would give better results”. 
It reveals that C3 is more focused on investing in technology, yet for better results, more 
funds are required to enhance the prevention systems. Additionally, more investment in 
human skills development and knowledge enhancement is also needed for a better 
prevention system. Thus, the analysis forward that there is still room for improving the 
prevention system, by investing especially in human development.  Therefore, C3 may 
be advised to focus on every aspect of IT security and information theft prevention 
especially investing in sophisticated technology and human resources for better 
deployment of the technology in the appropriate domain.  
Although, sometimes it is difficult to invest more resources, but the firm should analyse 
the long run cost-benefit, as a single data breach may result in many times higher than 
real investments. Sufficient investments in prevention system are also advised by Boyer 
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(2007), Devos and Pipan (2009) and Goyal et al. (2012) in different domains and are not 
tested in e-tail sector. Therefore, C3 may be advised to revise its decisions on investments, 
based on long-term benefits and risks, and increase the focus on human development 
along with facets of prevention. 
b) Securing Customers’ Information 
The security of customers’ information is critical for e-tailers, as such information always 
contain the customers’ payment details such as credit/debit cards and bank account 
details. To prevent the customers’ credentials and financial information, C3 has various 
security measures in place. Mentioning on the communication security, respondent C3-
R02 argued: 
“Our internal and external communication is secured by end to end encryption, so 
whatever information we send or receive is encrypted”. 
It confirms the firm’s arrangements for data security. Further to the security of customer 
information database and IT infrastructure, the same respondent confirmed that they have 
various security arrangements such as anti-virus, anti-malware, firewalls, anti-phishing 
and intrusion detection systems to fail any data breach attack.  
Although, C3 has implemented these measures to protect critical information, but results 
reveal that these security arrangements are managed by third party organisations. When 
asked on the performance evaluation and monitoring of these preventive technologies, 
most of respondents told these systems are not evaluated or regularly monitored by the 
business, but the third party manages and reports to the senior management on their 
performance.  
However, the preventive system works satisfactorily, its performance evaluation and 
monitoring are significant to confirm that it is engaged in proper domain. In this respect, 
the results show no arrangements for information security at the business end, but the 
firm only depends on the service provider, which may be riskier, as the ultimate 
responsibility lies with the e-tailers. Therefore, C3 may be advised to employ experts to 
evaluate the performance of security measures and monitor their deployment in the 
appropriate domain, which is also advised by Alrashed (2016), Goyal et al. (2012), 
Meinert, (2016) and Mithas and Rust (2016) for the effectiveness of prevention system.  
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c) Updating the Prevention System Regularly  
Information technologies are evolving very quickly, so are the security threats. To keep 
the security measures uptodate, e-tailers need to upgrade their prevention systems on a 
regular basis. Regarding the updating of the prevention system, respondent C3-R02 
emphasised: 
“We have to stay at the top of methodology and have to employ the better secure systems 
but the fraudster will always employee another angle another method to try and beat the 
existing system so we regard this has been an evolving cycle of improving, it can’t stop it 
has to be continued”. 
Respondent C3-R04 further added: 
Because there's always new techniques that the fraudster finds to get around your 
firewall, basically.  So you've always got to be keeping up”.  
These statements indicate that C3 has the practice of continuously updating the prevention 
systems. Although, the practice of updating the preventive software is helping to meet the 
challenges of ever-changing threats, however, the results also show that preventive 
arrangements are managed by a third party. So the issues on updating the preventive 
systems are not directly monitored by the management of C3, which may leave some 
risks related to system updates. As already discussed, the sole responsibility of customer 
information lies with the business management, so C3 may be advised to be directly 
involved in the management of preventive systems and actively seek to update the 
preventive systems, to face the emerging security challenges. 
d) Having a Secure Authentication System 
At C3, customers have to access their account to make an online purchase through an 
authentication process. The authentication system is the first line of defence against any 
identity fraud. C3 uses a single layer of authentication that includes the customer identity 
and password. This single-layered authentication is more prone to IDFs, as with stolen 
credentials fraudsters can easily access the account. So the e-tailer may enhance the 
effectiveness of authentication system by adopting one-time password sent through email 
or text message. The one-time password is sent to the registered contact, once the first 
layer of authentication is successfully passed. Thus, it helps to access the account with a 
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temporary password, and any IDF attempt fails for having no access to the temporary 
password (Bang et al., 2012). 
Additionally, C3 may also be advised to adopt the practice of sending login alerts to the 
customers, once their account is successfully accessed (Kumar and Goyal, 2016; Wang 
et al., 2006). It supports to detect any IDF at an earlier stage, which can be stopped and 
mitigated without incurring any losses. The practice of sending login alerts is currently 
adopted by many financial institutions. This practice is also utilised by Google and many 
other organisations, if the account is accessed through a new device.  
4.5.4 Detection 
In IDFM domain, detection has the role to identify suspicious frauds. E-tailers use data 
mining techniques to detect frauds, based on the pre-determined queries. The results show 
that C3 uses fraud screening system to identify suspicious frauds. 
a) Having a Fraud Screening Process 
Fraud screening process works on data sets to identify any suspicious frauds based on the 
rules. The findings confirm that C3 has a fraud screening system that processes every 
transaction to determine any link of the transaction with pre-set rules. The screening 
system is linked to the dataset, and fraud cues are embedded into that. Based on the 
information in these anti-fraud rules the screening system triggers out suspicious 
transactions, as participant C3-R05 pointed out: 
“We also have the Falcon system which is a rule-based system which obviously works on 
rules in the background to stop or pop up orders in the pending queue which we then can 
investigate each customer whether it is genuine so not to just lose it, so we do our 
background check.” 
The statement shows that C3 has embedded various anti-fraud rules into the screening 
process to flag out suspicious fraud. These rules are mostly based on information from 
previous frauds, delivery address, the amount involved, IP address and device 
recognition. Thus, the system flags out suspicious frauds, which are then processed for 
further verifications. C3 is a business firm, so it cares about the customers and tries to 
confirm a scam before rejecting it. In e-tail domain, rejection of sales on the basis of 
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suspicious fraud would result in losing customers, so C3 does a lot of background check 
before making any decision. These checks are detailed at mitigation stage.  
Although, C3 is using screening system to detect any suspected fraud, a significant 
number of scams are not detected. In the IDF domain, new trends and methods are 
emerging continuously, as emphasised by interviewee C3-R07: 
“And we will do strong controls around mitigating that.  We’re never going to stop it.  
People are always going to find a way”. 
Confirming it, participant C3-R01 added: 
“I've got to say in our company that they can always get better because we're losing 
money.  It's not as if we're stopping fraud completely”. 
These statements indicate that despite of the screening process some identity frauds go 
through, causing C3 losses. One of the possible reasons may be that fraudsters acquire 
access to authentic information. The effectiveness of a screening system also depends on 
human skills, which, as the findings show, is not adequately appreciated by the firm. 
Therefore, C3 may enhance the performance of IDF screening process through the 
development of human skills and knowledge regarding the fraud detection.  
The findings also indicate that anti-fraud rules are frequently updated to detect IDFs using 
emerging trends and methods. The development of new fraud cues and updating the 
existing is based on the information from newly identified frauds, as stated by participant 
C3-R03:  
“So if we get a fraud, we’ll change the rules that we have.  So we have a rule set that 
pushes stuff to fraud…we can notice daily of a change and we can implement that really 
quickly, push the data to our system to detect it. 
This confirms that C3 frequently updates its fraud cues based on the fraud trends and 
methods used in detected frauds. Although, the fraud rules are frequently changed yet C3 
is facing a significant number of successful IDFs. This shows that until fraud is confirmed 
and rules are changed, there occurs so many frauds. The results confirm that successful 
frauds are confirmed after a month or so, in some conditions it takes six months to prove 
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an IDF. In such situations, many frauds take place before the fraud rules are updated, 
which may be one of the reasons for continued frauds.  
Thus, the findings reveal that C3 has a reactive approach to updating the fraud rules, 
which may not work effectively. Therefore, to enhance the efficiency of fraud screening 
process, C3 may be suggested to adopt a precautionary approach and implement 
intelligent systems. In this regards C3 should enhance its learning on IDFs, through 
information sharing on fraud rules with other organisations (Power and Power, 2015). 
Likewise, C3 may also be suggested to emphasise on human aspects, as skills, knowledge 
and expertise of related staff can also improve the productivity of fraud screening process 
(Vahdati and Yasini, 2015).     
b) Having a Device Recognition System 
Recognition of devices used by customers to shop online is to some extent helpful to 
detect IDFs. With the help of cookies, the system recognises the device’s make and 
model. Most of the participants confirmed that C3 has the system to recognise the devices 
used in any previous frauds. The system identifies the IP address and the device make 
and model. The device recognition system helps to detect any fraud coming through a 
device, or an IP address previously used in fraud. Regarding its functioning, interviewee 
C3-R05 mentioned:  
“In device recognition system, if we put on there a fraud confirmed on a certain device, 
certain IP link, obviously this will feed into the database and then it will actually just 
jump out to us if that same device has been used again”. 
It indicates that it is a good system to identify frauds committed by organised groups, as 
they use same devices again and again to commit identity frauds. Thus, the system detects 
multiple accounts using the same devices and same account using multiple devices. 
Although, it’s a good system that recognises the device previously used in identity frauds, 
however, again it has some limitations in IDFM domain. At the outset, it only identifies 
the devices used in previous frauds; it means the system is not capable of detecting frauds 
attempted with other devices. Such limitation has also been mentioned by respondent C3-
R05, when he was asked to how is the system efficient for new devices? He replied: 
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“No.  I think that what the device recognition is for known fraud.  So in the past, if that 
device has been used to open fraud accounts or with us, we know that that possibly is 
going to be a fraud account as well”. 
The customers use different devices to access their accounts as noted by participant C3-
R02:  
“Of course people do change their devices, people do, you know, you can use your iPad 
then your laptop then your mobile.  But for us as a company, we wouldn’t allow that order 
to go if it did change until we spoke to our customer. Sometimes they say they haven’t 
placed that order”.  
This shows that the system detects new devices used either by customers or fraudsters. 
Further verifications lead to confirm, whether it’s a fraud or not. Although, the system 
has some success in detecting IDFs, however, it only recognises the make and model of 
the device, and IP addresses change with the location of the customer, thus leaving a room 
for fraudsters. To improve the detection of IDFs through customers’ devices, C3 may use 
a more intelligent system to identify not only the make and model but also the IMEI 
number and MAC address of the device and register the customers’ devices with their 
accounts. The IMEI number is specific to each device, so linking the customers’ devices 
with their accounts will further improve the detection of IDFs.  
4.5.5 Mitigation 
The findings demonstrate that once an IDF is suspected through the fraud screening 
system, it is then manually verified by a fraud analysts. The purpose of this stage is to 
discontinue any fraud, minimise the losses and try to reduce the effects of fraud on the 
customers and the firm. To achieve these objectives, C3 verifies the identity of the 
customers, reconfirm the order from the customers, support the IDFs victims and train its 
fraud managers. 
a) Verification of Identity Information 
The results confirmed that after detecting a suspected fraud through the screening process, 
the flagged transactions are then manually verified by the fraud analysis. The first thing 
fraud analysts do is to check the personal information, for which they use the various 
system, as mentioned by participant C3-R07: 
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“So there’s no way that we would get one system that gives us all the information we 
need.  Like I said, the RSA, basically a system purely used for the device recognition and 
the IP recognition, whereas obviously, the credit file search is Equifax.  Equifax can’t 
really give you much than that.  The TraceIQ, the trace file system we’ve got, obviously 
that gives the information from the electoral roll and passport, and we do have a tool in 
the Tracesmart if someone’s got a Facebook account, you can match up with that”. 
These techniques help to recognise the devices and IP address used, matching information 
with credit files, electoral registers, passport and social media accounts. The verifications 
done through these systems may help in detecting any false or engineered information. 
However, Identity frauds with genuine details may not be discovered using these 
methods, as mentioned by C3-R07: 
“Sometimes you’re going to have the case where you can’t get through, and you need to 
make a decision.  But I usually find, from when I was an adviser, the phone call is the 
decider.  I may have done all the checks, and it was fine, but that phone call completely 
turned my decision.  So we do rely heavily on the phone call and the questions that we 
ask for that phone call”. 
The statement indicates that though C3 uses the systems mentioned above, but identity 
frauds with genuine information need further verifications through a telephonic call. The 
questions asked on the telephone are very effective for detecting frauds with stolen 
identities. The results also reveal that combined use of verification technologies and 
telephonic calls gives very strong results as confirmed by interviewee C3-R02: 
“Sometimes if we’re talking to a customer, we don’t believe they’re genuine, or there’s 
something not right, we can then ask them to provide us with the passport details and the 
system will then verify whether it’s a correct passport or not”. 
The telephonic call has multiple advantages in deciding on suspected fraud. First, the call 
is made on the contact number taken from the account, which may vary from given in the 
order. Secondly, fraud analysis quiz the customers on the history of purchases and 
payments and additional information is also sought to verify during the call.  
Nevertheless, these verifications may help in confirmation of identity frauds, but C3 may 
be advised to collect some documentary evidence at the time of opening a customer 
account, which can be verified at the time of any suspected fraud (Kahn and Liñares-
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Zegarra, 2016). Furthermore, for the verification of personal information of new account 
applications C3 does not have a uniform policy, as two conflicting statements were 
discovered given by C3-R06 and R02 respectively: 
“And it’s a rule of thumb; you’re supposed to call out on every new account.  Because 
you might use all the systems in the world, but the person that you’re speaking to is still 
not the right person.  So we rely heavily on, on phone calls and the security questions we 
ask from those phone calls as well”. 
“So we don’t actually do checks at application stage, but we’ll do other stage, so you can 
get an account, but you might not get another”. 
These statements indicate that C3 has not laid down a policy for the verification of new 
account applications, which may leave some doors open to fraudsters. These fraudulently 
opened accounts turn into identity frauds, so C3 may be suggested to implement a process 
to verify each new account application and should also collect any document as a proof 
of identity (Kahn and Liñares-Zegarra, 2016).  
b) Having a Victim Support System 
The results disclose that once an identity fraud is unearthed, C3 has some practices to 
help the victims. First, the order is rejected, and the victim is assured of every possible 
support. In dealing with the financial losses, most respondents mentioned that the credit 
on the victim’s account is waived off. And for recovery of credit history, C3 removes that 
amount from the victims account on credit record. These practices help to set the customer 
free from any obligation related to the fraud. Additionally, respondent, C3-R06 explained:  
“So I think we’ll register them at CIFAS, protect their identity that way, tell them to get 
credit report.  Tell them if they’re interested to get an alert on their credit file”.  
Participant C3-R04 also confirmed it by adding:  
“We’ll register them (victims) at CIFAS as part of protection and then we advise them on 
the credit file and have them the alert on the credit file because we tell them that CIFAS 
will protect them with other CIFAS lenders.  Because obviously if CIFAS lender gets the 
referral, they’ll get the alert”. 
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The statements indicate that the victim support of C3 is not limited to its internal records 
but also register their information with CIFAS to avoid the victim any fraud with the 
associated organisations. It also suggests the victims get an alert service if their credit 
history is accessed, to timely detect any fraudulent attempt in future. 
c) Information Sharing on Incurred Frauds 
The results demonstrate that C3 has the practice of sharing information with other 
associated business firms. Identity information of the victims and confirmed frauds are 
made available to other business enterprises to help each other in the detection of IDFs. 
Confirming this, interviewee, C3-R02 mentioned:   
“We share victims’ information with other retailers so that this fraudster does not leave 
us and go next door like ….” 
The practice of sharing the victims’ information within the associated firms also helps C3 
to detect any recurrence of IDF. Such information sharing is beneficial for e-tail industry, 
so it may be adopted by each firm and coordination may be enhanced against IDFs.  
d) Order Reconfirmation 
The results confirm that C3 reconfirm some orders from the customers, after identity 
verifications. The results show that high-value orders, alternate delivery and collection 
services orders are reaffirmed through telephonic calls. The phone call helps to verify the 
identity and confirmation of the placed order. The telephone call also helps to detect any 
IDF using genuine information.  
e) Mitigation Training 
Mitigation includes practices to expose IDFs from suspicious transactions. At this stage, 
fraud analysts try to verify all the given information for being real and provided by 
genuine customers, which makes the role of the staff more significant in IDF 
management. To enhance the knowledge and skills of mitigation staff, C3 has 
implemented some training programs, as mentioned by C3-R07: 
“I train them basically, initially, into the fraud area. That initial induction is 12 weeks 
training”. 
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In addition to primary training, staff are also given training based on their performance 
in mitigation. The results show that the performance of mitigation staff is based on the 
quality of their decisions to unearth IDFs. Regarding the training for performance 
improvement, the same participant explained:  
After they’re referred to the training, they’re taken into the areas of fraud, which 
obviously, are the prevention and detection areas.  So obviously, they’re actually there to 
detect and prevent it coming through, to stop things going out, which obviously are 
fraudulent”. 
Thus, the statements reveal that C3 has the practice of providing training, especially for 
mitigations staff. Because of the significance of mitigations staff in detecting IDFs, they 
are also given continued training to improve their decisions to unearth IDFs. The results 
indicate the significance of mitigation training, so e-tailers may be suggested to adopt 
such practices within their firms.   
f) Dealing with Compromised Customers’ Accounts 
The findings confirm that C3 has the practice of closing down the compromised 
customers’ account, soon after fraud is confirmed. The customers are then given new 
accounts to continue their shopping with the firm. The results also reveal that frauds are 
further analysed and initially investigated, but frauds involving a small amount of money 
and without concrete evidence are just ignored, and no further actions are taken. 
4.5.6 Analysis 
Within this stage, staff analyse the fraud occurrence and review the organisational 
arrangements and weaknesses that caused the success of frauds. The results reveal that 
C3 has sets of managerial practices at the analysis stage. The managerial practices at this 
stage are related to hiring experienced fraud analysts, reviewing IDFs occurrences, 
managing the fraud risks, evaluation of prevention and detection systems and 
performance measurement of mitigation staff. 
a) Hiring Experienced Fraud Analysts 
The role of analysts is central to the management of IDFs, so the firms employ 
experienced and highly skilled professionals. The results disclose that C3 has employed 
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senior and experienced staff members as the fraud analysts. These analysts have vast 
experience in working in various positions related to the fraud management, as stressed 
by participant C3-R07: 
“The team of fraud analysts are senior staff members and highly experienced in various 
fields related to the fraud prevention”.  
Supporting it, respondent C3-R02 added: 
“Most of our fraud analysts are the senior staff members; they have vast experience of 
working in different sections of fraud”. 
These statements indicate that C3 has employed experienced staff members for the 
analysis of IDFs. Their experiences at different sections in IDFM may yield better results 
in reviewing the frauds, managing the IDF risks and performance improvement of 
mitigation staff. These analysts input their experiences, which help other stages to 
improve their performance. In response to the question, do you share your experiences 
with other staff members? Participant C3-R07 replied: 
“Absolutely, it wouldn't work otherwise.  So everything that is relevant, then absolutely, 
it's passed on… so it's easier just to give it out as early as I can”. 
This shows that the analysts share their experiences with other staff members, such 
sharing helps the staff at mitigation stage to enhance their skills and knowledge and 
policymakers to develop better fraud management policies. Although, experienced 
analysts have a significant impact, however, the involvement of senior management in 
fraud analysis would return more input regarding extra resources and more authority. 
Therefore, C3 may be advised to involve senior management in fraud analysis to improve 
IDFM, which is also advised by Coulson-Thomas (2017).  
b) Reviewing Identity Frauds 
Effective IDF countermeasures depend on the knowledge of fraud trends and methods. 
To learn these methods and the extent of fraud losses C3 has the process of reviewing 
previous identity frauds. Such learning supports to enhance the effectiveness of fraud 
detection and mitigation practices. The results indicate that C3 has a process of evaluating 
the frauds and feedback the findings. Most of the respondents confirmed that all the 
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incurred frauds are sent to the fraud analysts. They examine each fraud and try to locate 
the weaknesses of the reasons for the frauds being successful. The outcomes of these 
analyses are given to related offices to improve the fraud management. Regarding that 
feedback, the participants C3-R03 and C3-R02 informed respectively:   
“So wherever we find new trends that get communicated to everyone in specialised 
position”. 
“If they see a certain fraud trend, we all keep each other up-to-date.  So, the whole floor 
knows what to look out for; it can be a particular item or a trend…”. 
These statements confirm that the review team communicate the frauds trends and 
methods to the related staff members to enable them to be more vigilant on specific fraud 
trends. Information sharing on emerging fraud trends helps the staff members at other 
stages to develop countermeasures for effective management of frauds with new and 
emerging trends. It also enhances the skills and knowledge of the staff at various stages 
of fraud management. The results also indicate that the fraud prevention and detection 
systems are also updated in the light of fraud review reports. Regarding that interviewee 
C3-R04 stated: 
“Once we find that trend and what they’re doing, then our risk team will change our 
systems so that certain orders or certain types of referrals will refer out to us.  So, they 
can change the rules to spot a trend”. 
It confirms that the fraud reviews are helpful to detect the emerging fraud trends and 
update the prevention and detection systems to counter these emerging patterns of frauds. 
Thus, the process of IDF review helps in learning on new frauds trends and methods, 
enhance the skills and knowledge of staff members regarding the fraud management and 
provide bases to update the prevention and detection systems to counter the frauds more 
efficiently. 
c) Managing the Identity Fraud Risk 
Risk management critically helps in minimising the occurrences of IDFs. The results 
indicate that C1 is facing significant losses in identity frauds, for which the statement of 
respondent C3-R07 affirms: 
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“Yes, we [are] still losing significant and a lot of money on fraud, they still get in 
through”. 
Interviewee C3-R01 was a bit more optimistic: 
“The fraud rate is lowering for us.  Maybe not in the attempts, but certainly in the loss 
because of the systems being exceptional.  I've got to say in our company that they can 
always get better because we're losing money.  It's not as if we're stopping fraud 
completely”. 
These statements indicate that C3 continues to face a substantial number of frauds, which 
shows that there is still significant fraud risk in the firm. The results show that C3 has the 
process of reviewing the fraud risk and develop countermeasures to minimise these risks. 
The findings also indicate that risk is there even after implementing more systems, but 
frauds trends and methods are emerging so the firm also continuously manage the IDF 
risks. The results reveal that the risk analysis in C3 is reactionary, based on fraud reviews, 
as elaborated by C3-R06: 
“But it’s about trend analysis, and then what we’ll do from there is we’ll just keep 
tightening our controls.  So, if somebody’s found a loophole, we’ll keep tightening it up”. 
The results express that based on the fraud reviews C3 tries to tighten the control systems. 
It is a reactionary approach to risk management, which may be a reason for some frauds. 
On the other hand, the results expose that fraud management is a trade-off between 
stopping the frauds and messing up the customers, as mentioned by C3-R07: 
“But at the same time, the point is, as I keep saying, it’s a balance between how much 
you affect the consumer and how much you stop the fraud”. 
And: 
I think that’s the golden question in fraud: How much security do you implement to slow 
fraud and also not piss off the customer?  Because if you start annoying the customer and 
you lose legitimate business, then that’s the most important 
These statements are significant in IDFM because being a business firm, C3 has to make 
a favourable trade-off between two extremes i-e stopping the frauds and annoying the 
customers. The results illustrate that C3 is cautious about balancing the two extremes. 
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Although, balancing is necessary, but an adequate education and awareness can let the 
customers understand the situation and cooperate with the firm to manage IDFs more 
effectively. The results also indicate that the business does not create fear for fraudsters 
to enhance the deterrence, only because of the risk of an adverse impression.  
However, better education and awareness can create a sense of security for customers, 
and such threatening messages may be treated positively by the customers. Therefore, C3 
may be suggested to more focus on the customer education that may result in support 
from customers to tighten the control systems to stop more frauds without annoying them.    
d) Performance Measurement of Mitigation Staff 
The performance of mitigation staff is critical to spot the frauds through different 
verifications. To enhance the effectiveness of IDF mitigation, C1 measures the 
performance of staff involved in mitigating the frauds. The results disclose that the 
performance of mitigation staff is evaluated regularly, as reported by C3-R05:  
“My staff are managed and graded at the end of the year on their performance, and if 
any performance issue they are given training”. 
The statement reveals that C3 measures the performance of staff annually, and training 
are recommended to improve their performance. The results indicate that the analysis 
stage does not provide feedback to the mitigation staff on their decisions. Thus, no 
training is given to improve the quality of their decisions as a reflection of the feedback. 
As the fraud trends and methods are rapidly evolving, so annual training may not help to 
improve the performance of staff at mitigation.  
The absence of timely feedback and related training may be an obstacle towards the 
quality decisions on fraud mitigation, which may result in weaker mitigation process. 
Therefore, C3 may adopt the practices of performance feedback and timely training of 
mitigation staff to minimise the number of triumphant frauds and the extent of IDF losses.  
e) Evaluation of the Prevention and Detection Systems 
The prevention and detection technologies have a crucial impact on the management of 
IDFs. The results reveal that C3 has no process to evaluate the performance of these 
systems regularly. For detection technology, participant C3-R06 informed: 
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“The suppliers of these technologies demonstrate us their performance… whenever we 
buy or update a technology they show us their performance”.  
It indicates that the performance of prevention technology is evaluated at the time of its 
implementation and update. This shows that C3 does not have any process to evaluate the 
performance of prevention system on a regular basis, which may be a risk of data breach. 
Technologies are evolving with the time and the old one become absolute and ineffective 
to prevent attacks with emerging trends.  
Based on the findings, C3 may be recommended to adopt the practice of regularly 
evaluating the performance of the internal staff and the external professionals to keep the 
defence enacted against any data breach or identity theft attack. The performance 
evaluation of prevention tools is also advised by Seda, (2014), through penetration test, 
vulnerability assessment and overall defence analysis. 
The findings also reveal that C3 evaluates the performance of the detection technology 
related to the update in fraud rules to verify if it is adequately working on the newly 
implemented rule(s).  
Although, it’s a good practice to check the performance with new updates, but C3 may 
also be advised to involve external professional organisations to evaluate the performance 
of prevention and detection technologies. The performance evaluation of detection 
technology is also advised by Bierstaker et al. (2006) to be done through statistical and 
false positive ratio analysis.  
f) Setting Identity Frauds as Management Priority 
The results show that the top management is not presented reports specific on IDF issues 
and losses. They are forwarded with regular reports on overall fraud losses. As already 
mentioned more than half of the total frauds are the identity related, so the senior 
management may be given detailed reports on the losses and arrangements on IDFs. Thus, 
detailed reports on IDFs and countermeasures would catch the attention of senior 
management, which may make the IDFM more effective. The practice of involving the 
senior management in IDFM is also suggested by Coulson-Thomas (2017).  
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4.5.7 Policy 
Fraud management policies provide guidelines to adopt the practices which help to 
achieve desired goals. For the effectiveness of policies, their development, 
communication, awareness and compliance are significant processes. The fraud policies 
and related issues in C3 are mentioned below.  
a) Having Fraud Management Policies 
The results expose that the case organisation had some policies but limited to the security 
of information. When asked about IDFM policies, the participants told: 
“We have a security policy, so group security policy that covers every eventuality”. (C3-
R04) 
“So there is anti-money laundering policy, there is a fraud policy, and within those, there 
are certain elements that relate to frauds”. (C3-R01) 
The statements show that C3 has the policies related to the IT infrastructure security, 
information and communication security and money laundering. The results indicate that 
C3 is more focused on the policies linked to information security and internal frauds. The 
significance of having related policies is also advised by Singh et al. (2013), Soomro et 
al. (2016) and Soomro et al. (2017) for the security of information and implementing 
change.  
Nevertheless, these policies help but are limited to the security of identity information at 
the prevention stage only. It would assist in securing customers’ identity information 
which is used in IDFs. However, an effective IDFM needs a comprehensive set of policies 
related to each stage of the fraud management. When asked about IDFM policies, all of 
respondents replied in negation. The absence of such policies may lead to a variety of 
responses to the same situation, which may cause chaos within the firm in dealing with 
IDFs.  
Therefore, C3 may be advised to develop a comprehensive set of IDFM policies at each 
stage of the fraud management to provide proper guidelines to their workers for a uniform 
and planned actions. The need for comprehensive fraud management policies is also 
emphasised by Bierstaker et al. (2006) and Njenga and Osiemo (2013). The IDFM 
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policies should be dealt at the top management level, and input from operational level 
staff should be sought to make effective policies (Coulson-Thomas, 2017; Albrechtsen 
and Hovden, 2010). 
b) Policy Update 
The policy update is necessary to enact their effectiveness with diverse environmental 
challenges. IDFM challenges are ever changing with the advent of new technologies and 
fraud trends. Although, C3 has no set of IDFM policies, however, the results show that 
the firm has the practice of reviewing and updating existing security policies every year. 
The fraud trends and methods are ever-changing, so once IDFM policies are developed, 
these should be updated on a continuous basis. The practice of updating the policies is 
also advised by Bechtsoudis and Sklavos (2012). 
c) Policy Awareness 
The awareness of policies is necessary for their compliance. In this regard, the results 
show that all the polices are make available through the organisational database, so any 
staff member in need of any policy may access to it. Although, the ready access to the 
policies is supportive of staff for getting awareness on various policies, but policy 
awareness can still be enhanced through active learning system.  
To increase the policy awareness, C3 should actively reach each with related policies and 
ensures that every staff member is well aware of the policies in fulfilling his/her job. To 
ensure the policy awareness, C3 may develop awareness training and campaigns. The 
practice of creating the policies’ awareness is also highlighted by Siponen et al. (2014) 
and Soomro et al. (2016). Furthermore, Bierstaker et al. (2006) suggest for getting a 
written acknowledgement that each staff member has received a copy of related policies 
and understood it. 
d) Policy Compliance 
An active policy compliance process is indispensable to achieve the objectives of any 
policy. The results show that the compliance of policies is regulated through internal and 
external audits. Regarding the regular internal and external audit for policies’ compliance 
respondent C3-R06 told: 
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“Every department that is annually audited by the head of compliance … each department 
has to succeed, and has to provide evidence of their compliance, so we internally audit 
the compliance and we externally audit”. 
The practice of conducting compliance audit helps in ensuring that the policies are 
complied with at their spirit. In the absence of the policies, compliance practices do not 
add towards the IDFM, so C3 may be suggested to develop policies at each step of the 
fraud management and ensures better practices, with continuous monitoring of 
compliance through direct supervising staff. Additionally, C3 may also develop a 
mechanism for policy compliance that would help to ensure a positive staff behaviour 
towards the compliance.  
e) Data Access Management Policy 
The policy for access management on critical information is significant to prevent any 
unauthorised access and minimise the probabilities of internal IDT. The results express 
that C3 has data access policy, which describes that the data access to the staff members 
is limited to their job roles. As a member of staff mentioned: 
“We are given limited access to the customers’ and other data in relation to our 
responsibilities”. 
This shows that each staff members do not have access to customer and the organisational 
information beyond their nature of duties and responsibilities. The access is limited to the 
information necessary to accomplish their job roles. The findings confirm that the data 
access is annually reviewed and restored in accordance with the access management 
policy. Although, it’s a good practice to have such policy but access privilege should be 
monitored more frequently with the change of the duties and responsibilities of related 
staff members. 
4.5.8 Investigation 
IDF investigations are necessary to find out the facts and collect as many as evidence to 
fix the responsibilities and prosecute in the court of law. The results indicate that C3 has 
managerial practices for investigating IDFs, which confirms that investigation stage is 
also observed as a stage of IDFM. The results of the processes and managerial practices 
for IDF investigations are mentioned as under. 
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a) Employing Specialist Investigators 
The effectiveness of IDF investigations depends on the knowledge and expertise of the 
investigators. The results pass on that, for effective investigations, C3 has employed a 
team of expert professionals, as mentioned by participant C3-R04: 
“Our proper investigators are mostly from police officers, as when we have a case even 
down so write in the statements we do all the work, so the police are concerned for odds 
part, while everything else is done from us”. 
These investigators come with many years of experience in related field. Some 
interviewees also informed that these investigators are given proper training on the firm-
specific technology to enable them working with these systems. These investigators try 
to minimise the role of the police and prepare the IDF cases at the business end by 
collecting enough evidence.  
The results also reveal that the investigation team also comprises of technology experts 
to extract information from the live systems to present as evidence for frauds. Thus, the 
results confirm that C3 has employed a team of legal and technical experts to make the 
investigations more efficient. The results confirm that employing specialists for IDF 
investigations have significant effect, so e-tailers may be advised to have this practice for 
better IDFM.  
b) Investigate with Prosecution in Mind  
There may be multiple reasons for investigating IDFs, but the ultimate goal is to collect 
evidence which may help in effective prosecutions. The results reveal that the 
investigators at C3 get the evidential statements and attach evidence that is enough for 
trial, as argued by C3-R07: 
“Whereas we do that as an organisation, we follow fair investigations, so we want them 
prosecuted”. 
The results reveal that the evidence is preserved in accordance with the related laws and 
connections with legal acts are developed, to make the fraud prosecutable. Such practice 
of investigating the frauds with an aim for prosecution will help at the later stage to 
provide evidence to the court of law to prove the fraudsters guilty. 
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c) Collection of Evidence 
Evidence is the base for the prosecution of a fraudster. Prosecutions in IDFs are effective 
when sufficient evidence is provided to the courts to determine a fraudster being guilty 
of committing an IDF. Thus, the e-tailers have to collect, preserve and present a set of 
evidence to the police and prosecution. On the significance of evidence, respondent C2-
R06 informed: 
“Yeah, it is just as much as evidence to build a bigger picture to confirm the identity fraud 
... you cannot go to the police just say we think this is a fraud.  You need some evidence 
to back it up”.  
The statement shows that the collection of evidence is significant for prosecution, so it 
has the practice of investigating IDFs to collect as many as evidence, as reported by 
interviewee C3-R02:  
“If we can get the evidence, not just the devices, we can get the individuals and have them 
with the goods have the telephone conversations, have the IP addresses, all goods stuff 
to get the initial arrest”. 
Respondent C3-R03 confirmed this view: 
“We take all the types of information through our systems.  We then have a look to see 
any other information at all that we can get to the address or the individual.  If we get 
everything that we need, then again, it’s all statemented, and that’s put into the police as 
evidence”. 
The findings show that C3 has the practice of collecting evidence from their systems, 
which are mostly related to the used devices, IP address and information related to the 
individual and the delivery address. Thus, the results confirm that C3 has the practice of 
collecting the evidence and provide these to the police for further investigation and 
prosecution in the court.  
The results also reveal that these evidence are obtained only through the internal resources 
and information systems. However, C3 does not use the external sources for evidence 
collection. Confirming the significance of evidence collection, this study suggests that e-
tailers should adopt this practice to improve IDFM.  
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d) Reporting Fraud Cases to Police 
Reporting the fraud cases to the police is a preliminary step towards further investigations 
and prosecution. The results show that C3 reports the IDF cases to the police, as 
mentioned by participant C3-R02: 
“In certain circumstances, they're reported to the police, and that goes through action 
fraud which is the UK's fraud management system for reporting.  And the police can then 
investigate it as well as they can”. 
It confirms that C3 has the practice of reporting the IDF case to the police for further 
investigations and prosecutions. The results also show that mostly the frauds are reported 
to the police, but all the claims are not entertained by them, as mentioned by participant 
C3-R03:  
“The police probably wouldn't look something of without value, but it would be reported 
of a fraud account”.  
And 
“Sometimes police take action, and some time they don't because they say a bit like 
already said why don't you stop the parcel”. 
These statements describe that not all the reported cases are taken by the police. The 
results also reveal that mostly the cases with a small amount of money and with lack of 
evidence are not entertained by the police. The literature findings also suggests that the 
police force are already busy in other more critical issues, so they are reluctant to take the 
fraud cases with insufficient evidence and less valued items. In this regards e-tailers may 
be suggested to improve its investigations and collect and present evidence in such a way 
that the police get involved in fraud issues. Such practices are also forwarded by 
Jamieson, et al. (2007) and Monaghan, (2010) for better investigations and developing 
coordination with police. 
Furthermore, it is evident from the extant literature and the results that the police force 
are busy in more critical issues, so fraud cases get less of their attention. In this situation, 
e-tailers have to come forward and develop close coordination with the police force to get 
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their input in investigations and prosecution of IDFs. Regarding such coordination, 
respondent C3-R04 said the following: 
“The police are so understaffed that if we want our prosecutions to go ahead, we need to 
assist them. So we investigate at our end, that's so important to have that cooperation”.  
The statement shows that C3 has the practice of coordinating with the police force 
because of the lack of resources and less interest in small fraud cases. The results also 
indicate that the appointment of ex-police officers as the investigators is a significant 
practice to develop such coordination with the police. The findings results also show that 
C3 has the practices of investigating the cases at its end, making evidential statements 
and collecting evidence, which is helpful in developing coordination.  
Although, C3 workouts on fraud cases, however the lack of police response show that the 
firm should prepare and present IDF cases in such a way that require least efforts from 
the police force, which would develop better coordination. The practice of coordinating 
with police force by reducing their role is also advised by Amori (2008), Brooks and 
Button (2011), Cross and Blackshaw (2014) and Lewis et al. (2014).     
e) Catching the Fraudsters 
The purpose of IDF investigations and prosecution may not be accomplished if the 
fraudsters are not arrested. The results show that the firm has the practices of collecting 
as many as evidence and doing controlled delivery system to get the fraudsters caught by 
the police, as highlighted by respondent C3-R03: 
“So we actually go with the police and actually arrest, is with technical support group, 
known fraudsters who we identify through IT security systems and through the fraudulent 
orders”. 
Although, it’s a good practice to stand with police for the arrest of fraudsters, however, 
the results show that most police are reluctant to get involved in small-scale fraud cases. 
Therefore, the firms should improve its investigations to develop substantial grounds for 
the arrest of fraudsters. Such improvements may include field investigations and using 
external resources for evidence to make it as an easy arrest for the police, which would 
be a motivating factor for the police to arrest the fraudsters. 
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4.5.9 Prosecution 
In IDF domain the prosecution has multiple advantages. First, it helps to get the fraudster 
punished. It helps the e-tailers to recover their losses and maintain their position against 
fraudsters. The punishment decisions create a fear among the potential fraudsters, thus 
enhancing the deterrence. The results indicate that C3 has not an aggressive strategy to 
prosecute every fraud, yet with concrete evidence and police support, it prosecutes the 
fraudsters, as mentioned by participant C3-R04:   
“We will then meet with police show them the concrete evidence and apply with police 
for arrest warrant and prosecution”. 
The statement indicate that after collecting the evidence and preparing the case, C3 
approach the police for prosecution. The results also reveal that not all the time police 
entertain the case and take action to arrest the fraudster and prosecute. To make the trial 
more effective C3 may be advised to improve its investigations and prepare the cases in 
such a way that requires fewer actions from the police force. The fraud cases may also be 
prepared in accordance with the law, and legal issues should be addressed to enhance its 
chances to be accepted for prosecution.  
a) Involvement in the Prosecution Process 
For successful prosecutions, it is necessary for e-tailers to be involved in the courts and 
help the court by providing additional evidence and other information if required. The 
results confirm that C3 is represented by a senior staff member from investigations team, 
as mentioned by the interviewee C3-R01: 
“So I might do more evidence, more statements and then it goes to the crown prosecution 
service, they then ask lots of questions, and again, you might need to change your 
evidence….not change it, but add to it.  And then obviously we go to court ….” 
The practice of being involved in the prosecution process was also confirmed by other 
participants. The results indicate that for effective prosecution the representatives of the 
e-tailers are directly involved in the prosecution process and follow up the trial, to respond 
any enquiry and provide any further evidence. It confirms that following the prosecution 
process is helpful in getting the prosecution successful by defending the business position 
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and getting their plead granted. So e-tailers are suggested to take active part in prosecution 
process for better IDFM. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, identity fraud management practices are compared between the case 
organisations. Managerial practices at each stage of the underpinning framework are 
discussed for their significance and suggestions are made to improve these practices to 
achieve an effective identity fraud management. The individual results of each firm are 
dsicussed in the previous chapter. This chapter presents the cross-case analysis of the 
data. Cross-case analysis is widely used to synthesise the results produced by small 
number of cases based on replication logic (Yin, 2014).  
At first, results on the types of identity frauds are presented. Then managerial practices at 
each stage of the fraud management are compared within the case organisations. The 
limitations regarding the managerial practices are introduced, and improvements are 
suggested to make IDFM more efficient for each case firm. The framework extension is 
explained in IDFM context, and research contribution is explained. 
5.2 Methods and Types of IDFs in E-Tail Sector 
At the outset, the findings confirm that the case organisations are facing significant losses 
on account of identity frauds. It was also established that identity theft and IDFs are the 
leading challenges in e-tail business. It was known that application fraud, account 
takeover, friendly fraud, first-party fraud and internal identity theft are the most common 
identity related frauds faced by the e-tailers. The literature identifies these types of 
identity frauds as the most common too. Additionally, delivery fraud was also found in 
these firms, which is an addition to the research. The delivery fraud occurs when the 
delivery driver does not deliver the parcel and fraudulently sign it, as delivered. 
The data reveals that most of these frauds are committed through stolen identity 
information and account credentials. The findings demonstrate that although, fraudsters 
mostly steal identity and account credentials from customers rather than from e-tailors, 
the latter face the risk of internal identity theft and the breach of sensitive customers’ 
information, especially their bank details. To counter these risk e-tailers have 
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implemented various preventive technologies. The managerial practices for IDFM and 
IDT prevention are presented in the following section.  
5.3 Analysis of Managerial Practices of IDFM in the E-tail Sector 
The managerial practices of case organisations for IDFM are analysed and discussed 
below with respect to the each stage of framework.  
5.3.1 Deterrence of IDFs   
Deterrence is a set of precautionary practices to minimise the chances of IDF attacks 
(Jamieson et al., 2007). Deterrence practices reduce fraud attempts through customer 
education and creating fear of being caught and punished. Customer education helps to 
minimise the chances of identity theft-which is a pre-requisite for IDFs, whilst fear of 
being caught and punished averts the behaviour of fraudsters towards not attempting any 
fraud.  
Educating the customers regarding the risk of identity frauds significantly minimise the 
chances of a successful IDF attempt (Albrecht et al., 2011). It also enhances the customer 
awareness of the risk of IDFs thus motivating them to take countermeasures. Our analysis 
reveals that all three firms educate their customers regarding identity theft and advise 
them not to share their credentials with anyone. Such practice is also highlighted as 
significnat for IT security, ID theft and e-commerce frauds by Arachchilage & Love 
(2014), Seda (2014) and Sperdea et al. (2011) respectively.  
Managerial practices addressing customer education at each firm are summarised in Table 
5.1. C2 goes a step ahead and warns its customers of phishing emails and other methods 
of identity theft, which helps the customers to be vigilant in respect of identity theft 
attacks and take countermeasures to mitigate associated risks. These practices are in line 
with the suggestions of Arachchilage and Love (2014) and Seda (2014).  
Educating customers on possible IDT methods and counter measures is an effective 
instrument of fighting IDFs. Therefore, C1 and C3 and other e-tailers may be advised to 
pay greater attention to customer education of the IDT methods and countermeasures to 
enhance the efficacy of identity theft prevention. Additionally, e-tail firms may also 
educate their customers not to share personal data on social media, as advised by Ann 
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McGee and Ralph (2015) to minimise the chances of account takeover and application 
frauds.   
Table 5. 1 Comparing the cross-case managerial practices at deterrence stage 
Processes Managerial Practices C1 C2 C3 
Customer 
Education 
- Advise the customers to secure their credentials. 
- Suggest customers putting a strong password and 
periodically change it. 
- Customers are warned of phishing emails and 
other sources of identity theft. 
- Use website and email for customer education. 

























- Get the fraudsters arrested and prosecute them. 
- Publicise successful prosecution and arrests in 
local media. 













Table 5.1 presents managerial practices at the deterrence stage in each case firm. It shows 
that managerial practices adopted by these firms are nearly identical. In customer 
education C2 has adopted more practices as compared to the other firms, whereas the C1 
has a better process and additional practices in comparison to the other two e-tailers.  
The findings show that C2 educates its customers to check their credit history regularly, 
as this helps to recognise any identity fraud attempt or occurrence at an earlier stage. But 
C1 and C3 do not have such practice, which may result in detection of frauds at a later 
stage, where mitigation may not be possible. In order to detect IDFs at an earlier state, C1 
and C3 may be suggested to advise their customers to check their credit history regularly, 
and may also offer free access to credit history to their customers. For the same reason, 
the case firms may also advise their customers to check their bank and credit card 
transactions regularly, as IDFs uncovered at an earlier stage can be mitigated to minimise 
the losses, as suggested by Alrashed (2016). 
The findings also reveal that all the companies are using websites and emails to educate 
their customers. Although, these channels may work, but the impact of customer 
education may be enhanced further by using more active channels, such as using text 
messages and push messages. C3 uses push messages but they are limited to marketing 
information.  Additionally, the use of social media may also help to enhance the customer 
efficacy in IDF deterrence. In order to enhance the impact of customer education for 
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pursuing them to adopt preventive measure, e-tailers may use push messaging and text 
messing services, and social media. The limitations for existing practices and suggestions 
to improve these are detailed in Table 5.2.    
Table 5. 2 Suggestions for improvements of IDF deterrence 






Advise the customers to 
secure their credentials. 
C1, C2 
and C3 
Customers should be educated on 




The e-tailers are using 
push messages for 
marketing. 
C3 Push messages service should also be 




check their credit files 
regularly. 
C2 Customers may be offered free 




Only website and email 








Publicise arrests and 





Publicise such information in mass 
media to ensure the customers of 
their security, and a message to 
fraudsters on the certainty of fraud 
detection and legal action.    
C1, C2 
and C3 
Does not conduct 
controlled deliveries to 
arrest fraudsters. 
C3 Controlled deliveries should be made 
to catch the fraudsters. 
C3 
Customers are only 




Advise customers to check their bank 
and credit card transactions 




Table 5.2 presents the limitations of existing managerial practices adopted by the case 
organisations and suggestions are forwarded to improve these practices. These 
suggestions are based on cross-case analysis of the empirical findings and literature 
reflections. 
The literature findings suggest that the fear of being caught and punished can be created 
by apprehending and prosecuting the fraudsters, publicising information about 
prosecutions and the stance that the organisation takes in respect of IDFS. In this regard, 
the collected data demonstrate that all the case firms try to get the fraudsters arrested and 
prosecuted, with a varying degree of effort.  
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The deterrent effects of catching and prosecuting the fraudsters can be multiplied through 
publicising such information in mass media. The practice of disseminating the 
information on caught and punished is only adopted by C1. C2 and C3, as already 
mentioned in the previous chapter, are reluctant to disseminate such information because 
they worry that this would deter potential customers from making purchases online. The 
details regarding each firm are given in Table 5.2.  
This attitude of C2 and C3 is in contrast with the recommendations one can find in the 
literature on banking frauds, accounting frauds, cyber-attacks and IT misuse deterrence 
(See D'Arcy et al., 2009; Dorminey et al., 2012; Guitton, 2012; Leasure and Zhang, 2017; 
Workman and Gathegi, 2007). However, so far no research of this issue has been done in 
e-tailing. E-tailers operate in a challenging environment, in which competition is very 
intense. E-tailers are likely to be particularly sensitive to spreading messages that may 
have a negative impact on customer confidence. This puts them in a difficult position. On 
the one hand, as my results show, e-tail firms seek to minimise the risk of losing such 
confidence.  
On the other hand, lack of deterrent communication increases the threat of identity frauds. 
Therefore, e-tailers, especially C2 and C3, should consider publicising information on 
threats and fraud deterrence in such a way that it should not make an unfavourable 
impression on potential customers. For this, they should set the content of the messages 
in such a way as to show the certainty of fraud detection and consequent legal actions. 
Presented in such a way, information is more likely to reassure the customers that the firm 
they are dealing with has a modern and efficient detection system and their identity 
information and accounts are safe. At the same time, such content will forward a warning 
to potential fraudsters of the inevitability of being detected and punished if they transgress 
against these organisations. The detailed suggestions for IDF deterrence are presented in 
Table 5.2.  
C3 also lacks a controlled delivery system, which is likely to undermine their chances to 
catch the fraudsters red-handed. As the findings from C1 and C2 suggest, a controlled 
delivery process has a deterrent effect and sends a warning signal to potential fraudsters. 
For this reason all e-tailers may be recommended to consider arranging controlled 
deliveries. The practice of helping the police with making arrests may also enhance the 
cooperation between the e-tailers against identity fraud investigation and prosecution. 
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5.3.2 Prevention of IDFs 
Prevention is a critical stage in IDFM, as it helps to secure the information, which is used 
for frauds. It was revealed that e-tailers have specific processes and practices, which help 
them to secure the identity information. The significance of a prevention stage is also 
highlighted by Jamieson, et al. (2007), Kumar, et al. (2007) and Wilhelm, (2004) for 
internal frauds, identity theft and common frauds. 
Sophisticated prevention technologies, their implementation and operations are expensive 
and require substantial investments. It was confirmed that e-tailers have sufficiently 
invested, but these investments are limited to the acquisition of sophisticated 
technologies. The analysis illustrate the all case firms are more focused on investing in 
technology, whereas the human related issues are given less attention. The significance 
of human aspects of information security and IDT prevention has been emphasised by 
many authors, including Boss et al. (2015) and Meinert (2016) but it appears that firms 
are not investing enough in this critical aspect of IDT prevention.  
Lack of investments in staff training and awareness may lead to employee ignorance, 
insecure use of IT systems and lack of skills required to make the most of these systems, 
which may facilitate information theft and breach of information security. Additionally, 
only the experts can ensure the appropriate deployment in preventive technologies, so for 
the effective use of these systems, e-tailers should also focus on investing in human 
development and related fields. Thus, prioritising investments in developing human skills 
and awareness for a better prevention system would help to enhance the performance of 
prevention stage. Better preventive measures may ensure the security of customers’ data 
and lessen the chances of IDT. The detailed suggestion on improvements in prevention 
stage are given in Table 5.4. 
This study has established that all the firms have taken measures and adopted various 
practices to secure customers’ information (see Table 5.3). For the security of the internal 
network, firewalls have been installed to fail attacks on the firms’ databases. All 
communications are monitored for security purpose, and all the incoming and outgoing 
customer information is protected by the end to end encryption, to prevent a man-in-the-
middle attack. Additionally, anti-virus and anti-malware software is used to protect e-
mails and other internet traffic from any malicious attack. These technological 
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arrangements are in line with the suggestion by Ahamad et al. (2014), Alrashed (2016), 
Devos and Pipan, (2009), Geeta (2011)and  Goyal et al. (2012) for cybersecurity. 
Information technology is evolving very fast, so various challenges continue to emerge 
almost on a daily basis. To keep the IT security and prevention systems operational, firms 
need to evaluate their efficiency and update them constantly. My results show that 
prevention systems of the case firms are managed through outsourcing, thus putting their 
evaluation and update also in the hands of external firms (especially in the case of C3). It 
was affirmed that C1 evaluates its system by itself on a regular basis, so the decisions on 
updating it are taken by the management.  
In the case of C2, the services of a neutral third party professional firm are hired to 
evaluate its prevention systems,  hence updates are recommended by the external party. 
As for C3, no evidence was found that the firm had any evaluation practices; only reports 
from the supplier of these technologies were reviewed at the time of installation. With the 
developments in technologies and emerging risks, the best systems of the past become 
ineffective.  The details of managerial practices of the prevention stage are given in Table 
5.3. 
It was also discovered that updates related to preventive technologies are also offered by 
the suppliers of these technologies. Although, out-sourcing has many advantages, still the 
C2 and C3 should get involved in evaluating the performance of their prevention systems, 
because the end responsibility of the security of sensitive information lies with these 
firms. Their management is suggested to employ professionals or train internal staff 
enabling them to ensure the performance of preventive technologies. Furthermore, the 
decisions of system updates should also be based on the regular evaluation reports and 
efforts should be made to have the latest versions of hard and software. 
The findings highlight that even when IDT occurs on the customer side the e-tailers bear 
fraud related losses. Because of this, e-tailers have to adopt better managerial practices to 
prevent information theft at the customer end. The findings show that the case firms do 
educate their customers, but such education is limited to securing and regularly changing 
their passwords. The practice of suggesting the customers on the security of their 
credentials is not workable, if possible methods of IDT and countermeasures are not 
communicated. Therefore, e-tailers should create awareness of potential IDT risks and 
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countermeasures, which is also supported by Archchilage and Love (2014) and Seda 
(2014) in IT security and IDT prevention.  
Additionaly, Devos and Pipan (2009) suggest that organisations should provide their 
customers free software to help them to avert IDT. Such practice is already adopted by 
some banks in the UK. Although, this practice may help customers to avoid IDT it may 
create a financial burden for the e-tailers. The e-tailers should study the cost and benefits 
of offering free anti-virus and other preventive software and act as appropriate. 
Table 5. 3 Comparing cross-case managerial practices at the prevention stage 
Processes Managerial Practices C1 C2 C3 
Sufficient 
investments 
- Sufficient investments are made in the 
prevention technologies. 
- Human aspects of IDT prevention are given an 













- The internal network is protected at all entry 
and exit points with firewalls. 
- The flow of communication is monitored for 
security purpose. 
- Emails and internet traffic is secured through 
anti-virus and anti-malware. 
- All the incoming and outgoing customer 
information is encrypted. 
- Regularly train staff on security risk and safe 
use of IT sources. 
- Should having effective arrangements for 
internal IDT prevention. 













































- Life-cycle management for all systems to 
update regularly. 












- Standard, based on ID and password. Yes Yes Yes 
Table 5.3 presents managerial practices found in the case firms. This shows that the case 
organisations have similar processes and practices for the prevention of IDFs. It also 
reveals that these firms are more focused in the technology and less attention is given to 
the human aspects especially training and development of IT professionals, which may 
one of the reason of recurring IDFs.   
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The human related issues also have a significant impact on information security and 
preventive measures. There are two main aspects in the current domain, first is the 
knowledge and skills of professionals managing these systems. In this regard, the findings 
show that the case firms mostly rely on the capabilities of third party professionals. 
Although, security and preventive arrangements are outsourced, still e-tailers are advised 
to employ own professionals in the field to ensure that the third party arrangements are 
best serving the objectives of the business. 
The other human-related facets of IDT prevention are the awareness and education of IT 
users. The case firms have been found not having any comprehensive programme to 
educate and increase awareness of staff members. Although, some policies and initial 
training are there to guide the staff, but these are not flexible and updated to counter the 
emerging threats. Therefore, to minimise the human-related problems and to improve the 
performance of preventive measures e-tailers may introduce a continuous education and 
training programme as advised by Arachchilage and Love (2014), Boss et al. (2015), 
Meinert (2016) and Seda (2014) for IT security, banking frauds and IDT. These awareness 
and training events have been proven instrumental in directing the staff efforts towards 
minimising human errors and advancing own skills helping them to achieve 
organisational objectives. 
In line with the literature the study confirms that an authentication system is the first line 
of defence against IDFs. The system verifies the identity information and authorises the 
access to the customer account. The findings demonstrate that all the e-tailers have simple 
authentication process consisting of ID and a password. However, the e-tailers report that 
these accounts are sometimes hijacked with stolen credentials, which shows the 
limitations of their authentication systems.  
The e-tailers are looking for new solutions. Firm C2, for example, is considering an 
authentication system that uses biometric information. Additionally, a two-layered 
authentication system is also an option, which is already being used by many banks, and 
various researchers (Prakash et al., 2015; Sharma et al., 2015; Teh et al., 2016; Usman 
and Shah, 2013) have also suggested it for better authentication. 
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Table 5. 4 Suggestions for improvements of IDF prevention 






Fewer investments are 
made to create awareness 




The e-tailers should be more 
focused on human aspects of IDT 
prevention and develop programs 




A third party organisation 
manages the prevention 
system, so its evaluation 
and update are also at its 
discretion. 
C3 The firm should ensure the 
performance, update, and 
evaluation of prevention system 
either by its staff or hire the 
services of a neutral party.   
C3 
Educate customers on 




Educate customers on possible 
IDT risks and countermeasures. 
C1, C2 
and C3 
The e-tailers rely on third 
parties and the skills and 
knowledge of their staff. 
C2 and 
C3 
The e-tailers should have a team 
of experts to ensure that third 
party arrangements are best 




The e-tailers have simple 
authentication process, 




The e-tailers should improve the 
authentication system by 
implementing bio-metric, login 




This table highlights the limitations of existing managerial practices at the case forms. 
These suggestions are more related to focusing on the human aspects of prevention. The 
table portrays that e-tailers use more resources on acquisition of sophisticated technology, 
which is a good practice but literature findings reveal that skills and knowledge of staff 
is also significant to make the most of acquired technologies. Therefore, more emphasis 
is suggested for human aspects related to the secure use of technology and acquisition of 
skills and knowledge about the preventive technologies.     
The literature findings show that bio-metric is the most secure authentication (Teh et al., 
2016; Usman and Shah, 2013) but it also has some legal implications and once 
compromised it is not possible to change. Furthermore, the e-tailers should also consider 
using a one-time password, whenever a customer wants to access the account. Such 
practice would help to stop unauthorised access, using stolen credentials. The one-time 
login password is sent to the registered contacts of the customers. As a result the customer 
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is made aware of any unauthorised access to the account, and is also recommended by 
Bang et al. (2012).  
E-tailers can also detect frauds at an earlier stage, by sending login alerts to the customers 
on their registered contacts (Kumar and Goyal, 2016). Such process already exists with 
some banks and other organisations. It may help to detect any unauthorised access soon 
after the victim gets the alert. Thus, the customer contacts the firm making it aware of the 
fraud. Detailed suggestions on improvements at prevention stage are mentioned in Table 
5.4.  
Although, additional preventive measures like bio-metric authentication, one-time 
password and sending login alerts may have some impact on effective authentication 
system, but these measures have not been tested in business sector. Now a days e-tailers 
operate in high competition, so they try to minimise the operating costs and increase the 
ease of online shopping. In the given situation, these measures may have some negative 
implications, if these are implemented on their own. Therefore, e-tailers may be suggested 
to test the measures as these have trade-off between better prevention and reduced ease 
of online business. These measures may also have financial implications, therefore e-
tailers should study the benefits of implementing these measures against all the potential 
risks. 
5.3.3 Detection of IDFs 
Detection of IDFs is central to IDFM, as it supports other stages such as mitigation, 
analysis, policy, investigation and prosecution (Wilhelm, 2004). The outcomes of my 
research reveal that all the case firms have certain managerial practices that deal with 
identity fraud detection. 
All the case firms have in place a screening system to detect frauds. This is in line with 
previous findings  (Allan and Zhan, 2010; Carneiro et al., 2017; Dorfleitner and Jahnes, 
2014; Phua et al., 2010; Swathi and Kalpana, 2013) on fraud detection in credit card 
industry, banking and non-banking financial industries and identity frauds in credit 
applications. It is apparent that screening system is widely used for detection of fraud in 
various sectors.  
A screening system is an embodiment of anti-fraud rules. These rules reflect the nature 
of the item on sale, its value, alternative delivery address and other fraud trends based on 
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the analysis of data from previous frauds such as IP addresses and devices used. The 
screening system flags out suspicious activities which are then manually verified during 
the mitigation stage.  
The managerial practices for a screening process at all three organisations are similar 
except for the verification of newly opened account. Companies C1 and C2 verify the 
identity information on every new account application, but C3 does not have this practice. 
Not verifying the customer information at an earlier stage may lead to IDFs (application 
fraud), as some fraudsters open account with fictitious identities. To counter application 
frauds, C3 may adopt the process of verifying identity information before allowing them 
making any purchase.      
In the course of this research it was also established that counter fraud rules tend to be 
regularly updated however, some frauds still evade detection. One of the possible reasons 
may be the reactive approach to updating these anti-fraud rules. The managerial practices 
from all firms confirm that anti-fraud rules are updated, based on the information from 
previous frauds, while it takes a long time to verify an identity fraud. In this regard, the 
case firms may take anticipatory measures and try to identify emerging fraud trends 
through information sharing and install precautionary rules into their screening system. It 
may help to detect emerging frauds even with no history of such scams.  
The practice of regularly updating anti-fraud rules is also suggested by Allan and Zhan 
(2010), Carneiro et al. (2017), Dorfleitner and Jahnes (2014), Phua et al. (2010) and 
Swathi and Kalpana (2013) in relation to credit card fraud, loan fraud, IDF and other fraud 
detection in various industries. This shows that anticipatory approach of updating anti-
fraud rules is significantly effective in detection of IDFs, which may be advised to the 
online retailers.  
Because the performance of screening system is based on fraud analysts, so e-tailers 
should also focus on the enhancement of the skills and knowledge of the staff working 
with screening system. Such knowledge and skills have a significant impact on the 
efficiency of fraud detection system (Vahdati and Yasini, 2015). Therefore, in addition to 
focusing on the technologies e-tailers should also emphasise on the skills development of 
the staff dealing with the screening system. Managerial practices at the detection stage 
are presented in Table 5.5. 
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The study has revealed that firm C2 has the practice of verifying each application for a 
new account opening. It helps to detect any fraud using stolen or fictitious identity 
information at an earlier stage much before any fraud occurs. It also helps to discover 
duplicate applications. Firms C1 and C3 do not have such practice, which may result in 
confirmed fraud if stolen or engineered identity information is given at the time of account 
opening. Therefore, e-tailers especially, C1 and C3 may be suggested to verify each of 
the new account application manually, which will help in detecting any fraudulent 
account application. Also, to make it more useful, these firms may ask the suspicious 
applicants for any documentary proof, which can also be helpful in fraud detection in 
future (Amori, 2008). The detailed suggestions on improvements at detection stage are 
given in Table 5.6. 
Table 5. 5 Comparing the cross-case managerial practices at the detection stage 
Processes Managerial Practices C1 C2 C3 
Fraud 
screening 
- Every transaction is screened for fraud suspect 
- Fraud rules are implemented to flag out the 
suspicious frauds. 
- Odd items, expensive products and alternative 
delivery address orders are put out for manual 
verifications. 
- Data of previous frauds, such as email address, 
delivery and IP address etc. are also embedded 
into the screening system to detect any 
transaction having links to prior frauds. 
- Update the rules frequently to detect frauds 
with emerging trends. 












































- Recognise customer IP address. 
- Recognise customer device.  
- Put cookies on to detect devices previously 
used in fraud. 
- Detect any device accessing multiple accounts. 























- Receive customer complaints on identity frauds Yes Yes Yes 
The table above presents managerial practices for the detection of IDFs at each case firm. 
The processes and practices at each firm are similar in action so are the issues in IDFM. 
This suggests that large e-tailers have similar procedure implemented for detection of 
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IDFs. Therefore, the limitations regarding IDF detection are also similar, which are 
mentioned in the next table. 
Table 5. 6 Suggestions for improvements of IDF detection 
Limitations of existing 
practices 
Related 
to  Suggestions 
Valid 
for  
In spite of fraud 
screening, some frauds 
are still not detected. 
C1, C2 
and C3 
Focus on human skills and 
knowledge to develop more 
effective fraud rules. 
C1, C2 
and C3 




Be proactive and learn emerging 
trends to develop rules to detect 
IDFs with new patterns. 
C1, C2 
and C3 
Fraud detection methods 




Share information with other firms 
on the fraud rules to make the 




system for recognising 




Use intelligent system and get IMEI 








IP addresses may not be effective in 
public Wi-Fi, so link customer 
devices with their accounts. 
C1, C2 
and C3 




Provide free phone service to 
society for reporting any fraud or 
suspicious activity anonymously. 
C1, C2 
and C3 
Table 5.6 presents the limitations of the practices implemented in the case firms for 
detection of IDFs. The suggestions forwarded in the table above are related to human 
aspects, knowledge sharing, customer education and technology related.    
It was also revealed that all three firms were using the device recognition technology to 
detect devices or IP addressed previously involved in frauds. With the help of cookies, IP 
address and devices implicated in frauds are recognised and put into the system that 
identifies any transaction using them. The use of such technology in fraud detection is 
also advised by Al-Jumeily et al. (2015), Carneiro et al. (2017), Dorfleitner and Jahnes 
(2014), Swathi and Kalpana (2013) and many other researchers.  
Additionally, C1 and C3 are also using it to detect devices accessing multiple accounts or 
a new device used to obtain a customer account, which helps to distinguish a suspected 
fraud but the C2 is not utilising that technology for such a purpose. The significance of 
using device recognition technology has already been highlighted by the C1. Therefore, 
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C2 may be advised to use the device recognition technology to detect a new device 
accessing the customer account and the device accessing multiple account to make its 
IDF detection more effective. However, the results also suggest that information on the 
make and model of the device is sometimes not enough to detect frauds. Therefore, e-
tailers may adopt more intelligent technology to register customers’ devices with IMEI 
number and MAC address, which are unique to each device, where possible. 
5.3.4 Mitigation of IDFs 
The findings show that all the case firms have some practices related to the mitigation 
stage in IDFM. At this stage, these companies have the managerial practices concerning 
the verification of identity information of suspicious frauds, order reconfirmation, 
information sharing with other business firms about the confirmed frauds and victim 
support. The training of mitigation staff and practices related to dealing with 
compromised accounts are also a part of this stage.  
The mitigation process starts once the screening system flags out a suspicious transaction. 
The results reveal that in the first instance, these firms verify the identity information of 
their customers. The verification processes is very similar in all three firms. At first, they 
check the information provided by the customer they suspect of fraudulent intentions 
against the historical data collected when the account was opened. It helps to identify 
recent changes to the account, which may be done by the fraudster soon after taking over 
the account, and any variations are validated.  
The results also reveal that all three firms keep the record of historical data, which allows 
them to verify the suspicious updates of the accounts by contacting the customers using 
original contact details. Such process of verification is also advised by Cheng et al. (2015) 
and Tan et al. (2016) e-commerce and credit card IDFs. The findings from the extant 
literature also support for contacting the customers to verify the information on suspected 
frauds (Jamieson et al., 2007; Wilhelm, 2004). This helps the firms in detecting any 
fraudulent attempt once the account has been taken over by fraudsters.  
Findings also show that the e-tailers under study, also use the CIFAS database to check 
if that information has any link with previous frauds in member organisations. The 
findings also reveal that the case firms use BT people finder, electoral roll, mortality 
databases and credit files for identity verification. Such use of third party database for the 
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confirmation of identity information is also recommended by Jamieson, et al. (2007) to 
manage IDF in banking and public sector organisations. These sources of verifications 
are critical to identifying any fraud using stolen information, as electoral roll may also 
help to locate other related information such as the address and other peoples living at the 
same address. But C2 and C3 are not using mortality databases, which may be a risk as 
the fraudsters can still use the credentials of deceased people. The detail of managerial 
practices at mitigation stage are presented in Table 5.7. 
Table 5. 7 Comparing cross-case managerial practices at mitigation stage 




- Match information with previously given, at 
the time of account opening. 
- Check for updates on the customer account. 
- Use CIFAS database to check if previously 
involved in fraud.  
- Use BT people finder. 
- Verify through electoral roll for name and 
address. 
- Check mortality database for identity fraud. 
- Credit file checks for identity verifications. 
- Call the customer and quiz on information 
on their credit file. 
- Verification of device 
- Ask customers to verify previous order and 
payments 
- Verification of Passport information 
- Identity information of each new account 






















































- Reconfirm the high-value orders by calling 
the customers’ on already given contact 
numbers. 





- Develop a database of known fraudsters. 
- Share data on IDF with other firms. 
- Data on frauds is also shared with police and 













- Give the victim a new account for continued 
shopping. 
- Remove the credit from the victim account. 
- Register the victim’s information on CIFAS 
to prevent further fraud using that 
information. 
























- Fraud analysts are given training on 
customer accounts. 
- They are trained to extract information from 
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- Training is given on how to verify 
suspicious frauds. 


















- Reject the order / stop the delivery. 
- Close the customer account if no loss has 
incurred. 
- Inform the account holder of being a victim 
of IDF. 
- Fraud amount is withdrawn from the victim 
account. 


























Table 5.7 shows that for mitigation of IDFs all the case forms have implemented some 
processes and at each process they have multiple practices, which have similarities. A 
large number of processes and practices show that IDFs mitigation stage needs more focus 
and attention, because of its significance in deciding a transitions being a fraud or not. 
This stage is also critical as wrong decisions on suspected transactions have negative 
impact on the business operations and reputation.  
C3 also has the practice of verifying the passport details if other sources would not help 
in determining the existence of a fraud. The practice of verifying the customer’s identity 
through passport may yield better results compared to other forms of identification in 
unearthing any identity fraud. Considering the significance of passport verification in 
mitigating IDF, this study suggests that C1 and C2 may consider adopting this practice, 
after the cost benefit analysis, to enhance the effectiveness of mitigation.  
Firms C1 and C2 have the practice of verifying the identity details on every new account 
application. It helps to mitigate any fraudulent account opened to make purchases and 
skip the payments, which is called application fraud. As discussed in the literature, these 
frauds are attempted with fictitious identities. Once a fraudulent account is opened, the 
verification of information upon the detection of suspicious activities would not bring 
results because the original record itself is compromised. Therefore, the verification of 
identity information at the account opening stage would minimise the chances of these 
frauds. In the absence of such practice, C3 may be at more risk of application fraud, so 
C3 is recommended to adopt the practice of verifying identity information on all new 
account applications.  
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Additionally, e-tailers may also ask the customers to provide any documentary proof of 
identity, after persuasion that it would help them to stop any identity fraud on their 
account. The practice of collecting any documentary evidence of identity is helpful in 
IDFs in health sector (Amori, 2008). Adopting this practice also be helpful in mitigating 
IDFs in e-tail sector, therefore, businesses may be advised to collect documentary proof 
of identity. Literature findings show that firms should collect customer information as 
minimum as possible, but such documents may only be collected for suspicious accounts, 
which would help in mitigating IDFs.  
It was also confirmed that once identity information is verified, all the firms have the 
practice of reconfirming the orders by calling the customers and in some instances these 
orders are detected as fraud. This shows that suspected orders even with genuine 
information may be an account takeover fraud, which can be mitigated by calling the 
customers. It confirms that reconfirmation of suspected purchase orders is a significant 
practice to mitigate account takeover frauds, so e-tailers may be suggested to adopt it. 
This study confirms that the case firms have developed a database of known fraudsters 
and share it with law enforcing agencies and other e-retailers through the CIFAS platform. 
The results make it evident that such practice helps in detection and mitigation of identity 
frauds. Information regarding the incurred frauds is fed into the screening system that 
highlights any transaction having link with the information in the database, which is also 
recommended by Cross and Blackshaw (2014) as significant to mitigate online frauds. 
Although, the sharing of information on frauds attempts helps, but benefits are limited to 
the detection and mitigation stages.  
To maximise the advantages of information sharing, e-tailers should disclose relevant 
data on IDFM. Such information may be related to each stage suggesting various practices 
to manage IDFs more effectively (Feledi and Fenz, 2012). By contrast, Chohan et al. 
(2014) in a study on information theft prevention argue that organisations are reluctant to 
share information on IDFM, because of the lack of trust. Therefore, this research argues 
in favour of the e-tail organisations creating an atmosphere of trust and confidence to 
facilitate sharing successful practices and related achievements to develop a better IDF 
resistant environment. 
Managerial practices at the victim support processes of all the firms are quite similar. On 
the confirmation of fraud, the credit is written off on the customer account, their 
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information is fed into the CIFAS database to avoid further frauds at member 
organisations, and the credit history is restored. Furthermore, the victims are given a new 
account for continued business and suggestions are provided to avoid further losses in 
future. For business firms, victim support is critical to retain good customer relations. 
Although, these suggestions would help the victims to prevent any future IDF, but the 
benefits of such advises may be multiplied by forwarding these suggestions to more 
customers before any incident of IDF. The suggestions on the improvement in IDF 
mitigation are shown in Table 5.8. 
Table 5. 8 Suggestions for improvements of IDF mitigation 






Match information with 
previously given, at the 
time of account opening. 
C3 Information given by the 
customer at the time of account 
opening should be verified to 
detect any fraud after account 
takeover. 
C3 
Check mortality database 
for identity fraud. 
C2 and 
C3 
The database may not frequently 
be updated, so the e-tailers 
should not depend on these. 
C2 and 
C3 
No verification of identity 




Should implement passport 
information verification system 
C1 and 
C2 
ID information of each 
new account application is 
not verified 
C3 Should verify information at the 
time of account opening to 
detect any account takeover 
fraud. 
C3 




Companies should also share 
information on the effective 
management of IDFs. 
C1, C2 
and C3 
Additional support is 
offered to IDF victims 
C1, C2 
and C3 
Customers should also be 
advised to implement security 
software in their devices to 
prevent any IDT. 
C1, C2 
and C3 




The e-tailers should also 
develop the specialities of 
mitigation staff in accordance 




Close the compromised 




Keep the compromised accounts 
open with a view to getting the 
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The table above presents the limitations of existing managerial practices at each case firm. 
Based on these limitations and reflections from the findings of extant literature 
improvements are suggested to e-tailers to enhance the effectiveness of mitigation stage. 
Training has a critical role in improving the skills and knowledge of the members of staff 
responsible for the mitigation stage, accordingly, determining the ultimate success of this 
stage. The analysis reveals that all the investigated firms train their staff in two phases. 
First, an induction training is offered to enhance the employees’ skills in fraud mitigation, 
which is compulsory for all newcomers. During the second phase a mamber of staff 
undertakes controlled fraud analysis of her own.  
The decisions taken by the analysts are evaluated and the staff is given feedback that help 
them to improve the quality of her decisions. Although, such retrospective training is 
useful, to enhance the performance of mitigation staff, it is important that they should 
also be trained on new and emerging fraud trends. The staff may be educated in dealing 
efficiently with red-flagged transactions and how to minimise contacts with customers 
that may have a negative impact on customers’ attitude towards the e-tailers.  
The benefits of such training to fraud analysts are also highlighted by Becker et al. (2010) 
and Wilhelm (2004) in mortgage, insurance, retail banking and telecommunication 
industries. Furthermore, it may also be helpful to e-tailers to develop the capabilities of 
mitigation staff by the types and nature of IDFs.      
The findings show that on the confirmation of an IDF the order is cancelled, and the 
process of despatch or delivery of the item is stopped. The compromised account with no 
losses incurred is closed, and the information is fed into the fraud database to prevent any 
fraud in future. In case of incurred losses on any account, C1 keeps the account open to 
get the fraudster arrested if another fraud is attempted, while C2 and C3 close such 
accounts.  
Although, for a business enterprise it may not be a cost-effective practice, however, for 
the recovery of significant losses, the other companies may also follow C1. Using a 
compromised account as a trap, may help to catch the identity fraudsters and recover the 
losses. 
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5.3.5 Analysis of IDFs 
The process of IDF analysis helps to identify the causes and effects of frauds, and 
provides a foundation for adopting more efficient managerial practices. The process 
includes fraud risk assessment, identification of fraud trends, diagnosing the methods and 
patterns of frauds and exposing the weaknesses of the prevention and detection system 
(Aple and Nagin, 2017; Rose et al., 2015).  
The findings reveal that the case companies have hired external professionals or have 
employed experienced and senior staff members from within the firm as fraud analysts. 
Thus, firm C1 has hired experienced fraud analysts from retired staff of HM Revenue and 
Customs, the police and other investigational agencies. Once hired they are then given 
training in firm-specific procedures and technologies. While, C2 and C3 have the practice 
of employing senior personnel having vast experience in various fraud-related fields 
within the firms.  
Although, the practice of employing fraud analysts in the case firms vary, yet no 
significant differences were found in the effectiveness of identity fraud analysis. 
Therefore it may be assumed that experience related to fraud management is essential 
whether gained from within the organisation or from other law enforcing agencies. These 
fraud analysts receive information from the previous stage on incurred frauds and start a 
reviewing process. They try to understand the means, methods and trends of attempted 
frauds.  
Based on the outcomes of their investigations, the analysts forward suggestions and 
countermeasures to improve the defence line against such frauds. The practices of staying 
informed about the fraud trends and methods are also advised by Apel and Nagin (2017) 
and Yelland (2013) for help in improving fraud management in IT security and mobile 
network frauds.  
The findings also show that the process of reviewing the frauds is nearly same in all three 
firms. The information of the fraudsters/victims and the delivery addresses are collected 
and a database is built to prevent any fraud in the future, using that identity information. 
The case organisations also have the practice of sharing the database of known fraudsters 
with the CIFAS, to enable the member organisations avoiding frauds using such 
information. Thus, the practices of developing a database of notorious fraudsters and 
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sharing it, are critical to help and get helped to prevent certain IDFs using the same 
information. 
The identification of new fraud methods and trends from various external sources have a 
significant role in setting the organisational stance against detection and mitigation of 
such frauds. The respondents from C2 confirmed that the staff members in the fraud 
management field actively seek information on new IDF trends and methods through 
external resources. It helps C2 to assume the anticipatory practices to detect and mitigate 
such frauds, which the C1 and C3 are lacking.  
The staff at the C2 also have the practice of communicating such IDF trends and methods 
within the IDFM team. To help in detection and mitigation of IDFs with emerging trends 
and techniques, C1 and C3 may adopt the practices of learning new frauds trends and 
ways from various sources external to the firms and share such information with related 
staff. The existing managerial practices in fraud analysis in the case firms are presented 
in Table 5.9. 
The findings reveal that the process of reviewing the IDFs helps the case organisations in 
discovering the weaknesses of technology employed to detection identity frauds and the 
performance of the staff involved in mitigation of IDFs. All the case firms have the 
practices of updating the existing fraud rules and developing new ones, based on the 
outcomes of the analysis process. The fraud analysts recommend these rules to the 
management of screening system, and they implement them to detect suspicious frauds 
with emerging frauds trends.  
The findings also show that all the case organisations have the practice of communicating 
these new and emerging fraud trends to the staff related to the detection and mitigation 
processes. Thus, the process of reviewing IDFs helps the businesses to enhance their 
detection and mitigation mechanism against IDFs. Such process of fraud analysis is also 
suggested by Apel and Nagin (2017), Rose et al. (2015) and Yelland (2013) to develop 
anti-fraud strategies.  
The managerial practices of case organisations for identity fraud analysis are compared 
in the following table.  
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Table 5. 9 Comparing cross-case managerial practices at the analysis stage 




- Hire or employee well-experienced 
personnel for fraud analysis.  
Yes Yes Yes 
Reviewing 
identity frauds 
- Disclose the trends and methods of frauds. 
- Collect identity information regarding the 
fraudsters and delivery addresses. 
- Diagnose the weaknesses of systems and 
staff at previous stages. 
- Suggest fraud rules –based on occurred 
frauds- to detect such scams in future. 
- Communicate the new fraud trends and 





























- Hold regular meetings on identity fraud to 
improve its management. 
- Monitor the progress of existing 
prosecutions. 



















- Understand the potential risk of identity 
theft. 
- Take measures to minimise the fraud risks. 
- The business is still losing on IDFs. 





















- Validate all the control systems by related 
security policies. 
- Check for any policy violations, investigate 
these and take remedial actions. 
- Run vulnerability scanning of the 
prevention systems, website, access portals 
and firewalls on a regular basis. 
- The screening system is regularly evaluated 




























- Evaluate the performance of mitigation staff 
through their decisions. 
- Make plans for individual staff to develop 
their performance. 
- Feedback training is given based on the 



















- Fraud advisors actively learn new fraud 
trends from external sources. 
- New frauds trends and methods are shared 










The table above presents the processes for IDF analysis, which are common to all the case 
firms. For each process the table presents the list of managerial practices adopted by these 
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firms. Like at other stages, managerial practices for IDF analysis are similar at all the case 
organisations.  
The findings show that C1 and C2 hold regular meetings in which the management of 
IDFs is discussed. These sessions are attended by senior management, and issues and the 
organisational strategies are debated and reviewed to achieve better management of IDFs. 
These meetings help to evaluate the overall IDFM process and to explain the situation to 
the top management to get their input, including extra resources if needed. The practices 
of involving the senior management is also advised by Jamieson et al. (2007) and 
Wilhelm (2004), to improve the performance of fraud management process.  
The results from C1 and C2 show that the practices of holding regular meetings regarding 
the management of IDFs and putting the issue on top management are advantageous, but 
C3 has no such practices, which may result in lack of interest from top managers. This 
may lead to a shortfall of resources, which again would result in ineffective management 
of IDFs. Therefore, this study recommends the e-tailers, especially C3, to put IDFM 
issues on priority and get the senior management contribution, which may help it 
improving the management of IDFs. 
This study found no evidence on the evaluation of the performance of each stage of IDFM 
in the case firms. Such practice is critical to improving the overall management of IDFs, 
but no data has been found indicating the existence of such evaluation practices. The 
significance of evaluating and improving each stage of fraud management is also 
highlighted by Jamieson et al. (2007) and Wilhelm (2004), for the improvement of IDFM.  
The evaluation process is helpful in identifying the limitations and weaknesses of 
employed technologies, processes and human deficiencies, and based on this, 
management of enterprises may develop strategies to overcome these deficiencies. 
Therefore, it may be suggested to e-tailers for evaluating the performance of technology, 
processes and peoples at each stage of IDFM and plan strategies to overcome the 
deficiencies to improve IDFM process. The detailed suggestions on improving 
managerial practices in IDFM are presented in Table 5.10. 
All the firms have the process of managing the risks related to IDFs. It starts with 
understanding the risks of IDT. In this regards, the findings show that these firms are 
aware of the risks associated with IDFs, which creates a sense of insecurity. To minimise 
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these risks, all the case companies take technological and organisational measures, which 
also help to reduce the chances of IDFs. The representatives from all the firms confirmed 
that in spite of the arrangements, these firms are still losing on IDFs, which proves that 
there is still a room for improvements in managerial practices in IDFM. 
Business organisations always seek to make it easier for their customer to shop online. It 
was confirmed that un-necessary security checks and verifications may put a negative 
impact on the customers buying behaviour. The analysis show that firms with dispensable 
security layers and un-necessary verifications could irritate customers, so there should be 
a balance between security and ease of doing online business.  
The findings on C3 show that the firm is trying to have a favourable trade-off between its 
counter-fraud operations and the negative impacts of undue security on the business. On 
the contrary, the interviewees at C1 and C2 have not shown any concern regarding such 
trade-off, which may put adverse impact on their existing and potential customers. C1 
and C2 are business firms operating in a high competitive environment, so they may be 
suggested to focus on the trade-off between the security layers and customer ease of doing 
business. Better customer education can help the case firms adopt extra security layers to 
stop IDFs, once the customers are informed of the potential risks of IDFs. Therefore, e-
tailers may still have added security layers without adverse impact on their customers 
through better customer education and awareness.  
The practice of evaluating the efficiency of the prevention and screening systems is 
crucial for effective IDFM. It helps to assess the effectiveness of these measures against 
the potential risks of identity theft and frauds, and suggests measures for improvements. 
The findings show that the case firms validate all the control system regularly in 
accordance with established information security policies.  
The results disclose that C1 and C2 have the practice of evaluating the prevention system 
through vulnerability scanning on the website, access portals and firewalls on a regular 
basis. Such scanning allows to identify the system’s weakness and improve their 
effectiveness in IDT domain, but no such process was seen in C3. The absence of such 
practice may lead prevalence of severe risks, which may lead to data breach and identity 
theft. Implementing the process of evaluating the effectiveness of prevention system 
against possible threats would help to improve its performamnce, so e-tailers may be 
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advised to evaluate the prevention system in related domain (Dorminey et al., 2012; Seda, 
2014; Vahdati and Yasini, 2015). 
The absence of such evaluation practice may lead to the system weaknesses, which may 
be a possible reason for IDF occurrences in all the case companies. Some researchers, 
(Apel and Nagin, 2017; Bierstaker et al., 2006; Rose et al., 2015) have also proposed to 
evalute the detection system for enhanced detection of frauds. Thus, evaluation of 
detection system in IDFs domain may result in reduced number of IDFs, so e-tailers are 
advised to evalute their detection system to controll the number of successful IDFs. The 
detailed suggestions on improving fraud analysis are presented in Table 5.10.  
Table 5. 10 Suggestions for improvements of IDF analysis 







External sources are not 
utilised to understand 
emerging fraud patterns. 
C1 and 
C3 
Utilise media channels to gain 
information on emerging frauds 
and share with related staff. 
C1 and 
C3 
Ease of online shopping is 
not focused while making 
IDT prevention strategies.  
C1 and 
C2 
Focus on balancing the customer 
ease and preventing IDT. 
C1 and 
C2 
The vulnerability of 
prevention systems is not 
tested. 
C3 Run vulnerability scanning of the 
prevention systems and firewalls 
regularly. 
C3 
Fraud screening system 
should regularly be 
evaluated in IDF domain. 
C1, C2 
and C3 
Screening system should 
regularly be evaluated, to assess 
its effectiveness in IDF domain. 
C1, C2 
and C3 
Performance of mitigation 
staff is not evaluated by 
their decisions. 
C3 Evaluate the performance of 
mitigation staff through their 
decisions. 
C3 
Mitigation staff is not 
given feedback training on 
their decisions. 
C3 Feedback training should be 
given, based on the decisions of 
fraud advisors. 
C3 
Fraud trends and methods 
are learnt only through the 
analysis of incurred frauds.  
C1 and 
C3 
Fraud advisors should also 
actively learn new IDF methods 
and trends from external sources. 
C1 and 
C3 
Suggest fraud rules –based 
on occurred frauds- to 
detect those in future. 
C1 and 
C3 
Fraud rules should also be 
suggested based on trends learned 
through various external sources 
C1 and 
C3 




Evaluate the performance of each 




plans are designed for 
every staff members. 
C1, C2 
and C3 
Development plans of IDFM staff 
should be designed to enhance 
their expertise in specific doman. 
C1, C2 
and C3 
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Table 5.10 presents the limitations of existing managerial practices at IDF analysis stage 
for each firm. This shows that the e-tailers have the process of analysing IDFs, but is not 
meant for evaluating the performance of technologies and the processes at each stage of 
the framework, which is signified in the extant literature. The findings expose that the 
decisions of mitigation staff are also analysed at this stage. The results from C1 and C2 
confirm that the analysis stage also include the evaluation of the performance of 
mitigation staff through their decisions. These decisions are evaluated against the actual 
occurrences of IDFs. The analysts give feedback to the mitigation staff on their decisions 
regarding the approval of fraudulent transactions or rejection of genuine orders.  
Evaluation of screening system for the detection of suspicious frauds is also help to 
improve its performance. Despite this, no significant results were found to evaluate the 
performance of the screening system. The findings express that the case firms just asses 
the screening system when a new fraud rule is implemented or updated. Although, at the 
start of applying a fraud rule, the system is checked for its effectiveness, but this does not 
quantify the overall performance of the system.  
Keeping in view the significance of these decisions, C1 and C2 have the practice of 
feedback training to the mitigation staff. Such training helps them to know their 
weaknesses and provide opportunities to improve their performance. It is a cyclic process 
that enhances the quality of decisions to minimise the risk of losing business and 
mitigating IDFs. These results are in line with Vahdati and Yasini (2015) in online frauds. 
Keeping in view the advantages of such practices, e-tailers, (especially C3) are advised 
to implement the practices of evaluating the performance of mitigation staff and providing 
them feedback training.  
In addition to the feedback training, all the case firms have the regular plans for the 
development of staff including those in mitigation stage. Such plans help the personal 
development of individual staff members. This study suggests that e-tailers should design 
specific development plans for staff in the DIFM domain to develop their expertise.  
5.3.6 Policy for IDFs 
Business firms develop policies to manage various business operations effectively. The 
policies provide guidelines to the staff, regarding the fulfilment of day to day job 
obligations in a systematic and strategical manner to achieve organisational goals. In 
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IDFM, policies have a critical role in determining the course of actions against the frauds. 
The results expose that all the enterprises have implemented policies but are limited to 
identity theft prevention. 
Generally, all the businesses have policies to secure the information from theft and system 
hacking. Mostly, these policies are related to information security, communication 
security and infrastructure security. Furthermore, the findings indicate that all the case 
firms have similar arrangements to secure their information. Although, these policies are 
significant to prevent any information theft, which is used for IDFs, but they focus on 
only one stage of IDFM - prevention. However, for effective IDFM businesses need 
policies at each stage of fraud management, which are missing at all the e-tail firms. The 
need for anti-fraud policies is highlighted by Bierstaker et al. (2006) and wright (2007) 
for better fraud management.  
The absence of policies at other stages of fraud management leaves weaknesses in the 
process of IDFM. It also shows that the firms are more focused on the prevention of 
information theft, which may be one of the valid reasons for a significant number of 
successful frauds. In the absence of a set of comprehensive policies at each stage of 
IDFM, there is a lack of strategic actions against the fraud activities, which may allow 
some frauds to happen. This situation also creates confusion for the staff in dealing with 
issues related to the fraud management. Therefore, it is advised that all the firms should 
develop a set of policies for each stage of the fraud management (Njenga and Osiemo, 
2013). 
In addition to having appropriate policies, their communication and awareness are also 
important. The findings disclose that all the firms have made their policies available to 
their staff members through the internal communication system. The readily available 
policy documents are helpful to the staff for getting guidance in case of any confusion. In 
addition, the case organisations have the practice of sending policy updates through email 
in order to make the staff aware of the changes in existing policies. This practice helps 
the staff to get up to date with these changes. The practice of making the staff aware of 
policies is also suggested by Parsons et al. (2014) for better IT security, so it may also be 
applied in e-tailing. Managerial practices of each firm at the policy stage are mentioned 
in Table 5.11. 
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Table 5. 11 Comparing cross-case managerial practices at the policy stage 




- Have information and technology security 
policies 
- Have IDFM related policies at each stage. 















- E-learning packages are developed to help 
the staff learn about the contents of policies 
and understand them. 
- All the policies are available in the internal 
communication system. 
- New and updated policies are 
communicated effectively. 





























- Staff should have least access to personal 
information. 
- Only job-related information is allowed to 
access. 



















- A mechanism to for policy compliance. 
- Internally audit the policy compliance. 











Table 5.11 presents the processes and practices on IDFM policies at each case firm. 
Managerial practices for policy awareness and compliance are also given. This shows that 
a comprehensive set of IDFM polices guiding at each stage of fraud management is 
missing in all the case firm, for which suggestions are given in the next table.  
The findings also show that C1 and C2 have an online learning system that helps the staff 
to get access on any policy contents. This practice is essential to let the employee learn 
about the policies and interpret them to comply with. C3 lacks such a learning system, 
which may result in the policies been not readily available and may lead to non-
compliance with the policies. Ready availability of policies is necessary to direct the staff 
responses in accordance with the organisational objectives, therefore, e-tailers may 
consider developing a policy learning system to help their employees getting ready access 
on policies for effective compliance.  
Furthermore, this investigation has confirmed that the firms just make the policy 
documents available. Although, it’s a good practice to enable the staff access any policy 
document regardless of the time, but this research has reveal that the case firms do not 
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have any mechanism to ensure that these documents are read and properly understood by 
the staff members. Lack of policy understanding is one of the biggest obstacles towards 
policy compliance. Therefore, these e-tailers may be suggested to arrange a feedback 
mechanism, to ensure that each staff member read and understand the related policies. 
Additionally, the firms should also develop a training programme to create policy 
awareness, understanding and learning compliance process and develop a positive 
attitude of staff, which would result in better compliance (Parsons et al., 2014; Singh et 
al., 2013; Soomro et al., 2016). Detailed suggestions on policies and related issues are 
mentioned in Table 5.12. 
Table 5. 12 Suggestions for improvements of IDFM policies 










The case firms should develop 
policies at each stage of IDFM. 
C1, C2 
and C3 




The data access privilege should 
be assessed more frequently. 
C2 and 
C3 
Policy compliance is 








Policies are made 
available only on the 
firm's database 
C3 Develop a learning package to 
make staff aware of policies. 
C3 




Fraud related policies should be 




Table 5.12 gives the limitations of existing managerial practices at the each case firm. 
This portrays that e-tailers have no set of comprehensive policies on IDFM to direct the 
behaviour of staff at each stage of fraud management. On the other hand, mechanism on 
policy awareness and compliance also has some critical limitations, for which suggestion 
are given in the table.   
The findings also reveal that the case firms review their policies on an annual basis. 
However, this may not be often enough to effectively counter the IDF challenges, so e-
tailers may adopt the practice of continuously updating their IDFM policies for better 
response to IDF issues. This would also help in ensuring the better countermeasures 
against the emerging fraud trends and methods. 
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The case firms hold sensitive information related to vast number of customers. To secure 
such information from external challenges, prevention measures may be adopted, and 
policies related to the minimum standards of information security would helpful if 
implemented.  
In addition to external challenges, the firms also have threats from the insiders. To 
minimise these risks, the case organisations have least access policies to data access. They 
allow only minimum access of their staff to sensitive information in regard to customers 
and the organisation itself. Staff members are given access to information which is 
essential to disposing of their duties. This helps to minimise the chances of internal data 
theft. It was also established that in C2 and C3 data access privileges are assessed on an 
annual basis, which is not frequent enough and may leave compromised data access 
privileges undetected for some time. For this reason, C2 and C3 may be advised to assess 
the access privileges more frequently like it is done in C1, in which they do it every six 
months. Additionally, e-tailers are also advised to review data access privileges, once any 
change in the position of the staff members takes place (Alrashed, 2016; Wang et al., 
2006). 
For the management of IDFs, the significance of policy compliance is as important as the 
policy itself. The respondents indicated that all the case firms have the practice of internal 
and external audit for the policy compliance. Such audits help the top management 
ensuring that the laid down policies are properly complied with, which may support 
achieving organisational goals.  
However, to ensure the policy compliance in real time C1 may need to develop a 
mechanism through which the immediate supervisors ensure that the policies are 
complied with, without waiting for an audit. Such practice helps to closely monitor the 
compliance process and correct any errors and weaknesses of staff about the policy 
understanding and compliance procedures. Such mechanism may also help to enhance 
the staff performance for compliance through training and awareness. The practices of 
closely monitoring the compliance process and having compliance mechanism are also 
highlighted by Chen et al. (2015) and Parsons et al. (2014) for IT security policy 
compliance. For effective IDFM, C2 and C3 may be advised to develop a policy 
compliance mechanism, to ensure policy compliance in a timely manner. 
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5.3.7 Investigation of IDFs 
The findings confirm that the investigation of IDFs takes place at all the e-tailers under 
study. The investigation process starts with the reports from the analysis stage and 
includes various procedures and practices to collect the evidence and submit the cases for 
prosecution. Therefore, it was confirmed that the investigation stage is also a part of 
IDFM. The practice of conducting investigations at the business end is also recommended 
by Brooks and Button (2011) and Lewis et al. (2014) to reduce the dependency on police 
force and develop close coordination with law enforcing agencies. 
For effective investigations, a team of professional investigators is necessary, with a 
sound knowledge of working in the field. The results demonstrate that the e-tailers 
investigate IDFS at their end, so they have devoted staff members to perform 
investigations. These investigation teams consist of specialist investigators, such as ex-
police as in C1 and C2, who are given firm-specific training to retrieve digital evidence 
from the firms’ systems. C3 has a team comprising of senior and experienced fraud 
managers with sound knowledge of state laws and investigation procedures.  
Although, there is a difference in the composition of the investigation teams, this study 
does not reveal any significant variation in the success rate between the teams. Therefore, 
it may be deduced that employing ex-police or experienced civilian staff for IDF 
investigations does not affect performance, given that they possess sound knowledge of 
related state laws and investigation procedures. The suggestion on appointing a team of 
experts for fraud investigations is also advised by Amori (2008) to reduce burden on 
police force and collect evidence for prosecution. 
It has been found that the fraud investigators directly engage with the law enforcing 
agencies in the course of preparing cases, collecting additional evidence and forwarding 
it for the prosecution process. It reduces the business dependency on law enforcing 
agencies, thus developing better coordination, which lessens the police role (Lewis et al., 
2014). 
Nevertheless, the purpose of investigating the IDFs is to collect information on the 
involved fraudsters and evidence to prove their guilt, the benefits would be limited if the 
investigations are not conducted with the prosecution in mind. Through analysis, it came 
to know that all the case firms seek to prosecute most of the fraudsters. These firms collect 
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and preserve evidence in such a way that it is suitable to be presented in the courts of law, 
which is also recommended by Furlan and Bajec (2008) and Rose et al.  (2015) for 
effective prosecution. Managerial practices at the investigation stage are presented in 
Table 5.13. 
Table 5. 13 Comparing cross-case managerial practices at the investigation stage 




- Establish a dedicated investigation team. 
- Investigators are experienced in related fields. 
- Investigation team consist of ex-police officers. 
- Investigators directly engage with law 
enforcing agencies and have the experience to 
work with police. 



























- Investigations are conducted to collect the 
evidence and fulfil the legal requirements to 






- Collect as many as evidence to prove fraud. 
- Use external databases for collecting evidence. 
- Collect digital evidence including IP address, 
device identification and related addresses. 
- Use GPS system to identify the location of 
delivery. 
- Use social media to collect more identity 
information of the suspects. 
- With all the evidence prepare a case for the 
onward process. 
- Record the victim’s statement confirming the 





































- Report fraud cases to the police with all the 
evidence. 
- Work with police for further investigations to 













- Help the police to arrest the fraudsters. 
- A controlled delivery system to catch the 








The above table lists managerial practices for IDF investigations at each case 
organisation. This shows that the case firms have specialist investigators that collect the 
evidence, liaise with the police and follow up the fraud cases in the courts of law. The 
table represents that investigational process at all the case firms have similarities with a 
minor difference of adopted practices.   
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The findings reveal that the e-tailers use internal and external sources to collect evidence 
to prove a fraudster’s guilt. For internal evidence collection, all the firms use technologies 
to identify the IP address, recognise the device used in fraud, and GPS location service to 
determine the exact location of the goods delivery. Information collected through internal 
systems help the e-tailers to match this information with previously used addresses and 
location of the victims. Furthermore, this information also helps to identify and locate 
fraudsters and may stand as evidence in the court of law. 
In addition to the internal sources, the e-tailers also use external sources of information 
for evidence collection. It was known that the case firms use various external databases 
(such as electoral roll, IP address locator and others) to collect evidence related to the 
fraudster and the delivery addresses. These e-tailers also use social media to obtain 
information on the fraudsters and their activities.  
The data reveal these external sources of information help to identify the fraudster and 
gather evidence. Although, the e-tailers are using these sources, the validity is 
questionable as the fraudsters may not give their actual details in social media accounts, 
whilst external databases may not be updated frequently enough. Therefore, these e-
tailers are advised to use external sources very carefully and try to get evidence from 
robust databases for more authenticate information. The use of both the internal and 
external sources for evidence collection is similarly advised by Cross and Blackshaw 
(2014) and Wilhelm (2004) in collection of evidence and verification of personal 
information. 
The results demonstrate that C1 and C3 get victim statements to prove the occurrence of 
an IDF. For prosecution, it is necessary to establish that a fraud has taken place. Therefore, 
both organisations have the practice of getting an evidential statement from the victim 
and preparing the case. However, C2 does not take such statements, leaving it to the 
police.  
As already mentioned in the literate, the police force has less focus on small frauds so 
leaving some jobs on the police may cause lack of coordination, which will negatively 
affect the firms standing against these frauds. It is therefore, suggested to the e-tailers to 
take the initiative, collect evidential statements and complete investigations to minimise 
police involvement. These practices are also forwarded by Amori (2008), Cross and 
Blackshaw (2014) and Lewis et al. (2014) for enhanced role of private firms and better 
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coordination among the business firms and law enforcing agencies. It may also enhance 
the firms’ capabilities in fraud investigations and quick processing of fraud cases. 
The findings reveal that after collecting some evidence, the fraud cases are reported to 
the police for further processing. It was also confirmed that it was the discretion of senior 
staff members to take fraud case to the police. These decisions are mostly based on the 
amount of frauds and collected evidence. It was also reported that sometimes these case 
are not advanced by the police especially when the goods are not delivered, or a small 
amount is involved. In this regards, the extant literature (see Table 2.10) recommends 
firms to organise effective investigations at the business end and develop coordination 
with the police force. Therefore, e-tailers need to be more involved in private 
investigations, and supporting and minimising the role of the police, to process fraud 
cases for prosecution. The detailed suggestion for improving the investigation stage are 
presented in Table 5.14. 
Table 5. 14 Suggestions for improvements of IDF investigations 






Use only internal 
systems for collecting 
evidence. 
 
C3 The firm should also use external 
sources (such as electoral roll, 
people and property finder 192, IP 
address locator and other) for 
evidence collection. 
Should also use social media for 
getting more evidence. 
C3 
Does not get statements 
from the victims of IDF. 
C2 Get victim’s statement, confirming 
the IDF as required by the law. 
C2 
Do not do controlled 
deliveries to catch the 
fraudsters. 
C3 Adopt a controlled delivery process 
to catch the fraudsters. 
C3 
Sometimes police are not 




Improve the system to minimise 




Sometimes these case 




Improve investigation process to 
enhance the police cooperation. 
C1, C2 
and C3 
Decisions on reporting 
the fraud case are mostly 
based on the number of 




Improve the investigations process 
and prepare the fraud cases more 
effectively to enhance their 
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This table presents the limitations in the existing practices on investigation. These firms 
are given some suggestions to improve their practices at IDF investigations, which are 
mainly related to conduct the investigations at the firm end and reduce the dependency 
on the police, which may improve their position for better IDFM.   
It was also revealed that after the collection of sufficient evidence, and identification of 
fraudsters, these companies supply these to the local police and try to get them arrested 
to initiate the prosecution. Therefore, findings confirm that investigations conducted to 
collect evidence are critical for the arrest and prosecution of the fraudsters. Catching and 
prosecuting fraudsters have deterrent impact on IDFs, so e-tailers may be suggested to 
improve the investigation process for sufficient evidence and maximise the chances of 
police involvement and arrest of the fraudsters. 
Additionally, C1 and C2 have the practice of catching the fraudsters through a controlled 
delivery system. After confirming a fraudulent attempt, these firms coordinate with 
police, and once the delivery is accepted, the police catch the fraudsters red-handed. The 
controlled delivery system is an important method of catching fraudsters and providing 
prosecution with sufficient evidence. C3 and other e-tailers may improve their standing 
against the fraudsters by adopting the practice of controlled delivery process.  
However, the results also reveal that in some instances the police force is reluctant to take 
action on the grounds, such as the involvement of smaller amount the loss was small and 
it was possibe to stop the delivery, thus incurring no loss. In this regard, the firms should 
improve its controlled delivery system to minimise the police role and saving the 
resources of the police force, which may enhance their motivation to be involved in such 
process.  
5.3.8 Prosecution of IDFs 
In IDFM prosecution plays an important role. To begin with, it helps with the recovery 
of losses. In addition, a successful prosecution gives a warning to potential fraudsters. 
The results demonstrate that all the case firms are involved in the prosecution of IDFs, 
which confirms that the prosecution stage is also observed as a part of IDFM. Therefore, 
these firms investigate at their end, collect evidence and prepare the case to submit to the 
police for prosecution. The police do not always accept and process fraud cases for 
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prosecution. According to the respondents, this happens when the monetary value 
involved is small or when the police lack technology or resources to investigate.  
The results also reveal that the police forces are more focused on other critical issues, so 
small fraud cases are of less interest to them. To resolve these problems, the e-tailers 
should be more involved in investigations and prepare the cases that need the least efforts 
from the police while developing close coordination with them in dealing with the cases 
of fraud as is also advised by Gogolin and Jones (2010). 
For effective prosecution, it was found that these firms have the practice of following the 
fraud case in the courts of law. These firms send their representatives to the courts to 
pursue the cases and help the courts by responding to the queries and providing additional 
information and evidence if required, which is in line with the recommendations of Lewis 
et al. (2014) and Monaghan (2010).  
Furthermore, these authors also advise private firms to be involved in prosecution process 
and initiate the prosecution privately, which may reduce the dependency on the police. In 
this case e-tailers would be able to prosecute any fraud case irrespective of the amount 
involved or resources required to process it. This practice would enhance the rate of 
prosecutions, which in results would improve the position of e-tailers against IDFs.     
The results reveal that the C1 publicises the arrests and successful prosecutions in the 
media, which may have a deterrent effect on identity fraudsters, but the C2 and C3 do not 
do this. The respondents from C2 and C3 expressed the opinion that publicising such 
information may put a scare off their potential customers.  
This contradicts the view held by authors suchas Dorminey et al. (2012), Ijeoma and 
Aronu (2013) and Sperdea et al. (2011) who recommend to publicise such cases to send 
a clear message to criminals as a deterrent that the firms are determined to have them 
caught and punished. In this regard, the C2 and C3 may be advised to focus on the 
contents of the text and tone of message to make it more favourable showing e-tailers 
strategic standing against fraudsters and a sense of security for their customers. 
Therefore, tactical information on arrests and prosecutions would put a positive impact 
on their customers for being secure while dealing with these firms, and simultaneously a 
threat to the potential fraudsters. Based on the above discussion the conceptual framework 
is presented below. 
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Figure 5. 1 A Conceptual Framework for Management of Identity Fraud. 
The conceptual framework represents the significance of managerial practices and IT 
support for the management of identity fraud in e-tail sector. The framework contains 
eight stages for effective identity fraud management encompassing organisational, social 
and technological aspects. Some of these stages are kept in same box because of the 
similar nature of managerial practices and close inter-connections between them. The 
arrows show the connections and flow of support and communication between the stages 
of framework and support elements.  
Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter presented a cross-case analysis of the results from three e-tailers and 
discussed the effectiveness of existing practices and suggested improvements and some 
additional practices to improve IDFM. At first, the types and methods of prevailing 
identity frauds at e-tail firms were presented, and was confirmed that similar types of 
identity frauds are faced by the large e-tailers based in the UK. 
In the next section, the framework extension is detailed and managerial practices at each 
stage of the framework were compared across the three e-tailers and the extant literature. 
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Starting from the first stage, managerial practices at each stage were discussed in details 
for their effectiveness. The weaknesses of existing managerial practices were discussed, 
and guidelines are recommended to improve these practices. This study also found that 
the e-tailers are not giving appropriate and balanced focus on the stages of fraud 
management, so practices were suggested to enhance e-tailers focus on some stages to 
improve the impact of IDFM. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONTRIBUTION TO PRACTICE AND KNOWLEDGE AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Contribution of this Study 
The literature shows that online frauds have become a significant challenge for e-tailers. 
IDFs make more than 60% of total online frauds (CIFAS, 2018b). The literature reveals 
that e-tailers fall victim of the greatest share of these identity frauds. Although, the extant 
literature has some studies on online frauds, previous studies are mostly focused on 
banking and non-banking financial institutions, and public sector organisations. In the 
absence of any significant research on IDFM in e-tail sector, these business firms are 
facing various financial and reputational challenges. 
At the outset, present study contributes to the literature by investigating the types of IDFs 
faced by large e-tailers. This study confirmed that the types of IDFs faced by e-tailers in 
the UK are similar to those, found in other industries through the literature. Additionally 
a novel type of IDF was found, which was termed as delivery fraud. In this type of fraud 
the delivery driver does not handover the parcel but fraudulently sign as delivered.  
This study is unique in its nature as no previous research has investigated managerial 
practices in IDFM. Hence it’s the novel contribution of this study that it provides new 
insights into IDFM practices. This research also contributes by exploring IDFM practices 
in real world setting at large e-tail firms and offers suggestions for improvements. This 
research tried to understand IDFM, its process and explored practices adopted by large e-
tail firms and identified the limitations and weaknesses based on the reflections from 
literature findings. The suggestions forwarded by this study advance the state of the art 
in managing IDFs a step ahead, which provides foundation for future studies in current 
domain. Synthesising the empirical data, additional managerial practices are also added 
to the body of knowledge.  
The fraud management lifecycle framework (Wilhelm, (2004), has also been extended in 
IDFM in e-tailing. The framework was used as underpinning to base the research and get 
help in data collection. The framework was also helpful in developing the research 
instrument as the questions were based on each stage of the framework. Observing the 
flexibility of the framework, this study forwards that it may also be used and extended in 
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various contexts. Finally, a conceptual framework has been suggested in IDFM domain 
in e-tail industry, such extension is detailed in the next section. 
Furthermore, present research offers suggestions for improvements in IDFM. E-tailers 
are also advised to put IDFs as the top management priority to gain their attention and 
focus in the management of frauds.   Additionally, this study contributed to the real world 
by forwarding e-tail firms guidelines to improve the existing managerial practices. 
Reflecting on the theoretical and empirical data e-tailers are suggested a comprehensive 
set of managerial practices at each stage of fraud management, which are briefed in 
section 6.1.3.  
6.1.1 The Theoretical Contribution - Explanation of Conceptual Framework and 
Design Method  
The major frameworks discussed in the literature have been studied in the context of e-
tailing and reviewed for their suitability as discussed in section 2.7 of this thesis. The 
fraud management lifecycle framework, suggested by Wilhelm (2004) was selected to as 
under-pinning framework to design a conceptual framework for improvements in IDFM 
in the e-tail sector. Originally, the framework was developed for the management of 
various types of frauds in communication, mortgage and credit card industries. The 
framework consists of eight stages: deterrence, prevention, detection, mitigation, 
analysis, policy, investigation and prosecution. These are described in detail in chapter 
two, section 2.7.5.  
This fruad management lifecycle framework (Wilhelm, 2004) has already been adopted 
and extended by various researchers, such as Amasiatu (2016), Jamieson et al. (2007), 
Kumar et al. (2007) and Njenga and Osiemo (2013) in relation to first-party fraud, 
enterprise IDT, organisational collaboration and risk performance respectively. The 
characteristics of the framework and the criteria for their selection have already been 
explained in detail in chapter two. Furthermore, the framework has never been extended 
to an e-tail context, so its extension adds value to the literature and practice. 
This study has suggested a conceptual framework for managing identity frauds in e-tail 
sector. The framework is based on empirical findings of this research. It is given a new 
shape based on its functionality. As per the confirmation of the significance of each stage 
of the framework, no stage has been removed, but some stages are put together based on 
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similar practices and close interactions.  The framework is designed to its functions. It 
suggests managerial practices for each stage, while IT support is set as support for each 
stage. Therefore, stages of fraud management are put in-between two horizons i.e. IT 
support and managerial practices.  
The deterrence stage is put on the top, because it comes before any other IDFM activity. 
At the next down, prevention and detection stages are put together on the bases of similar 
nature of managerial practices at both the stages. At this point, the purpose of managerial 
practices is to stop any fraud attempt prior to occurrence, or to detect any attempted fraud. 
After that, flow down the mitigation and analysis stages. The objectives at this stage are 
to minimise the extent of fraud and know the causes and consequences of such frauds in 
order to prevent these in future. The policy stage comes below them, as the analysis stage 
provides grounds to design effective IDFM policies. The exploration of the limitations of 
the systems, managerial practices and risk analysis gives a sound base for the 
development of effective policies. Finally, investigation and prosecution stages are put 
together confirming their relevance. Both the stages are linked together, as without 
investigations, effective prosecution in not possible and standalone investigations may 
not worth doing. 
The stages of fraud management, IT support and managerial practices are linked together 
with the help of arrows. Such linkages enable the flow of information from one to another 
stage and also facilitates sequential as well as simultaneous functioning of the stages. The 
links among the stages also facilitate the design of IDFM policies; as an outcome of 
analysis process and the flow of policy guidelines is further communicated through IT 
support and managerial practices. The detailed managerial practices at each stage are 
explained in chapter five. These stages are also interconnected for better performance. 
This study also farwarded that each stage at IDFM may be given an appropriate focus in 
all aspects of fraud management. 
This research investigated the applicability of the processes and practices at each stage of 
the framework to e-tailing, relying on the synthesis of the original empirical data and the 
analysis of the extant literature. The conceptual framework creates a foundation for 
recommendation on how to evaluate the success of various aspects of fraud management. 
This will also help to improve managerial practices, so that they meet the emerging 
challenges related to the management of IDFs. The framework also focuses on the human 
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aspects of IDFM not adequately addressed in previous studies. The empirical results point 
at a lack of focus on staff training and awareness, and on customer education among e-
tailers. 
Finally, the framework helped to analyse the managerial practices of e-tailers at each 
stage of IDFM. The collected evidence made it possible to highlight the limitations of 
existing practices and suggest improvements, as well as recommend some additional 
practices in the conceptual framework (see section 5.3). Recommendations regarding 
managerial practices at each stage of IDFM and conceptual framework in e-tail context 
constitute the novelty element of this research, which contributes to the existing body of 
knowledge and opens many avenues for future research. 
6.1.2 Contribution to the Practice of E-tailing 
In addition to the literature, this study also contributes significantly to the real world of 
e-tailing. Three large e-tailers have been investigated for the management of IDFs, which 
have never been done before. These investigations have helped to understand the identity 
fraud issues and analysing managerial practices in detail. The managerial practices and 
organisational actions and strategies were analysed, their limitations were exposed, and 
suggestions were given to improve IDFM. 
To reflect the existing practices, the fraud management framework by Wilhelm (2004) 
has been extended. The modified framework offers detailed procedures and managerial 
practices at each stage of IDFM. Firstly, the extended framework helps e-tailers to 
understand what constitutes IDFM. Secondly, analysis of managerial practices at each 
stage of the framework provides guidance to e-tailers on how to adopt better practices 
and improve the existing ones. E-tailers are also suggested to evaluate the performance 
of each stage. The practice of evaluating the technology, process and performance of 
related staff would help e-tailers to understand the weaknesses in IDFM. Based on these 
evaluations and the recommendations of this study, the businesses may improve their 
response to IDFs. 
The case organisations were given feedback reports based on individual results. In these 
reports, each firm was given a detailed understanding of their existing practices, their 
weaknesses and suggestions and guidelines were forwarded on how to improve their 
management of IDFs. In addition, these firms were also provided with an anonymised 
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cross-case report to help them expand their understandings of IDFM and to adopt better 
managerial practices. Finally, the outcomes of the present research will assist the e-tail 
sector in controlling IDF losses and retaining better customer relationship. Summarised 
recommendations and guidelines for each stage of IDFM are given below. 
6.1.3 Recommendations to E-tailers for Better IDFM 
This study helps e-tailers to confront successfully the challenge of IDF through better 
management of IDF. It was established that these firms are losing significant amount of 
financial resources every year. These losses may be curtailed at each stage of the extended 
framework if e-tailers implement the recommendations that follow. 
For a better deterrence, e-tailers should educate their customers and create fear among 
potential fraudsters. For customer education, active means of communication should be 
adopted. Customer education should focus on creating awareness of IDFs. Customers 
should be educated about possible countermeasures to IDFs. In order to create the fear of 
being caught and punished in fraudsters, e-tailers should make public organisational 
arrangements employed to catch fraudsters.  
Arrests and successful prosecution should be publicised in such a way that such publicity 
should not make any negative impression on potential customers. To achieve this firms 
should check the contents and the tone of the messages they send out. E-tailers should 
also inform the public about their actions and standing against the fraudsters. 
Additionally, e-tailers should assure their customers that their personal information is safe 
with them, to enhance their trust. 
The prevention of information theft is a critical aspect of IDFM. In this regard, most 
organisations employ the services of third party firms. Although, outsourcing may be 
beneficial, e-tailers should ensure the proper application of prevention technologies in the 
IDT prevention domain. The e-tailers should also evaluate the performance of prevention 
systems. Third parties may be hired to do the checking. Information sharing on effective 
measures of IDT prevention will also enhance the effectiveness of the preventive 
measures. Human aspects should be prioritised, as the majority of information breaches 
are the results of human mistake or ignorance.  
Accordingly, e-tailers should have a comprehensive programme to promote IDT 
prevention awareness. The IT professionals should be trained continuously to stay abreast 
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with emerging technologies and to ensure that third party provide up to date services that 
meet the firm’s objectives. For effective authentication of customers’ accounts, firms 
should either adopt the practice of sending login alerts or send a one-time password to the 
customers.  
Identity fraud detection has a significant impact on stopping the frauds and enhancing the 
firm’s resistance against fraudsters. In this regards, e-tailers should implement a fraud 
screening system that is not limited to the reflections on past frauds, but is capable of 
detecting new types of frauds and emerging fraudulent trends. For that, e-tailer should 
actively seek knowledge on new IDF trends through media and from other firms. 
Additionally, the performance of fraud screening should be evaluated regularly in the 
context of the emerging fraud trends. 
Mitigation is a critical stage in the verification of identity information and locating 
identity frauds. It follows from this research that for effective mitigation e-tailers may use 
various sources of identity verification. These businesses may collect any documentary 
proof of identification at the time of account opening that would be helpful in ID 
verification in future transactions. The mitigation staff should be given feedback training 
on their decisions to improve the quality of their decisions. Thus, it would help to increase 
the chances of IDF detection, and releasing the genuine purchase orders. Additionally, 
customers may also be advised to regularly check their credit card and bank transactions 
to detect any IDF at an earlier stage. 
Fraud analysis should not be limited to calculating the financial impact of these frauds. 
Managerial practices at this stage should be aimed at diagnosing the weaknesses of 
technologies, processes and procedures and human aspects of failure. A detailed report 
on each fraud should be circulated among the related staff and arrangements should be 
made to overcome those weaknesses. The analysis process should also evaluate the 
performance of other stages of fraud management and feedback should be given to 
enhancing their effectiveness. 
The anti-fraud policies have a critical impact on the management of IDFs; these may help 
to direct the staff actions toward the ideal manners, so maintaining a detailed set of 
policies for each stage of IDFM may be advised. Detailed policies should also be 
established for the deployment of anti-fraud technologies and especially access 
management policy should be designed to control internal fraud. IDFM policies should 
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be communicated effectively to ensure that each member of staff is familiar with these 
policies and can comply with. A sound compliance procedure should be executed by 
immediate supervisors. Furthermore, IDFM policies should be evaluated regularly and 
frequently in response to emerging challenges so that timely updates take place. 
Investigation and prosecution are essential stages in IDFM. In this regards, e-tailers 
should ensure appropriate investigations at their end, as police force may not necessarily 
show interest in such frauds. To enhance cooperation with the police, e-tailers should 
privately investigate the frauds, collect and preserve evidence and prepare the case for 
prosecution in accordance with the laws of the state. The firms may also be suggested to 
pursue the prosecution process in the courts of law to defend their position and to recover 
the damages and getting the fraudsters punished.   
6.2 Conclusions 
Online frauds have been a big challenge for e-tailers. The dominant share in these scams 
is contributed by manipulations with the identity of customers. These frauds result in 
substantial financial losses and reputational damages to e-tailers thus creating a 
significant obstacle to e-commerce. With advancements in technology, the means and 
methods of online fraud are also evolving. Although, online identity frauds have been 
investigated by scholars, most of the studies are limited in scope. So far no study has 
offered a comprehensive picture of identity fraud management in e-tail context. The 
absence of such studies resulted in continuous growth in the instances of fraud and 
associated losses. This research has set itself the objective of helping e-tailers to improve 
IDFM through empirical investigation. 
This study has provided a comprehemsive understanding of managerial practices in 
IDFM in large e-tail organisations and used analysis to suggest improvements and 
guidelines for better IDFM. The starting point for the investigation was a thorough review 
of the extant literature in order to set the boundaries of this research and explore the depth 
and breadth of the literature addressing the current issue. The review has revealed that 
most of research in identity frauds addresses financial businesses and public sector 
organisations, and mostly focuses on the technological aspects of identity fraud. The 
position of this researcher, however, is that better management of IDFs needs a 
comprehensive approach incorporating the human, organisational and technological 
aspects of IDFM. 
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For a comprehensive study on IDFM the literature was examined to find an appropriate 
framework, comprehensively addressing various aspects of fraud management. A number 
of frameworks were evaluated (see section 2.7), based on the selection criteria established 
in section 2.7.1. The fraud management lifecycle framework proposed by Wilhelm (2004) 
was found to be the most appropriate one to attain the objectives of this study. 
This study used a qualitative method involving a multiple case study. The data was 
collected from three large UK based e-tailers. For data collection, semi-structured 
interview were used. In all, 33 face-to-face interviews were conducted with respondents 
representing various fields and levels of management. The interview recordings were 
transcribed, and Nvivo software was used to organise the data. The results from the cases 
were analysed individually, followed by a cross-case analysis for lateral replication. 
These results were analysed and suggestions were provided in reflections with the extant 
literature. 
The findings revealed that IDFs is one of the biggest challenges for the case e-tailers and 
these firms are losing a significant amount of their revenues due to fraud. Various types 
and methods of IDFs were explored at each retailer and were comparatively analysed. It 
was also known that the e-tailers were less interested in identifying the types and methods 
of frauds, especially IDFs, which may lead to some weaknesses in fraud management.  
All the case firms had the process of managing identity frauds, and all the stages of fraud 
management, suggested by Wilhelm (2004) were prevalent. The results also revealed that 
these firms had nearly similar managerial practices for IDFM. It was also found that 
similar to cases described in the extant literature, these companies prioritised the 
technological aspects of IDFM at the expense of developing the skills and awareness of 
their staff, which may be one of the possible reasons for the existing deficiencies of fraud 
management. In fact, this study has found that the human factor is a critical aspect of 
IDFM. Also it has been established that customer education was not carried out efficiently 
and IDT mostly occurs at the customer side. However, the e-tailers are to deal with 
customers in a highly competitive environment, so there is a trade-off between putting 
extra security layers and the ease of purchasing. Such a trade-off makes the identity fraud 
management more challenging for the e-tailers.  
On this basis, the study recommends the e-tailers to adopt a strategy that focuses on 
human, organisational and technological aspects to faciltate better managerial practices 
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in IDFM. An appropriate emphasis should be given to each stage of the framework and a 
comprehensive set of IDFM policies should be developed, updated regularly and 
compliance should be ensured. Customer education may be improved to build trust 
between clients and e-tailers helping them to cooperate in preventing any IDT. The 
breadth and depth of information sharing, with customers, other business firms, law 
enforcing agencies and related organisations may be increased to include sharing the best 
practices at each stage of IDFM. It would help the whole industry and the customers to 
minimise the risks of online shopping.  
The managerial practices for the evaluation of each stage of IDFM are also suggested in 
this study to diagnose the weaknesses of existing processes and practices and to improve 
the overall IDFM. Finally, this research extended the fraud management framework in 
identity fraud management and managerial practices at each stage were suggested, and 
guidelines were given to make the framework effective for IDFM. Thus, the outlined 
objectives of this study were achieved.     
6.2.1 Research Objective 1. To explore identity fraud types and methods facing the 
e-tail sector. 
To achieve the aim of this study, various types of identity fraud faced by e-tailers were 
described and analysed. It was found that not all types of IDFs mentioned in the literature 
were present in the case firms. The particular types of frauds faced by each company are 
specified in the results section dedicated to each case and are further discussed in section 
5.2. The data reveal that the e-tailers do not pay sufficient attention to the identification 
of the types and methods of IDFs, which may result in the lack of proper countermeasures 
for certain categories of fraud.  
6.2.2 Research Objective 2. To investigate the existing managerial practices of 
IDFM in e-tail sector. 
The managerial practices at each stage of the IDFM were investigated in detail through 
semi-structured interviews conducted at three large UK e-tailers. These practices were 
discussed in sections 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. Furthermore, they have also been cross-compared 
in section 5.3. The data show that the three e-tailers have IDFM comprised of eight stages. 
It was also revealed that the e-tailers do not always treat these stages with necessary 
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attention, which provides for some weaknesses in IDFM. It has been found that all three 
e-tailers do not have in place a set of comprehensive policies for IDFM.  
Furthermore, the data reveal that the human factor is not given due attention which may 
also add to the ineffectiveness of fraud management. Finally, customer education has a 
certain weakness, as only passive channels are used for communication and advice is 
limited to the recommendation of the continual change of the password. However, 
customers are not educated on possible other methods of IDFs and available counter 
measures to minimise the account takeover frauds, the leading form of IDF.     
6.2.3 Research Objective 3. To extend the fraud management lifecycle framework 
(Wilhelm, 2004) for improving managerial practices in IDFM in e-tail sector. 
In this dissertation the fraud management framework, suggested by Wilhelm (2004) was 
adopted to IDFM in the e-tail sector. Various managerial practices have been suggested 
at each stage of the framework as well as guidelines aimed at improving the existing 
practices. The framework is extended on the basis of the results obtained, and some novel 
practices are developed. The conceptual framework is summarised in the next section. 
6.2.4 The Extended Framework  
The conceptual framework comprises the same eight stages, namely deterrence, 
prevention, detection, mitigation, analysis, policy, investigation and prosecution. These 
stages can work both in linear and network forms as already suggested by Wilhelm 
(2004). The framework has been suggested based on the empirical results. It has been 
designed to illustrate its functionality. Stages with similar nature of managerial practices 
and close interactions have been kept together. IT support throughout the stages has also 
been illustrated to signify its importance. The detailed design process has been explained 
in section 6.1.1 and the picture of the framework is given as figure 5.1. A summary of 
managerial practices at each stage of IDFM is given below. 
a) Deterrence 
For effective deterrence, customer education and creating of fear among fraudsters are 
critical. To advance customer education e-tailers should use active channels of 
communication and make them aware of countermeasures to IDT. For creating the fear 
of being caught and punished, e-tailers should use mass media. However, to avoid any 
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negative impact on the public opinioin, especially the potential customers, the tone and 
context of the message should be designed in such a way that it presented the firm’s 
strategy against fraudsters in a positive way and ensured confidence in business dealings. 
b) Prevention 
Prevention is a crucial stage in securing the integrity of critical information related to the 
customers and the firm. It is related more to the technological arrangements, but attention 
should be given to the appropriate deployments of these technologies in reflections of the 
challenges of IDT. The human factor should not be neglected either as the performance 
of any technology depends on the expertise of the people who use it. The authentication 
system should be made more effective by the use of advanced technologies. Information 
security should be enhanced, and data access policy should be implemented and log of 
who accessed what information should be maintained. 
c) Detection  
Earlier detection of IDFs is necessary to limit fraud losses. For IDF detection e-tailers 
should have a fraud screening system based on fraud cues and data mining. Intelligent 
fraud cues should be implemented and information from various sources ought to be 
utilised for designing useful fraud cues. These fraud cues should also reflect the IDF 
methods and types. The extent of the information sharing may be extended to get help 
developing more effective fraud cues. 
d) Mitigation 
Real-time mitigation is necessary for e-tailers as online transactions ought to be processed 
very quickly. At this stage, the identity of suspicious transactions need to be verified 
through various databases. These databases may include the electoral roll, credit history 
and mortality register.  
The social media can be used as well. A telephone conversation is the most useful mode 
of quizing the identity of the customer. The human aspect here is critical as the decisions 
of whether it is a fraud or not lies with staff dealing with them. To increase staff 
competence a comprehensive training program should be designed. Additionally, 
feedback training should be organised to improve the performance of mitigation staff. 
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e) Analysis 
This stage helps to determine fraud types and methods detected after the occurrence. The 
analysis process also helps to identify the weakness of the managerial practices performed 
at the detection and mitigation stages. Such feedback on the shortcomings in managerial 
practices helps to enhance fraud detection and mitigation and suggests improvements in 
managerial practices. At this stage, the financial impact of these frauds is calculated, and 
foundations for further investigations and prosecution are provided. The fraud analysis 
process may also help in designing better IDFM policies. 
f) Policy 
Policies provide guidelines to carry out day to day business operations. For an efficient 
IDFM, e-tailers should have a comprehensive set of policies at each stage of fraud 
management. Effective channels should be used for policy communication, and it should 
be ensured that each staff member reads and understands related policy documents. The 
policies should be reviewed and regularly updated to meet the emerging challenges of 
IDFs. Finally, there should be a compliance mechanism to ensure that each member of 
staff performs her duties in accordance with the policy guidelines. Additionally, internal 
and external audits should be conducted to evaluate the policy compliance. 
g) Investigations 
For effective investigations, e-tailers should have a team of experts to conduct inquiries 
at the business end. Investigators should have sound knowledge of related state laws. The 
law enforcing agencies are focused on critical issues. They show little or no interest in 
IDF investigations. Private investigations reduce the role of the police and also help to 
develop close coordination with them thus, better investigations of IDFs are achieved. 
The e-tailers should collect and preserve all the traditional and digital evidence in 
accordance with the state laws. The investigators should also prepare the fraud cases that 
are complete and ready to be filed for prosecution. 
h) Prosecution 
The prosecution is a critical stage in IDFM. It offers multiple advantages to e-tailers. The 
benefits are not limited to the recovery of losses but can also be used as a deterrent. 
Therefore, e-tailers should try to prosecute every fraudster, for which,enough evidence is 
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collected. E-tailers should also follow-up the prosecution process and investigational staff 
should represent the firm in the courts of law. The successful prosecutions should be 
publicised as deterrence strategy. 
6.2.5 A summary of the Key Findings of this Research 
This research was carried out to understand IDFM and analyse the managerial practices 
in IDFM at large UK e-tail organisations. The study has produced some significant results 
that would help to improve IDFM in e-tailing. At the outset, it was found that the e-tailers 
are less focused on identifying the types and methods of IDFs. In the absence of such 
information, managerial practices in IDFM remain less effective. Therefore, the e-tailers 
should take steps to identify the types and methods of IDFs, which will help them to adopt 
better practices to manage these frauds. 
This research established that the stages of fraud management framework proposed by 
Wilhelm (2004) were prevalent in the e-tail firms but were not linked in a holistic way 
for IDFM. Additionally, it was found that these stages of fraud management are not given 
proper attention, resulting in weaker arrangements at some stages, which may be one of 
the reasons for the weaknesses in IDFM. 
At the deterrence stage, it was found that the e-tailers have the process of customer 
education but is limited, which is not significantly contributing to the effectiveness of 
IDFM. On the issue of creating fear among the potential fraudsters, contrary results were 
found as two firms had that practice of creating fear, while one business was reluctant, 
for the reasons of negative impact of the firm on the society.  
This research also found that e-tailers are more focused on the technological aspects of 
IDFM and less on the organisational and human factors, which may be contributing to 
the persistence of frauds occurrence. The prevention system also has some limitations as 
the authentication process allows the access customer account with stolen information, 
which was a big challenge for these firms. To counter this challenge, better managerial 
practices can be adopted to introduce an additional layer of security. Practices at the fraud 
detection stage are reactionary, which may be improved by considering various sources 
of information on the types and methods of IDFs. 
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Similar to customer education, the e-tailers also have the practice of sharing information 
with other firms. However, such information is limited to data on incurred frauds, which 
limits the benefits of learning from the experiences of others.  
It was also established that none of the three e-tailers has policies on IDFM, which 
weakened fraud management significantly. The few existing policies, which every e-
tailers had, were limited to information security at the prevention stage. The absence of 
policies at other stages may be seen as a major limitation of an effective IDFM. 
Furthermore, weaknesses were also found in policy communication, awareness and the 
compliance methods. 
Finally, some flaws were also found in IDF investigation and prosecution procedures. 
The investigations carried out at the business end had some limitations, which resulted in 
lack of coordination from the police. In such a situation resources spent on analysis and 
investigations were wasted, thus multiplying the fraud losses.  
Last but not least, it was found that all the e-tailers have sound IT security systems and 
have invested generously in the technology. Therefore, no significant data breach or any 
other incident has been reported. However, the organisational and human aspects of 
IDFM require more focus. 
6.2.6 Research Limitations and Suggestions for Future Work 
Like every other research, this study has certain limitations.  
This study is based on only three online retailers and based on replication logic. So these 
results may not be generalizable to the whole e-tail sector. Therefore, research based on 
wider number of e-tailers is required to verify the generalisability of this research. 
A qualitative research approach was adopted, with 33 interviews from three e-tailers. To 
overcome the limitations of this approach, more studies based on quantitative survey 
approach and covering a greater number of respondents is needed. 
This study was based on examples from a developed country; Business norms, 
organisational culture, buying behaviour of customer and economic conditions in 
developing countries may vary. Therefore additional research is suggested to cover 
diverse aspects of emerging economies. Additionally, the data regulations and cyber laws 
Page 237 of 254 
 
may also vary from country to country. It is therefore proposed to conduct more research, 
encompassing the mentioned aspects. 
In this study, the data were collected from large e-tailers, however, there may be some 
variations based on the size of the business. Therefore, more research is needed to include 
medium and small e-tailers, to understand differences related to the firm size in the 
effective management of IDFs. 
All the e-tailers under study are credit lending firms that allow customers open accounts 
and use credit for a specified period. It is possible that non-credit lending e-tailers may 
have a different situation. Therefore, more research is needed to study the impacts of 
advance payment methods on the challenges of IDFM. 
This research was more focused on the managerial aspects; further studies may be 
initiated analysing the technological and human aspects in depth. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. The Research Questionnaire 
Evaluating the managerial practices in identity fraud management in e-tail 
organisations UK 
Case study research questionnaire 
Block 01: Introduction 
Questions Related Questions 
1. What is area of your responsibility? i. Job title         ii. Length of service 
2. What is your role in identity (ID) 
fraud management domain? 
i. Level of management. 
 
Block 02:  Deterrence 
Questions Related Questions 
1. What do you do to deter ID frauds in 
your organisation? 
i. What managerial practices (i.e 
customer education, security 
awareness, threat etc.) are helpful 
to deter ID related frauds? 
2. What other practices you think will 
help in developing effective 
deterrence?   
i.  
 
Block 03: Prevention  
Questions Related Questions 
1. How do you prevent ID frauds? i. How is it effective? 
2. How do you support the IT 
professionals to develop an effective 
ID fraud prevention system? 
ii.  
3. Do you audit to ensure effectiveness 
of control systems for ID fraud 
prevention? 
i. How can ID fraud prevention 
system be improved? 
 
Block 04: Detection 
Questions Related Questions 
1. What system do you have to detect 
the ID frauds? 
i. How effective is the detection 
system? 
ii. How do you measure the 
effectiveness of detection system? 
2. How do you deal with any suspicious 
ID fraud attempt? 
iii. Does everyone know about his/her 
responsibility and reporting line 
regarding ID fraud detection? 
 
Block 05:  Mitigation  
Questions Related Questions 
1. How do you mitigate the fraudulent 
transactions? 
i. How effective is the process? 
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2. Do you think that you are given 
enough authority to deal with 
mitigation matters? 
ii. Do you believe that delegation of 
more powers will be helpful in this 
regard? 




Block 06: Analysis 
Questions Related Questions 
1. How do you analyse the ID related 
frauds? 
 
2. What managerial practices (like, 
hiring of special professionals, 
provision of resources, technological 
tools, etc.) do you use in ID fraud 
analysis? 
i. How are these practices helpful?  
3. How do you use analysts’ 
report/recommendations for effective 
ID fraud management? 
i. How does the management 
support to implement the analysts’ 
suggestions? 
4. How can the analysis process be 
improved? 
i. What the management can do to 
support the analysts? 
 
Block 07: Policy 
Questions Related Questions 
1. Do you have a ID fraud management 
policy? 
i. If yes, how effective is it? 
ii. If no, do you think such a policy 
would be helpful? How? 
2. How do you communicate the policy? i. How do you ensure the policy 
compliance? 
3. What managerial practices (such as 
supervisory support, training, 
awareness, communication etc.) are 
helpful in policy compliance? 
i. How do you promote a policy 
compliance culture in your 
organisation? 
 
4. How do you ensure coordination and 
cooperation among various 
departments for effective policy 
development and compliance? 
i. What other factors you believe 
would be helpful for a successful 
policy?  
 
Block 08: Investigation & Prosecution 
Questions Related Questions 
1. What process you have to investigate 
and prosecute an ID fraud? 
i. How effective is the process to 
recover the losses and deter the ID 
frauds? 
2. How do you work with the law 
enforcing agencies regarding ID fraud 
investigation and prosecution? 
ii. How are these links helpful? 
iii. How can the working relationship 
be improved in ID fraud 
management dimension? 
3. How can investigation system be 
improved? 
i. What do you suggest to improve 
the prosecution system on your 
part?  
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Block 09:  General 
Questions Related Questions 
1. How do you do the online business? i. How is it effective in ID fraud 
management? 
2. Are there trainings for ID fraud 
awareness and policy compliance in 
your organisation? 
i. Do you need more trainings and 
awareness to manage ID frauds? 
3. What special rewards are there for 
effective ID fraud management? 
i. How can the reward system be 
improved? 
4. What channels do you use for 
communication within and outside 
the organisation?  
 
5. Whether centralised or decentralised 
decision system you have in ID fraud 
management? 
i. How is it effective than the other 
one? 
6. What other practices you think will be 
helpful in ID fraud management? 
i. At what level ID fraud issues are 
dealt in your organisation? 
7. Do you share any information about 
ID fraud management with 
colleagues and other teams? 
 
i. How is the information sharing 
helpful in ID fraud management? 
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